

INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ACADEMY
INTERNATIONAL
STUDENT ARTICLES - II



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İSTANBUL
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PRESIDENCY FOR
TURKS ABROAD
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İSTANBUL
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International Student Academy
International Student Articles II

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Presentation (YTB)

Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) offers the world's qualified higher education opportunities for thousands of young people from different countries with the program Turkey Scholarships and also builds bridges of brotherhood with different geography. We're establishing strong ties in line with the vision of the entrepreneur and humanitarian Turkey.

In this respect, our Agency carries out qualified programs outside the university area for the scientific and academic development of international students. One of these programs is the International Student Academy. International Student Academy is a comprehensive set of programs to strengthen the academic, social and cultural equipment of our international students in higher education in our country, to provide new opportunities for interests and fields of study, to develop communication with academics, writers and artists in Turkey and to strengthen the sharing of knowledge, experience and experience among themselves.

In this respect, the International Student Academy consists of seminars, workshops, clubs, excursions and practical works aimed at increasing the academic and professional equipment of the students, developing their skills in producing, realizing and managing projects and taking an active role in the field of civil society.

Of course, the cooperation of non-governmental organizations and trainers contributed greatly to the realization of all these activities. In this sense, a highly qualified program was offered by Istanbul Academy of Sciences (IBA) within the framework of the International Student Academy in 2018 - 2019 period.

The articles written by the students participating in the program related to their fields of expertise were published by İBA at the end of the

program. This book work is a very valuable and meaningful work on behalf of our international students, Istanbul Academy of Sciences and our Presidency.

We congratulate our international students and wish them success. I express my gratitude to the Istanbul Academy of Sciences and to our esteemed professors for their contributions.

Abdullah EREN

President of Abroad Turks and Relative Communities

Presentation (IBA)

Istanbul Academy of Sciences (IBA) continues to provide academic and intellectual services to domestic students and international students from abroad by starting from own history and social accumulation of Turkey, the world of knowledge and thought and universal standards. In this context, IBA continues the International Student Academy project jointly with the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism for international students.

The International Student Academy, which consists of Fall and Spring semesters, hosts many students from tens of countries in a wide geography extending to the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In this period, Istanbul Academy of Sciences offers students a qualified program with a unique content as in the previous periods, within the scope of the International Student Academy.

Within the scope of the program, The Academy provides ground to international students from abroad for the development of knowledge and experience with courses given by experts in the field at the levels of culture, art, science and academy. A qualified environment is creating to strengthen the academic, social and cultural equipment of international students. In addition, a multi-faceted program is implemented to enable students to adapt to the social life of our country and to promote our country, culture, history and world vision in a healthy way.

The International Student Academy covers a wide range of knowledge and ideas from history to literature, from law to cinema, from politics to economy, from art to society. The program provides an intensive, rich and colorful educational environment with seminars, workshops,

reading groups and travel programs for on-site training.

Within the scope of the International Student Academy, students coming from both Turkey and abroad meet each other and have a mutually effective and qualified communication environment. In addition, within the scope of the program, international students have the opportunity to get to know the historical and cultural accumulation of our country, the richness of art and literature, the world of thought and their view of the world.

Students have the opportunity to develop an academic-social network for the future. Within the framework of the program, students increase their academic and professional equipment and undergo an efficient process for the development of civil society awareness and organizational capability, strengthening the perspective of social responsibility and social awareness.

Thus, in this period when the Global World was in need and seeking a pluralistic future in the international community International Student Academy provides students with the possibilities and opportunities offered by the question of Turkey's cultural diplomacy offers an important contribution to intercultural vision-based interaction.

IBA considers it important to improve the academic, cultural and social abilities of international students and gives priority to practices aimed at strengthening students' research and academic writing skills within the framework of the project. This book is a collection of research and academic writing activities of the students within the scope of International Student Academy. The review should be considered as a colorful and qualified composition of students' knowledge and thought universes from many different points of the world and as a modest contribution at the academic level to pluralist global vision of Turkey and to cultural diplomacy perspective.

Prof. Dr. Glfettin ELİK

Istanbul Academy of Sciences Foundation
Chairman of the board

The Political Economics in The Horn Of Africa: Case Study of The Policies Pursued By Turkey in Africa, Ethiopia and Somalia (Perspectives From Political Economics)

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Abstract

There has been revival in economic and diplomatic relationships between Turkey and African countries particularly after 1998. While Turkey's interest in Africa was stagnant at the beginning, especially after 2005, this relationship turned into a more general, active and increased interest in developing ties with the continent (Ozkhan, 2008). The aim of this paper is to evaluate the consequences of Turkish policy in the Horn of Africa. The paper uses political economics perspective to evaluate Turkish relationships with the continent. In the due process of this paper, various policies pursued by other countries such as U.S.A, China are explained and compared with the Turkish foreign policy to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Turkish African policy comparatively.

Furthermore, the Turkish economic and diplomatic policies, which

are implemented to establish ties with Ethiopia and Somalia, are used as a case study to determine the pros and cons of present policy employed in the continent. The concept soft power is explained as is reflected in the Turkish foreign policy, including how it is practically implemented in its engagement with countries in the region. In light of these analysis, the paper ultimately aims to find out the best practiced policies and hence to provide policy recommendations to the Turkish foreign policy makers.

Keywords: Soft power, political economy, Aid, Diplomacy, culture

Introduction

Foreign policy is an important tool in any nation's relationship with the outside world. It is difficult to talk about relations between Turkey and Africa without mentioning foreign policy. Historically, Turkey had established relations going back to centuries long, from Ottoman to 1923 Turkish republic.

Turkey's interest and concentration in most of her relationships with European Union, Caucasians, Balkans, the Middle East, United States, Southern Asia, Far Eastern and pacific countries . My assumption is that time, strategy, economy, military, and strategic importance bring shifts in country's foreign policies. The question this paper asks are: Why does Turkey need relations with Africa this time? What are the consequences of Turkish relations with Africa, especially for the countries in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia and Somalia? What are the pros and cons of Turkey relationship for Ethiopia and Somalia? Finally, what policy shifts are needed in Turkish relationship with countries in Africa?

The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the consequences of Turkey relationship for Africa, from the political economics perspectives of Ethiopian and Somalia case. Based on Turkish foreign policy analysis, the paper argues that despite globalization forces, Turkish foreign policy towards African countries is nationally driven, guided by historical legacies and domestic political factors. That the recent development has since its initiation developed varied adaptive policy responses. Taking the pros and cons of Turkish relationship with African countries, this paper will argue that successive Turkish governments have been facing with great challenges to join the European Union.

To understand Turkey's current policy towards Africa countries, the paper begins with foreign policy analysis. It goes on to analyze the historical background of Turkish and African countries' relations. It does this by

tracing the relations from the Ottoman era to the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government. This is followed by the U.S and Chinese Policies on Africa explained briefly, pros and cons of Turkish relationship with African countries, and policy recommendations at last for Turkish Foreign policy

I. Turkish Foreign Policy Analysis in Africa

Foreign policy analysis is the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system. Diplomacy, intelligence, trade negotiations and cultural exchanges all form part of the substance of Foreign policy analysis. By virtue of this approach, foreign policy analysis is necessarily concerned with the boundaries between the external environment outside of the nation state and the internal or domestic environment,

Foreign policy's starting point is the state and its interactions with other states, be this through direct bilateral relations or through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN).

According to realist paradigm, state is understood to be a unitary actor, one in which it isn't necessary to analyse the role of discrete components of government (Executive, legislative or judiciary). In this context, a key concept in Foreign Policy Analysis is that of the "national interest". What constitutes national interest, and how it is interpreted varies across scholars. For Hans Mongenthau, national interest is synonymous with power and, as such, both the proper object of a state's foreign policy and the best measure of its capacity to achieve its aim. For realists, the character of the international system, i.e its fundamentally anarchic nature, is the most important guide to interpret foreign policy.

Against this, the pursuit of security, and efforts to enhance material wealth places states in competition with other states, limiting scope for cooperation in a series of selective, self-interested strategies. In this setting, the centrality of power, especially as manifested in military power, is seen to be the key determinant of a states' ability to sustain a successful foreign policy, geographic position, material resources, and demography are other important issues in this paper as well.

This paper applies the realist theory's assumptions on foreign policy as policies that conform to basic parameters set by the anarchic international system and that above all, scholars need to investigate the influence

of the structure of the international system and the relative power of states so as to understand the outcomes of foreign policy.

Various theories such as the "Classical Realism Formulation of balance of power" Provides an effective tool for analyzing state action in international affairs. Rational choice theory seeks to introduce a rigorous, methodologically sound approach that could use laws of choice to assess the process and outcome of foreign policy decision making. From this perspective, the maximization of utility by states is the ultimate aim of foreign policy decision makers. By maximization of utility, we mean a state first identifies and priorities foreign policy goals; it then identifies and selects from the means available to it which fulfill its aims with the least cost.

In this regard, the focus of this approach is traditionally on policy outcomes and therefore assumes a relatively undifferentiated decision-making body for foreign policy (a 'unitary actor'), The main argument of this paper is that Turkish foreign policy is as such one determined by a Unitary actor- President Erdogan rather than one composed of different decision makers

The pursuit of security and efforts to enhance material wealth place states in competition with other states, limiting the scope for cooperation to a series of selective, self-interested strategies. In this setting, the centrality of power, especially manifested as military power, is seen to be the key determinant of a state's ability to sustain a successful foreign policy. Geographic position, material resources and demography. Turkey selected Somalia under the shadow of Humanitarianism as exemplified in Turkish foreign policy which in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, means human-centered state tradition compelling it to work with an enterprising spirit in the humanitarian dimension of her foreign policy (MFA, 2016). In line with this human-centered approach, Turkey spent 7.2 billion USD of humanitarian assistance in 2017, standing on the second largest humanitarian donor in the world.

Turkish foreign policy, in the words of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, "reflects the enterprising spirit and humanitarian values of its nation." This is an "Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy.", guided by the enduring objective to achieve "Peace at Home, Peace in the World" as set out by the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, Turkey holds the largest number of refugees in the world, spending over 33 billion USD

to deliver aid and services to Syrians.

Another point of departure Turkey uses to reason out its establishment in foreign countries is the issue of terrorism, as is defined by its foreign policy of fighting terrorism. The world is riddled with various problems including extremism, xenophobia, anti-Islam trends, hatred, and discrimination. This being the case, Turkey sees itself as a country that fits in addressing those challenges by stressing the need for transparency, diversity, dialogue and inclusive policies. Against this background, Turkey's involvement in countries of the Horn, despite its policy claims to fight terrorism, help nations in state building, and security, has been one of a unilateral rather than one coordinated with other partners such as the U.S, European Union, etc.

This is to say, Turkish involvement has rather created regional competition for influence in the Horn of Africa among Gulf States of Qatar, United Arab Emirates, including western powers such as UK, and the U.S. The belief that every nation is fighting Al-shabaab terrorism has filled the minds of many in Somalia who consider those state actors as pursuing their own interests, extracting Somalia's natural resources unknowingly, and making use of Somalia's developmental sectors including but not limited to Mogadishu Port, and Aden Ade International Airport.

While Turkish relationship with Africa is not a new phenomenon, its social, and cultural relations with the continent predate the founding of the Turkish republic in 1923, and can be rooted back to the predecessor, the Ottoman Empire.

As part of its foreign policy, Turkey made extensive efforts to expand itself globally through its total of 242 diplomatic and consular missions, thereby emerging as the fifth largest global diplomatic network. A member of NATO, and G20, and accession candidacy to EU, Turkey tends towards a vast network of cooperation including High level cooperation Councils with 25 countries, trilateral or other multilateral regional formations, as well as 20 Free Trade Agreements, makes Turkey maintain close ties with the countries in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa, Southern Caucasus, South and Central Asia.

The above evidences suggest how important foreign relations and diplomatic missions overseas are important in Turkey's drive to become globally influential not only in the field of humanitarian as Turkish Foreign policy claims, but also in the security and military aspect as is shown

in Turkish Military bases of Somali and Qatar.

II. Turkey Policy in Ethiopia

Turkey has made great progress with the “African Expansion” (Nihat Zeybekci,2016)¹. The expansion was initiated by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2003 and Turkish Airlines is nearly the “National airways” of Africa, he added. Turkey’s minister of Economy, Nihat Zeybekci stated that Turkey has made great progress with the “African Expansion” initiated by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 2003. Turkey-Africa Business and economic forum that took place in Istanbul between the 2-3rd of November was completed successfully, he added.

According to Nihat Zeybekci, export and import with Ethiopia are growing at a stable pace but would like to see a shift in the trade balance in favor of Ethiopia. He drew attention to Ethiopia’s investment climate by expressing it the most appropriate climate in Africa, calling for investment from Turkish investors.

Attending a meeting of the Joint Economic Commission, Zeybekci stated that Ethiopia and Turkey will have agreements over different sectors and that the “Turkey help Center” was established within Minister of Economy of Ethiopia to enable trade growth.

Economically, East Africa, the fastest-growing region in Africa, received \$7.6 billion in FDI in 2017, a 3 percent decline from 2016. Ethiopia absorbed nearly half of this amount, with \$3.6 billion (down 10 percent), and is now the second largest recipient of FDI in Africa after Egypt, despite its smaller economy (the eighth largest in Africa).

Turkish and Chinese firms announced investments in light manufacturing and automotive after Ethiopia lifted the state of emergency in the second half of 2017. United States fashion supplier PVH (Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger); Dubai-based Velocity Apparelz Companies (Levi’s, Zara and Under Armour); and China’s Jiangsu Sunshine Group (Giorgio Armani and Hugo Boss) all set up their factories in Ethiopia in 2017. Several of these firms are located in Ethiopia’s flagship, Chinese-built, Hawassa Industrial Park.

Besides, Turkey’s lack of historical and political baggage in the eastern Africa region has been a net positive. That is, while many studies have cited Turkey’s Ottoman past as a partial impetus for Turkey’s engage-

1 *Turkish Economic Minister attends Ethiopia-Turkey business and investment forum*

ment in Somalia (International Crisis Group, 2012), for example, I argue that this is decidedly not the case. Rather, Turkey's status as an unknown quantity in the region has smoothed its acceptance as an emerging power and viable, alternative partner (Cannon, 2016a, p. 105). To offer further analysis and understanding, I explicate the variables behind Turkey's foray into, and successes in, Ethiopia below. Timing: It is impossible to understand Turkey's successes in Ethiopia if one ignores when Turkey became involved in Ethiopia.

Turkey is also considered by many as an honest broker in the Horn of Africa. Turkey and Turkish businesses are regarded favorably, at least by Ethiopian stakeholders who engineered Turkey's control of the textile sector and train lines. Furthermore, during the meetings of the Joint Economic Commission, Ethiopia and Turkey will have agreements over different sectors and that "Turkey Help Center" was established within Minister of Economy of Ethiopia to enable trade growth of Ethiopia. Indeed, Ethiopia is viewed as a robust African state and one that offers a strategic gateway to East Africa given the importance of its security, roads and rail networks as well as its economic clout.

Second, Ethiopia attracts a variety of economic and political actors and has been firmly in the West's camp since independence.

Third, Ethiopia has reciprocated Turkey's charm offensive on political and economic levels. The contrast with Somalia is true, stark, given its history of instability and inability to broadcast power effectively throughout the entire state. Fourth, though Ethiopia presents unique opportunities and challenges vis-à-vis Turkey, nowhere near the appetite for and space. In this paper, Turkey's foreign policy as a soft power should not be used in line with African states, especially those in the Horn. It should be explained concerning the historical factors that shaped its development and emergence from the time of the Republic to the current Republic led by the Justice and Development Party (AK party).

Turkish foreign policy, the fundamentals of which have been shaped by various factors such as the legacy of the Ottomans, the geographical positioning and the Kemalist Ideology, is argued to have undergone a radical transformation with the end of the Cold war. While it is clear that the present Turkish government has made those transformations, especially after the publications of the fundamental bases of the present Turkish foreign policy by former Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu in his book

titled “Strategic depth and Turkey’s international position” an increment in the number of academic, scholarly articles and journalist writings about Turkey’s soft power has occurred.

Although there are limited studies with a strong theoretical background on the origins of Turkish soft power as part of its foreign policy, along with the scope of this subject matter, which is very broad and beyond the limits of this article, a micro-level analyses of the concept with regards to public, culture, economic and political diplomacy.

Turkey’s Horn of Africa Strategy and that of Africa, in general, gained momentum with the coming to power of AK party after the 2002 elections. Turkey’s policy for enhancing its influence by renovating cultural centers left by Ottomans such as the renovation of Mosques in Mekele of Ethiopia, and history, in particular, the legacy of Ottoman has led to a perception of the threat as Neo-Ottomans, revisionist and hegemonic policy both in the region and in the academic circle.

III. Turkish Policy in Somalia

Turkey’s involvement in Somalia and its success so far is a novelty in Turkish foreign policy (Ozkan, 2012). Turkey’s involvement in Somalia began 19 August 2011 following Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Mogadishu. While this wasn’t the first visit by a Turkish to the African continent, yet many scholars believe this to have a significant contribution to building Turkey’s image in Africa, while at the same time it opened Turkey to Africa and beyond (Ozkan, 2012). Turkey’s efforts in Somalia are important for a variety of reasons. To start with, Turkey played a role in building and bringing back Somalia’s image in the international Community attracting the attention of other nations. Second, Ankara’s policy in Somalia is believed to have had a positive spillover effect back in Turkey by immensely contributing to Turkey’s domestic institutions.

What is so important in terms of the discussions in this article and empirical studies from available literature is that what was seen as purely a humanitarian engagement after Erdogan’s visit to Somalia following the severe Somali drought, is now being seen as the most comprehensive Turkey Somali and Eastern Africa foreign policy.

This issue opens up the importance of humanitarian aid in a nation’s foreign policy and what it can open up nations to achieve.

While humanitarian aid increases human welfare at a global level, it

can also act as one of the greatest ways of spreading influence and diplomatic power. A typical example of nations that use foreign aid as a weapon includes the United States of America as it can decide which countries will receive foreign aid when they will receive it, what it is and how to deliver it.

By 2016, the U.S spent 49 billion on foreign aid- about 1% of its annual spending- which includes support to the UN. This scenario had backlash both from overseas foreign development and assistance groups and Americans as well who feel this to be a waste of resources despite pieces of evidence showing the reverse. In line with this, in a book written in 1962 titled *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, William Henderson states: "Foreign aid as a political instrument of U.S. policy is here to stay because of its usefulness and flexibility."

There are clashing points of view and opinions on the role of Turkey in the Horn of Africa. Turkey has only been involved in Somalia since 2011, yet it can point to a string of successes, physical edifices, and an arguably outsized presence in the country (Harper, 2013). In my analysis of Turkey's efforts in Somalia, I argue that Turkey's timing, capacity for risk, products and expertise on offer, soft power assets and ability to effectively project this power, as well as a coordinated and unilateral approach have paid dividends for Turkey on humanitarian, diplomatic, economic, security and political fronts, leading to its increased status as a rising power (Cannon, 2016a). Besides, Turkey's lack of historical and political baggage in the eastern Africa region has been a net positive. That is, while many studies have cited Turkey's Ottoman past as a partial impetus for Turkey's engagement in Somalia (International Crisis Group, 2012),

IV. The Pros and Cons of Turkish, U.S, and China Policies on Africa

Turkish involvement in the Horn of Africa did not come at a default. Turkey's attempts to establish Military base in the Horn of Africa country, Somalia helped surge rivalries in the region. (Akpınar, 2017). While this military base gets its roots to Turkish foreign policy of peace at global combined with domestic peace, recent attempts by the U.S to cut financial aid to Africa, other nations such as Gulf States, and Western powers like UK are replacing and taking their own stake in Somalia.

While geographically, Somalia is far from Turkey and instability doesn't affect Turkey, Turkey's six years long humanitarian

assistance presence in Somalia gives her enough reason to consider establishing a military base there. In addition to this, Turkey's wider policy of instituting itself militarily in the region from the Arabian Gulf of Aden (Qatar base) to the Horn of Africa (Mogadishu-Indian Ocean), has been influential in bringing regional rivalries.

This being the case, regional power have already lined up in the region to support existing regional states in Somalia, funding Al-shabaab and arming semi-autonomous regions in Puntland, Somaliland, Hirshabele and Jubaland regions, etc. The bulk of this illegal actions were taken by Emirates against Somalia's sovereignty by establishing a military base in Berbera, Somaliland, taking over main ports in Somaliland and punt land illegally, and fueling tensions on maritime conflict between Somalia and Kenya in support of Kenya. All those challenges came to Somalia from the Gulf following Somalia's permission to allow Turkey establish the largest ever overseas military base in the region and Africa, Turkish-Somalia Military base.

My argument is that while Turkish present in Somalia has helped ease the humanitarian challenges, rebuild state institutions, and main developmental infrastructural facilities such as Mogadishu Aden Ade international Airport, modernization of Mogadishu port, and Digfer Hospital, yet the challenges from local and domestic enemies have hampered the current government overcome terrorists and attract regional states that are part of the Somali Federal Republic.

The United States, another global power and owner of the largest ever military bases globally, is strongly present in Somalia. The U.S policy is closely similar to that of Turkey when it comes to strengthening global peace and security, partnerships and cooperation, and foreign aid.. Yet, what makes Turkish foreign policy unique from that of the United States is the procedure and policies it follows with regards to countries in the region.

In a similar vein, following suit with the United States, China has opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in August which, according to Chinese officials, aims to operate solely as a logistics base to support its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in Yemen and Somalia. There are, however, concerns that China may be aspiring for more in the region...

Djibouti is particularly significant due to its proximity to Yemen and

strategic location at the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which is the chokepoint of the Red Sea along the marine route that transfers Gulf oil to Europe. In Africa, the presence of the United States, in the same way like Turkey, is not bound by established positions or traditions, rather by fixed agreements or vested interests. There are several cases where the United States has supported nations in fulfillment of its interests, Ethiopia's invasion of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia by 2006 is a typical example. The U.S. gave Ethiopia 1 million USD in financial aid, an invasion that, apart from failure, claimed the loss of life and material on both sides, ending up in Ethiopia's withdrawal from Somalia. Other interests are clear in the Gulf Arab States, Saudi Arabia, Middle East, etc.

Although the United States is now being pilloried as the leader among the neo-colonialists, seeking to exploit the newly independent peoples, the actual American stake in Africa is relatively slight. In 1960 the whole of the continent, including the U.A.R., took only 4 percent of the exports of the United States and supplied only 3.7 percent of American imports. An impressive list of minerals and other raw materials of which Africa is a major supplier can be drawn up, but one is presumably still justified in maintaining, as did Andrew N. Kamarck of the International Bank in 1958 where he expressed as follows: "We could get along without African commodities and African markets with an imperceptible ripple in our standard of living"

For the last few decades, debates on the rapidly growing presence of China in Africa have compounded among economists and policy analysts. China's interests in Africa are not only economic, diplomatic, but include security, and ideological ones as it seeks to support for the Chinese Communist Party's domestic political legitimacy, and for China's foreign policy agenda internationally, especially in multilateral forum, given the size of the African voting bloc.

China's foreign policy on Africa, unlike U.S. and Turkey, has always focused on its economic interests in Africa, as opposed to being purely diplomatic and security. This is expressed in Chinese Africa Strategy. From this perspective, there is a strong tendency to assert moral judgments in assessing China's activities in Africa, especially in Ethiopia where their presence has done nothing more than environmental damage and extractive resource being stolen unknowingly, and often in secret agreements with various state actors in Ethiopia.

In explaining China's secret economic and business relations with Africa, the U.S secretary of State: Rex Tillerson advised and caution African countries to be prudent in contracts signed with Chinese companies. Contracts are not beneficial for the countries of the continent, according to the head of the American diplomacy.

"Contracts do not create enough jobs, locally, do not train enough people to participate more in the economy of their country in the future. And often the funding model is done in such a way that when the country is in financial difficulty, it loses control of its own infrastructure, its own resources," said Rex Tillerson(2017).

It is in the argument of this paper that developed nations use foreign aid as a means to exploit, and re-colonize Africa. After decades of colonial rule under major Western Powers, the continent was left with a legacy of harsh, imperialist rule that set it back years in modernization.

To this scenario, it has become the focus of enormous flows of developmental assistance from countries hoping to foster social, institutional, and infrastructural change, totaling over 300 billion USD since 1970 alone. This assistance was often conditional, with aid dependent on a country's human rights record. The west, however, has ceased to be a Western aid dependent continent as they fall to Chinese Prey. While China's Africa policies of assistance and economic growth promises are visible, the vestiges of colonialism evident in this relationship raise questions about the true cost of realizing those benefits.

Although China's relationship with Africa provided the continent with significant benefits when it comes to the manufacturing sector, the drawbacks and weaknesses suggested as of yet in the continent are enormous. Dirk illem de Vilde, a Senior Research Fellow and head of International Economic Development at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) told the HPR that:

"On all the infrastructure indicators, African countries are way behind compared to other countries. There is a huge infrastructure gap that is holding back development in many African countries at the moment."

Despite criticisms of colonialism, China has gone so far to deny those colonial critics as its Foreign Minister, Wang Yi insisted in a 2015 tour of Kenya that "[China] absolutely won't take the old path of Western colonists, and absolutely will not sacrifice Africa's ecological environment

and long-term interests.”

While China’s economic issues in Africa are important to its geographic and strategic positioning in the continent, this has not made China well fit into achieving that goal in its foreign policy strategy, which is ill planned, and explored.

Finally, as china becomes a global power hub for African nations, a simplistic understanding or underestimation of Africa as China’s supplier of raw materials inevitably neglects other key aspects of Africa within China’s global strategy. In addition, as China’s goals and policies have become more diversified in the continent, little efforts has been spent on examining China’s internal bureaucratic processes by which political economic, and security decisions are made regarding Africa policy. It is on account of this that this paper evaluates the consequences of Turkish policy in the continent, from a political economic perspective of countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia using China and U.S.A as points of reference since they are a kin to some sort of similarities when it comes to their interests in the region and their global economic, political and diplomatic influences.

Turkey maintains a very strong economic, and diplomatic representation in Africa. For many, this has gained momentum in the period after 2005. Unlike U.S, and Chinese engagements in the continent, the Turkish one is being seen as unilateral, narrow economic pursuits, and lacking a sustainable strategy, lacks homogeneity across nations and countries, proliferation of business actors, and government deficiencies in managing economic ties.

For Ethiopia, unlike Somalia where state institutions are almost missing due to the protracted long term civil war, Turkish relationships can’t serve as a substitute for Chinese counter parts though the later’s economic influence in the country is losing to that of Turkey, yet, Chinese long term investment potentials in the country are beyond doubt amazing and rapidly growing. So, for Ethiopia, Turkish companies and businesses pouring billions in USD annually to the local economy, too serves a lot in creating domestic employment, and income generation for a lot of people in the country. Somalia’s case being more humanitarian, and developmental to a little extent, I believe both nations can have their own stake in their Turkish relationship including pros and cons, with Ethiopia being indifferent to both as compared to Somalia given the relative peace, security and institutional capacity it has under its own statehoodness. Somalia needs a

long way to feel relatively independent from domestic source of finance, including from Turkey once a strong, and functional state institutions are set in place.

Conclusions

Turkey's involvement in Africa is not a recent phenomenon. It is a relationship that has existed for centuries from the Ottoman period to recent times. Turkish presence in the Horn of Africa gained momentum in the period after 2005 when the current Turkish President H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the then prime minister, visited Addis Ababa, a scenario that paved the way for the later visit and involvement in Somalia following the 2011 severe drought that strongly hit Somalia, a country isolated by the international community for decades, where statelessness and civil war ruined almost all forms of statehood and social services went missing.

It is important to note that much of the literature on Turkey's role in Somalia argued that Turkey found virgin territory in Somalia; i.e. a lack of interested actors (Heaton, 2012; Sezgin, & Dijkzeul, 2015; Linehan, 2013). In reality, nothing could be further from the truth.

Indeed, I argue that the presence of too many interested actors with competing aims has contributed to the protracted crisis in Somalia (Cannon, 2016a, p. 114-115). Yet, herein lies the positive nature of Turkey's role in Somalia. That is, to involve itself in Somalia, Turkish political and business leaders needed a large appetite for risk, unlike other actors who engaged in Somalia from neighboring countries such as Kenya, and Ethiopia.

This study defines soft power in the context of Turkish foreign policy, especially concerning its intervention in Africa, among others Ethiopia and Somalia. In this context, the study depended on the definitions of the concept of soft power as given by Prof, Nye:

"The definition of soft power is based on a culture such as political, foreign policy and political values seen to be attractive to other societies". In line with this, the logic he used was a kind of soft power based on attraction, mainly one that depends on cultural diplomacy. In other words, soft power is implemented through public diplomacy activities including culture, values, and foreign policy.

It is in line with these definitions that this paper analyzed the political economy in the Horn of Africa, Turkey as the main player in individual

case studies of two countries in the Horn: Somalia and Ethiopia, While Turkey's foreign policy on Africa is clear, its intervention in both countries and attractions, and influences in both is akin to some sort of similarity, especially in the areas of cultural attractions, restorations of historical Ottoman symbols, including political, economic and military representations, exchanges in terms of trade, tourism, businesses and foreign direct investment. Despite these, Somalia's case diverges from that of Ethiopia in the investment, and state building area. While Turkey's engagements in Somalia are more humanitarian, the same engagement in Ethiopia is more of developmental and foreign direct investment, this does not mean that the Turkish role in Somalia lacks the developmental aspect. However, the extent and level of security and existence of strong state institutions made Ethiopia benefit more from Turkish involvement and the attractions of businesses and private sector from outside.

To sum up, this study examined Turkey's role in the Horn of Africa with particular focus on Ethiopia and Somaliawithin the framework of the consequences of this relationship from the political economic and diplomatic perspectives. Accordingly, it is argued that Turkey's Horn of Africa Policy from 2005, and after AK Party's coming to power by 2002 got formulated in an economic and diplomatically based aspects with the establishments of Institutions like TİKA, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities work as the instruments generating the soft power of Turkey in Somalia, while TİKA, DAMLA, etc are active in Ethiopia, This paper is final, and is subject to changes in the existing context, geography and demographics in the region and world in general, but it helps give a bird's eye view on the concept of soft power as defined by culture, diplomacy, and economy,

Policy Recommendation

It should be mentioned that Turkey has not colonial goals in Africa, but does have cultural, economic, diplomatic, political and religious ties dating back to the Ottoman Empire. This is an advantage for Turkey and Africa. However, a coherent and serious Turkish policy towards Africa is needed, one that considers the following points:

- Turkey should have different ways of considering and dealing with Africa and African issues. Africa is not one or united. It should develop an inclusive and all-encompassing approach towards Africa.
- The geographic and nature of colonial holding of countries in Africa should be taken into account since those colonials and their roots affect the mindset, thinking and their approach to various issues. This fact should be taken seriously while developing relations with each country.
- There exist two types of leadership in Africa. Democratic such as the case of Somalia, and dictatorial ones like Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda. Intensifying relations with the former group of countries is of paramount importance since this would make Turkey's relations with Africa more meaningful and long-lasting.
- Turkey has recently developed its relations with Africa at the institutional level, involving itself in such bodies as the African Union and Africa Development Bank, it should make a trickle down to local decision making levels at regional level.
- Turkey's Africa policy should not be a unilateral one, it should take into account the existing global dynamics. inter-continental groupings as Dialogue Forums is the best way to link relations with Africa and the world.

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The Roles of Non-Governmental Organizations in Combating Poverty and Inequality

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Abstract

Over the years, people have been living in poverty and resources have been distributed unevenly which placed in vulnerable positions. In most cases, this situation is attributed to the failure of states to exercise their duties which is why some regions in the world have been hit by poverty and inequality more than others. To solve these problems, NGOs came up with different strategies such as providing aid to the poor, establishment of microfinance entities, national development in the areas of democracy and good governance, and bridging the gap of poverty and inequality is promoting girls education as evidenced by the findings of this article on the roles played by NGOs in different fields and different regions.

Keywords: Poverty, Inequality, NGOs.

Introduction

Poverty is seen as one of the most social and economic problems that are bedeviling the world today. Poverty can be referred to as deprivation that a person encounters to satisfy his basic needs or to acquire assets, income, skills, technology or knowledge. Poverty is the denial of choices and opportunities most basic to human development—to lead along, healthy, creative life and enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, self-esteem, and the respect of others (Human Development Index, 2017)¹. According to the World Bank, a person is considered to be poor when he/she earns less than \$1 or \$2 a day as a proportion of the total population.

For decades, the notion of empowering the poor worldwide has been a complex phenomenon giving the fact that it is a move has been taking place without much end results especially in the developing countries. The concept of poverty as a global problem pushed for the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals with a target of halving the global poverty rate. In 2015, in another move to reduce the number of extreme poverty, the United Nations adopted the anti-poverty mission in the name of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Addo, 2010)².

Chambers, et. al. (2011) states poverty can be interpreted from an individualistic point of view. To individual poverty can be defined as the income level of the people in a state. However, with regards to parameters of measuring people, there are various definitions and these definitions depend on geographical locations. As Olsen (2010) opines, in Africa for example, poverty is usually interpreted as drought and famine whereas in Asia corrupted government is the leading factor of poverty and in other geographic location like the United States or Europe, in general, is as a result of economic crisis or an increase in the unemployment rate.

1 Human Development Index <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> (Accessed May 20, 2019)

2 Addo Nana Akufo Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to Ghana (Human Rights Council, 2018).

Inequality is the measurement of how a country's resources are shared across the country or a geographical boundary. Poverty and inequality are interrelated. In some cases, inequality is referred to as poverty. An unequal society is a society with a huge gap between the poor and rich, fewer resources and power. Inequalities are 'fundamentally about relational disparities, denial of fair and equivalent enjoyment of rights, and the persistence of arbitrary discrepancies in the worth, status, dignity and freedoms of different people' (UNICEF & UN Women, 2013)³. As a result of inequality in the distribution of resources, some people are better off while some are worse off. Poverty and inequality undermine solidarity and social stability. It also leads to a reduction in social welfare and causes depression (Olayinka, 2010). Approximately 702 million suffer from poverty (UNDP, 2017). To find a solution to this, UNDP rolled out the Sustainable Development Goals to address social, environmental, economic, health and other factors that lead to poverty and inequality.

To address the issue of poverty and inequality NGOs emerged. As part of their development effort they commit themselves to promote the interest of the poor by building schools, improving the health care, empowering women and mobilize resources to the needy (Willets, 2002; Lewis & Kanji, 2009; Banks, et al., 2015).

I. Literature Review

I. 1. The Concept of Poverty


Ferguson (2011) defined poverty as *"Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon. It is the deprivation of one's ability to live as a free and dignified human being with the full potential to achieve one's desired goals in life. It also includes the concept of vulnerability, which is the likelihood that people will fall into poverty owing to shocks to the economic system or personal mishaps, and the concept of social exclusion, which focuses on the lack of participation of individuals or groups in society..."* In the definition given by World Bank and cited by Adjei (2012), poverty is the deprivation of a person's well-being from different perspectives which include but not limited to income, quality education, good health, nutrition, housing and having the right to own assets. According to the definition given

3 Natalie Risse 'UNICEF, UN Women Release Final Report on Inequalities Consultation' <http://sdg.iisd.org/news/unicef-un-women-release-final-report-on-inequalities-consultation/> Accessed May 17, 2013

by United Nations which included the work of Nobel-prize winning economist Amartya Sen poverty is defined as *'a human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security, and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.'* (Sen, 1991; UN, 2001).


Global poverty rate, 1990-2015

Share of people who live below \$1.90 a day (%), 2011 PPP



Source: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/12/21/year-in-review-2018-in-14-charts>


In 1990, the majority of people were living in extreme poverty and living on less than \$2 a day. In 1990 35.9 percent of people were living in abject poverty. This figure fell to 28.6 in 1999, 20.11 in 2008 and 10 in 2015. It can be seen that over the last decades the world poverty has reduced tremendously. Despite this fall, more than 736 million people are still living in poverty which shows a small pace in poverty reduction (World Bank, 2015).



Source: World Bank 2019

In 2015, out of the estimated 736 million people that live in extreme poverty, 368 million which is half of the total lived in 5 countries which are Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, and Nigeria. According to regions, most regions with extreme poverty happen to be countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa with their citizens living on less than \$1.90 a day.

Projections to 2030 For The Five Countries With The Most Extreme Poor In 2015



The chart above is a projection of 5 countries with extreme poverty from 2012 to 2030. In 2030, the poverty rate in Bangladesh will approach zero. The saddest thing is that the poverty rate in sub-Saharan African countries like Ethiopia, DRC, and Nigeria remains elevated. The Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report 2018 states that looking at these trends is better to ensure that citizens of these countries enjoy the benefits of economic development rather than focus on reducing the poverty rate by 3 percent.

I. 2. Types of Poverty

Jensen (2009) classified the types of poverty into 6:

1. Situational Poverty: Otherwise known as temporary poverty. It is a type of poverty that happens for a short period of time as a result of a suddenness crisis or loss.

2. Generational Poverty: Is a type of poverty that is chronic in nature

and it is transferred from one generation to another.

3. Absolute Poverty: This type of poverty is characterized by deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education, and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to social services (United Nations, 1995).

4. Relative Poverty: A type of poverty that is directly connected to the economic position of a person or family.

5. Urban Poverty: Inherent to areas with over 50, 000 inhabitants. Things like overcrowding, violence, noise, and poor community help programs aggravate the inhabitants' conditions.

6. Rural Poverty: Like Urban poverty, this type of poverty also occurs in some specific areas known as nonmetropolitan areas with less than 50, 000 inhabitants.

I. 3. Measures of Poverty

The World Bank Handbook on Poverty and Inequality (Haughton & Khandker, 2009, p. 1) suggests it is important to measure poverty in order to:

- ❖ Keep poor people on the agenda: Ravallion (1998) argues that, "A credible measure of poverty can be a powerful instrument for focusing the attention of policymakers on the living conditions of the poor." If poverty is not measured there is a high possibility that it will not appear on the economic and political agenda of the government.

- ❖ Identify poor people and thus be able to target appropriate interventions: To be able to help the poor there is a need to know who they are. Therefore; giving a true figure of the number of poor people sets out the poverty profile as and inequality in a country.

- ❖ Monitor and evaluate projects and policy interventions geared to poor people: Measuring poverty monitors and evaluates how effective a project would be to help the poor. For example, collecting data from on households and their economic condition helps the government to understand what policies should be implemented on a particular sector of the economy and where the subsidy is needed.

- ❖ Evaluate the effectiveness of institutions whose goal is to help poor people: Evaluating the effectiveness of institutions and give an insight into how good or bad government policies are to the poor.

I. 4. Poverty Lines

A poverty line is a line that specifies the income and level of spending

of a person in the purchase of essential items needed for survival such as food, clothing, housing, schooling, water, and good healthcare. In a general context, a poverty line gives experts an insight on how to count the poor and to see the progress made in reducing the number of poor people.

1.5. Indicators of Poverty

The indicators of measuring poverty in a country are usually the economic performance of the country and the standard of living.

One of the indicators of measuring poverty is the Poverty Gap Index or the Income Gap Index. This index measures the fall of the income of the poor below the poverty line. The indicator measures people from 18-65 and over 65 (OECD, 2019).

1.5.1. Human Development Index (HDI)

Another indicator is the Human Development Indicator (HDI). HDI was developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the goal is to have a good measure of both the social and the economic indicators of human development (UNDP, 2019).




Source: UNDP, 2019

The graph represents the levels of economic and social development of countries. It is composed of life expectancy at birth, expected years of schooling and gross national income per capita of a country.




The above HDI index shows the key dimensions of human development in different countries of the world. The HDI index is shown in a ge-

ometric mean which is between 0-1. From the index, two countries which are Niger and the Central Republic have an index of 0.3 to 0.4, countries like Mali, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Yemen, and other African countries have 0.4 to 0.5, 0.7 to 0.8 few African countries like Algeria, Libya and Botswana and together with Asian and Latin American countries like China, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, etc. The other countries that have 0.8 to 0.9 are Russia, Saudi Arabia, Hungary, Argentina, Spain, Australia, Canada, the United States, and other European countries. The indices mean that countries that fall between 0 to 0.5 are either a low or middle country in terms of human development while others that are between 0.5 to 1 are high or very high countries in human development.



With referral to a long and healthy life of the HDI, over the years there has been a drastic increase in life expectancy globally as shown below



Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/life-expectancy>

From 1770 to 2015 life expectancy has increased in different regions in the world. Oceania started experiencing an increase in life expectancy

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from 1870, while Africa started experiencing its own around 1920. Increase in life expectancy took a great height in different regions in the world. From 1990 to 2015 most regions life expectancy was between the ranges of 65 to 75 with the exception of Africa which has never exceeded 58.


Another key dimension of HDI is being knowledgeable. From the historical perspective, in the last couple of centuries, there has been a tremendous increase in the literacy levels for the world population. In 1960 the global literacy rate was 42% and in 2015 it rose to 86% (OECD, 2016). Despite this development, inequalities still exist and some countries are lagging behind in education. This is shown below



Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/literacy>

Despite the increase in the global literacy rate, some countries still have a low level of literacy of less than 30%. For example, Niger and Afghanistan are countries whose population especially youth of between 15-24 years are illiterate, while countries like South Africa, Brazil, and Russia have a literacy rate of more than 90%.

For a decent standard of living, productivity matters. As argued by Malthus technology is the key to increased productivity and prosperity. On the other hand, no matter how productive they are if the population is huge there is a high tendency of disparity. This is shown below



Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth>

On the left of the chart, countries whose agriculture is at a low level had very low population density, while countries with the highest population density have very productive land.

On the same left side of the chart, it can be seen that countries like Morocco and India have a productivity of land than Norway and Egypt but this does not favor them.



Source: <https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth>

The chart represents per capita adjusted for price changes over time (inflation) and price differences between countries – it is measured in international-\$ in 2011 prices. The income level differs from regions to regions. Most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia have an income level of 0 to \$20,000 while other regions such as Canada, Europe, and the United States have above \$20,000.


Now, the Human Development Index Contains the Human Poverty Index and the Multidimensional Poverty Index.

I. 5. 2. The Human Poverty Index

The Human Poverty Index of HPI is part of HDI. HDI is divided into two: The Human Poverty Index frequently is divided into two measures. HPI-1 is used to measure absolute poverty in less developed countries HPI-2 is used to measure relative poverty in industrialized (more developed) countries.

I. 5. 3. The Multidimensional Poverty Index

The Multidimensional Poverty Index measures acute global poverty starting from the household. It is composed of ten indicators in three dimensions - health, education and living standards (Alkire et al., 2013).



Source: ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/

The graph shows three dimensions of poverty with ten indicators. According to UNDP (2018) in the health sector, a person is considered deprived if a child or a person under 70 is undernourished and if a child in the family died within 5 year period preceding the survey. A person in a family is considered deprived if in a family no one over the age of 10 has finished six years of schooling and if a child is not going to school at the age he/she should go and complete class 8. Standard of living is also part of the three dimensions of the multidimensional poverty index. A family is regarded as deprived if do not have safe drinking water or if they have to walk for 30 minutes to fetch water. Also, they are deprived if no electricity, housing materials or inadequate floor and have no assets, computer or a car.

II. Inequality


Inequalities are 'fundamentally about relational disparities, denial of fair and equivalent enjoyment of rights, and the persistence of arbitrary discrepancies in the worth, status, dignity and freedoms of different people' (UNICEF & UN Women, 2013). Inequality exists in several ways such as income, education, wealth, health and nutrition. Inequality varies from one region to another and it happens within and between countries and by either taking into account population weighting or not (Milanovic, 2012).

Inequality is divided into two prominent perspective inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunities (de Barros et al., 2009; UNDP, 2013; UNICEF & UN Women, 2013; World Bank, 2006). Inequality of out-

comes is usually attributed to the income of individual and educational attainment while inequality of opportunities occurs as a result of differences background, unequal access to employment or education, background, and social treatment and conditions.

II. 1. Measuring Inequality

One of the measurements of inequality is The Gini Index. The Gini index is derived from the Lorenz curve and is used to measure the level of inequality in a country or rather how wealth is distributed in a population. Basically, the Gini index varies from 0 (everyone has income) to 1 (a single individual with all the income). However, in most cases, the Gini index is within the range of 0.3 and 0.5 for per capita expenditures (Haughton & Khandker, 2009).



Source: World Bank (2019)

The atlas shows the world by income and regions in 2017. It shows that most countries in Africa with the exception of Algeria, Libya, Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa have an income of less than \$1,005 and within the range of \$1,006 and \$3,955. In Europe, North America, Russian Federation, and Australia most of the countries fall under the category of upper middle income and high income which is more than \$3,955 with the exception of Ukraine and Moldova. In Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean almost all the countries are low middle-income countries with the exception of China, Kazakhstan, and the likes. In brief, inequality is rampant in the African continent.

III. The Roles of NGO

NGOs come in different aspects and they all have their goals and objectives. In most cases, NGOs are either referred to as non-profit organizations or civil societies with each of them carrying out their activities at local, national or international levels. Most NGOs are concerned with poverty alleviation or rendering support to those that are affected by natural disasters. Moreover, the growth of NGOs over the decades shows that one of the organizations that are highly recognized in human development. NGOs are regarded as the third sector of the economy balancing between political and market forces. Some NGOs are primarily concerned with the alleviation of poverty, while others focus on filling the gaps left by the government (Klugman, 1997). Cernea (1988:8) opined that NGOs serve a gateway for development through local implementation of developmental policies at the local level. Furthermore, their sets of goals are seen as a catalyst of change which helps in the betterment of the lives of marginalized people and empowerment of women. The failure of markets has made NGOs intervene. Berger and Neuhaus (1977) believe that the intervention of NGOs in the market has created values for social ends and governance globally. In an attempt to promote social gains, promote a code of conducts, and mitigating spillover effects, NGOs serve as advisory to the people and conduct research (Wapner, 1996). To empower youth, reduce poverty and inequality, NGOs act as capacity builders. They carry out this activity through education support program, increasing the number of girls enrolled in a school, organizational support, and skill training (Itumo, 2015). NGOs also act as peace builders. In Africa for example, NGOs have played a vital role in restoring peace and reducing the sufferings from war trauma (Karina Silver, 2000). In service delivery, NGOs are known to be involved in providing services (such as clothing, food, etc.) to the poor. They have the ability to fill in the gaps in society through the mobilization of resource to provide services for those who need them (Willets, 2002; Lewis & Kanji, 2009; Banks, et al., 2015).

IV. The Role of NGOs in Combating Poverty and Inequality

Non-governmental organizations (NGO) are generally seen as important organizations that reach the masses with respect to the failure of government or nations to support or provide aid to their citizens. In other words, NGOs are established for the sole purpose of fighting for the

interest of the public. The roles played by NGO are usually seen as roles that cannot be played government in some sectors. Because of this is often referred to as the third sectors that help in resolving problems like combating poverty and inequality (Abu Hussin et. al. p. 6, 2018). NGOs also play vital roles in combating poverty, inequality, giving financial support to small businesses as well as humanitarian support. An example of this type of NGO is an international NGO in the name of Islamic Relief which has played a vital role in combating poverty and inequality in the Muslim countries by providing aid and support to some Muslim countries such as Iraq, Sudan, and Egypt (Abu Hussin et. al. p. 9, 2018).

In Africa for example, over the past decades, NGOs have to play a major role in fighting poverty and inequality through different channels. As cited by Adjei (p. 7, 2012) in the work of Wamani (2007), NGOs like World Vision and Plan International, Safe Water Network (SWN) and Water Health International (WHI), have been working extremely hard in supporting the marginalized people in rural areas in Ghana through the supply of water to reduce water poverty, providing education, enhancing agriculture, and women empowerment. With regards to inequality NGOs also remain the most crucial organization that tries to bridge the gap that exists especially in a rural area. An example of this is the Courage Education Foundation (CEF) in Nigeria. This NGO gives scholarships to the ones whose parents cannot afford to send them to school or those who cannot fully support their children with learning materials (Kamanu, 2004). Also, in another move to support promote equality between boys and girls, NGOs like Girls Power Initiative (GPI) play the most vital role by establishing libraries for girls in the Southern part of Nigeria (Ikpi, et. al, 1991). In Uganda, NGOs engage farmers through associations such as Farmer Group Association. The main goal of this association is to empower farmers regardless of their gender or age. Through this empowerment, farmers have been able to become closer to each other in order to be more equalized and produce goods in commercial quantities (Namara, p. 125, 2009).

In Asia, several NGOs have been contributing tremendously towards the reduction of poverty and inequality. OXFAM, ActionAid, Save the Children Fund are some of the notable NGOs in Bangladesh that has been working on reducing the level of poverty and inequality. For example, to limit the level of inequality in the health sector, education and creating

awareness on gender issues, the above-mentioned organization opened rehabilitation centers even went to the extent of paying teachers (White p. 33-34, 1991).

In Europe, NGOs work hard to combat poverty and inequality. An example of this is RENASIS in Romania, an NGO that belongs to the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN), an NGO that is against poverty and inequality. To reduce poverty and inequality in Romania, EAPN promotes the involvement of other NGOs in the country and strengthen their capacity which is in line with the EU policy and from this has been a decline in the poverty and inequality rate in Romania (Poverty Watch Romania, 2017).

From North Africa/ Middle East the NGOs in the countries have been utilizing the limited resources they have to reduce the poverty rate and inequality. For example, in Morocco, the National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD) successfully led to the extension of credit given to poor households and small scale industries. Through this project, people were both, directly and indirectly, lifted out of poverty (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

Conclusion

In conclusion, poverty and inequality are intertwined. Over the cause of time, poverty and inequality have been hindering the growth and development of nations especially the ones in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and this can be attributed to the failure of states to address these issues critically which made NGOs come into play and address these critical problems. The poverty and inequality reduction strategy used by NGOs such as providing services for poor and low income, girls empowerment, establishment of microfinance entities, acting as a voice for the poor, and mobilization of resource to provide services for those who need them have helped in bringing the number of people living in poverty and inequality in different regions around the globe.

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Public Tafsir Gatherings in Northern Nigeria: A Study on Oral Tafsir Tradition.¹

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Abstract

The exegesis traditions that are performed verbally, which we termed as an “oral tafsir tradition”, are believed by tafsir experts to have started from the very early stage of *Qur’ānic* revelation. These exegesis activities are reported to be performed by oral method throughout the revelation period and in both Companions and Successors’ era (*Ṣaḥābah* and *Tābi’un*). This traditional oral method of tafsir sustained until the “compilation period” when the written *tafsīr* works started to emerge. Here, in the Northern Nigerian society, which comprises the former Kānim-Borno and the Sokoto Caliphate and which consists of today’s Nigerian nineteen states, this similar development is believed to have begun in the 11th-century

¹ This article is a translation of my work in the Turkish language entitled: “Sözlü Tefsir Geleneği Bağlamında Nijerya’nın Kuzey Toplumlarında Tefsir Meclisleri”

a.d (5tha.h). In the 11th-century, with the acceptance of Islam religion by some kings of the Kingdom of Kānim-Borno, the Qur'ānic studies and its commentary in local languages witnessed a huge growth. The same development is accepted to have happened in the Hausa land during the 15th-century. This oral tafsir tradition has continued uninterruptedly for many years in Northern Nigeria. Thus, in the Sokoto Caliphate, not only in the pre-colonial (1832-1903) but also in both the age of imperialism (1903-1960) and the post-colonial period, the oral tafsir works have seen a renewed progress.

This paper will evaluate, in terms of oral tafsir, the public tafsīr sessions that are performed verbally, especially during the month of Ramadan, in Northern Nigeria. The emergence, development and place of the tafsir sessions in the said society, as well as its cultural, intellectual and religious roles, will also be discussed.

Keywords; Oral tafsir, Northern Nigeria, public tafsir gathering, Kānim-Borno, Sokoto caliphate.

Introduction

As was mentioned earlier, the oral *tafsir* tradition begins from the time of the Prophet and perdures to the modern period. It is well known that Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was not only reciting the verses that were revealed to him to his companions but he also, by using different approaches, interpreted some of the verses. Also, the companions used to ask the Prophet (PBUH) some of the verses that were not clear to them and of course they get the oral explanations from the Prophet (PBUH).²

During the companions' era, a lot of the *ṣaḥābah* such as Abdullah b. Mas'ud (d. 32/ 652-53), Ubay b. Ka'b (d. 33/654) Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī (d. 42 / 662-63) and Abdullah b. al-Abbās (d. 68 / 687-88), with the Islamic conquest, emigrated to different countries³ to convey the teaching of Islām; Consequently, they organized sessions on Islamic studies such as Qur'ān and tafsir. Interestingly, these sessions have played a major role in the development of oral tafsir. Because from them famous exegetes like Saīd b. Jubāir (d. 94/713), Mujaḥid b. Jabr (d. 103/721), al-Ḥasan b. Yasār al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728), Qatādah b. Diāmāh (d. 117/735) and Zayd b. Aslam (d. 136/754) were graduated.⁴ In terms of oral interpretations, three important schools of tafsir were established in Mecca, Madīnah and Iraq by

2 For instance, regarding the Qur'an 6\82 (Surah Al-An'am verse 82), the companions asked the Prophet (PBUH) more explanation on word meaning of 'Al-dhulm' and he explained to with what was stated in Qur'an 31\13 (Surah Lokmān verse 13) 'Inna al-shirkah laḍulmun-Adīm'. For more detail on the interpretations of the Prophet (PBUH), see, Al-Dhaḥabī, Muḥammad Hussain, *at-Tafsīr ve'l-mufasssīrūn*, Cairo, Dāru'l-Ḥadis, 2012, VI p.43-44.

3 Abdullah b. Mas'ud emigrated to Iraq and established Iraq school of tafsir, Abū Mūsā al-Ashari to Syria, Ubay b. Ka'b to Madinah and Abdullah b. Abbās to Mecca. See, Al-Dhaḥabī, *ibid.*, VI, p.92-115.

4 Ibn Abbās' public tafsir sessions that were conducted in Kaaba can be considered as an example of the public tafsir sessions in the Companions' time. For more detail on that, see As-Suyūṭī, Jalāluddīn Abdurrahman b. Abu Bakr, *al-Itqān*, Egypt, al-Hay'ahal-Misriyah al-ammah li'l-kutub, VII, p.68-105, 1974.

the students who were trained and graduated from the mentioned exegetical sessions. Most of the traditional tafsir narrations that found today in classical tafsir literature were mostly reported from the students of these schools.⁵

The recorded written *tafsir* works started to emerge with the beginning of the compilation era immediately after Successors' (*Tābiūn*) period. Thus, the *tafsir* work of Abu'l-Ḥasan Mukātil b. Sulaimān (d. 150/767) was accepted to be the first written commentary among the available tafsir literature today.⁶ Although the development of *tafsir* tradition was transformed through the emergence of written *tafsir* works, nonetheless, by examining some historical sources, the oral *tafsir* tradition appears to be sustained to the modern period.⁷

1. Oral *Tafsir* Tradition in Kānim-Borno and Hausa Land.

Even though there is no comprehensive data in the *Qur'ānic* studies sources about the oral *tafsir* tradition in Kānim-Borno and Hausa lands, however, according to some available works, Islam arrived in Kānim-Borno region⁸ at the end of the Islamic 1st-century via trade and commercial activities. In the 12th-century a.d, during the reign of Hummi Jilmi b. Selemma, Islam was declared to be the official religion of that Kingdom. Since then, Islam becomes a heritage of the kingdom and religious studies witnessed enormous growth; Subsequently, the region contributed immensely to the developments of Islamic studies. In the *Qur'ānic* studies discipline a lot *Hāfiz* (memorizers of the Qur'an) were trained and tafsir

5 For a detail review on these schools, see, Al-Dhahabi, *ibid*, VI, p.92-115.

6 More details on the commentary activities in the compilation time can be found in, Demirci, Muhsin, *Tafsirtarihi*, Istanbul, Faculty of Theology Foundation Publications (IFAV), p. 100-110, 2014.

7 For instance, Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqiyyuddin Ahmad b. Abdulhalim (d. 728 / 1328) held public tafsir lectures at Umayyad Mosque during the Mamluk period. Also, in the Ottoman empire the exegesis gatherings known as (*Huzur dersleri*) were said to have held in the presence of the sultans during the months of Ramadan, and in 20th century Muhammad Metwali al-Sha'rāwī (d. 1998) gave a series of public tafsir sessions in Egypt. For Ibn Taymiyyah, see, Abū al-Faḍl Ismā'īl b. Umar Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-nihāyah*, Dāru'l-Fikr, 1986, V.XIII, p.303; for 'Huzur dersleri' see, Kara, Ömer, *Osmanlıdahuzurderslerigelenegiveleritürü*, Türkiye Araştırma lar literatür dergisi, 9/18, p.519-539, 2001.

8 Kānim-Borno region consists of part of today's Borno State, Northern Nigeria and some part of today's Chad. Arab, Kanuri, Fulani and Hausa people are a major indigene of that region.

activities, precisely, during the 17th-century has seen a considerable rise and undeniably, oral tafsir tradition played a significant role in the development of these exegetical activities.⁹

Interestingly, in some part of ancient Hausa land such as Kano, Daura, Katsina, Gobir, Zaria and Rano, during the reign of Ali Yaji b. Samiya, the first Muslim king in Kano, (750-787 / 1349-1385), with the contribution of the king himself, the Islamic religion spread widely.¹⁰ However, regarding Islamic studies, it is the visit of Muhammad b. Abdulkarīm al-Magīlī al-Tilimsānī (d. 909/1503) to Kano, during Muhammad Rumfa's time (867-904 / 1463-1499) that give rise to the studies of religion not only in Kano but also in other neighbouring Hausa States.¹¹ Moreover, the emigration, resetting and arrival of some of the Islamic scholars to Kano during this period, especially during pilgrimage journey, played a vital role in the development of Islamic studies in Hausa land. Thus, these scholars have brought books related to Islamic sciences and organized intellectual gatherings in the form of open education to discuss these books. These intellectual gatherings, indeed, have played a major role in teaching Islam in the region.¹² By considering the tafsir books that were brought during that period like that of al-Samarkandī and by looking at the commentators that were found at that region such as Hāshim al-Zamfarī and by examining the oral tafsir sessions that were conducted and the tafsir books that were written in the Sokoto Caliphate, it can be said that, oral exegetical sessions have given significant attention in the Hausa land during this period. And as a result of that, great exegetes like Sheikh Uthmān b. Fodio (d. 1232/1817) were educated in these sessions.¹³

9 For detail review on oral commentary activities in Kānim-Borno, see, Dahiru Umar, *Qur'ānic Studies in Borno: Developments in the Nineteenth and the Twentieth Centuries*, Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Department of Shariah and Islamic Studies, Bayero University, 1995; Galadanci, Shaihu Ahmad Said, *Harakatu'l-lugah al-Arabiyyafi Nigeria min sanah 1804 ilasanah 1966*, Kano, Sharikah-Dāru al-Ummah, p. 32-36.. 32-36, 2016.

10 Galadanci, *ibid*, p.39-42; H.R. Palmer, *The Kano Chronicle*, the Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain & Ireland, v. XXXVIII, p. 70-71, 1908.

11 See, H.R. Palmer, *ibid*. 77

12 For example, during the reign of Muhammad Kosoki son of Abdullah (914-972 / 1509-1565), Sheikh Tunisi and Sheikh Abdussalām visited Kano and brought, al-Ashifa of the Qadīlya (d.554/1149), and al-Jāmi' al-Sagīr of (al-Suyuti) and al-Samarkandī (probably the tafsir work of Abū'l-Leys al-Samarkandī). See, H.R. Palmer, *Ibid.*, p.79; Galadanci, *ibid*, p.64.

13 Uthmān b. Fodio before the establishment of Sokoto caliphate was said to have participated in the tafsir session of some scholars in Hausa lands such as Hāshim Al-Zamfarī, Hajj Muhammad

During this period, according to some sources, the classical education system, known as, 'talqīn system' was used in the public sessions. In this system, the students gathered in the *soro / zaure* (vestibule of the private residence) or a mosque, and the scholar would read an Arabic Islamic sciences book and made translation and explanations with the local languages. It is not different in the tafsir sessions, the scholars give the translation of the recited verse in the native languages. However, after the student reached a certain level of tafsir knowledge, specific *tafsīr* book such as *al-tafsīr al-Jalālain*¹⁴ would be taught.

Although some scholars were experts in more than one branch of Islamic sciences; in most of these sessions, in only one Islamic field lessons were given.¹⁵ And the source of tafsir lessons, according to Galadanci, was *al-tafsīr al-Jalālain*.¹⁶ However, it is possible to say that the books of *tafsīr* that were brought to Hausa land such as *al-Samarkandī* were also taught in tafsir sessions.

II. Oral Tafsir Tradition in Sokoto Caliphate (1804-1903).

In terms of the development of Islamic sciences in general, oral and written tafsīr in particular, the Sokoto Caliphate, which was established at the beginning of the 19th century, is considered to be an important period in the history of Northern Nigeria because of the remarkable contributions of the founding fathers of the said caliphate such as Uthmān b. Fodio (d. 1232/1817), Muhammad Bello (d. 1253/1837) and Abdullah b. Fodio (d. 1245/1829) to the field of Islamic studies.

Initially, according to Abdullah Hakim, Sheikh Uthmān b. Fodio started to give public classes in Islamic sciences such as tafsir, hadith and fiqh during the week in 1188/1774. At the same time, he also delivered

Raji and Ahmad b. Muhammad. See Bugaje, Usman Muhammad, *The Contents, Methods & Impact of Shehu Usman Dan Fodio's Teachings* Unpublished Master's thesis, Institute of African & Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1979, p. 16; Adam, Abba Idris, *Re-inventing Islamic Civilization in the Sudanic Belt, the Role of Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio*, Journal of Modern Education, 4, No.6, p.458, 2014.

14 Tafsir work of two authors one of whom is Abū Abdillāh Jalāluddīn Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Mahallī (d. 864/1459) and the other is Abū'l-Faḍl Jalāluddīn Abdu-rrahmān b. Abī Bakr b. Muhammad as-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505)

15 Galadanci, *ibid*, p.67; Andrea Brigaglia, *Leaning Gnosis & Exegesis: Public Tafsir & Sufi Revival in the City of Kano (Northern Nigeria) 1950-1970*, Die welt des Islam 49, p.346-347, 2009.

16 Galadanci, *ibid*, p.65

sermons on weekends and he used Qur'anic verses as reference.¹⁷ Because of the fact that Sheikh Uthmān has used to explain the verses he quoted, this sermon has been considered too as a helping hand to the development of oral *tafsīr*. Abdullah a brother to Uthmān b. Fodio is among the students that attended Sheikh Uthmān's classes. Apart from tawhīd, fiqh and hadith, Abdullah has also taken tafsir of the whole Qur'an from his brother several times.¹⁸ Throughout his life Sheikh Uthmān b. Fodio has contributed to the tafsir and Islamic studies in general.

After the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, Abdullah b. Fodio, a student of Uthmān b. Fodio created his school of *tafsīr* in Gwandu, an emirate in today's Kebbi State. This school of *tafsīr* also contributed immensely not only to the oral tafsir tradition but also to the written works. Beside the tafsir sessions, Abdullah wrote two books one of which is *Ziyā'u al-ta'wīl fī mānī al-tanzīl* and the other is *Kifāyatuda'fāu al-sūdūn*. Furthermore, he has two works on Qur'anic sciences, *Miftāhu al-tafsīr* and *al-Fawāidu'l-Jalīlah*.¹⁹ Other significant contributions to the development of tafsir during this period are the public sessions by Muhammad Bello son of Uthmān b. Fodio and his *Gāyatu al-sūlfitafsīri al-rasūl*, a wonderful traditional tafsir work.²⁰

In the Sokoto Caliphate, as it was in Kānim-Borno and Hausa land, the classical method of education is continued to be used. However, oral tafsīr tradition has played an outstanding part in the development of commentary works. Because written tafsir works have witnessed a considerable increase through this period and by examining these works, it will be seen that, *Majāzu'l-Qur'ān* of Abū Ubayd Ma'mar b. al-Muthanna (d. 19/824), *Anwār al-tanzīl wa Asrāru't-ta'wīl* of Nāsiruddīn Abdullah b. Umar al-Baydāwī (d. 685/1286), *Lubāb at-ta'wīl fī mānī al-tanzīl* by Abu-Hasan Ali

17 Quick, Abdullah Hākīm, *Aspects of Islamic Social Intellectual History in Hausaland-UthmanībnFūdī* (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Department of History, University of Toronto, p. 84.

18 Galadanci, *ibid*, p. 72; Quick, *ibid*, 84, 1995.

19 Abdullah b. Fodio's *Ziyāu al-ta'wīl fī mānī al-tanzīl* tafsir work was published by Ahmad Ahmad Abū Su'ūd and Uthmān Tayyib and his work *Kifāyatuda'fāu al-sūdūn* was examined by Sani Musa Ayagi and Hāmid Ibrahim Hāmid in their Master thesis and later published by Dārū al-Ummah, Kano and his works related to the studies of Qur'an (*Miftāhu at-tafsīr* and *al-fawā'id al-jalīlah*) were also published Dārū al-Ummah.

20 *Gāyatu al-sūlfitafsīri al-rasūl* was critically edited by Ahmed Murtaḍa and published by Dārū al-Ummah.

b. Muhammad al-Khāzin (d. 714/1341) *al-Jawāhir al-hisān fī tafsīr'l Qur'ān* of AbūZaid Abdurrahman b. Muhammad al-Sa'ālībī (ö.875 /1471) have used as a source of tafsir works; Therefore, it can be claimed that some of these works were used as a source of oral tafsir tradition.

III. Systematization of Oral Tafsir Tradition in Northern Nigeria.

At the beginning of the 20th-century, the Qur'ānic schools are very common in Borno region, Arabic language and literature sessions in Zaz-zau region²¹, while classical schools of *Malikīfiqh* are popular in Kano.²² When it comes to oral public *tafsīr* sessions, they were conducted in most of the Northern Nigerian societies, especially during the holy month of Ramadan. These sessions used to take place generally either at the mosque of the palace or at the home of a rich person or at the abode of some great scholars (*Malam*s).²³

In the early circle of tafsir from the late 1930s to the beginning of 1940s, *Malam* Muhammad Shamsuddin (d. 1947) the grandson of *Malam* Ali Abdullah²⁴ initiated a school of *tafsīr* in the Jar Kasaneighbourhood. Despite to the fact that *Malam* Muhammad Shamsuddin directly translated the works of Jalalayn (Suyuti and Mahallī) in his classes,²⁵ this school of *tafsīr* had an enormous impact on the development of oral tafsir in Northern Nigeria. Because between 1930 and 1940s some leading scholars of the Qādiriyah sect, like *Malam* Yusuf Makwarari, and some of the great scholars of the Tijāniyah order such as *Malam* Uthmān Shehū Mai Hūla (d. 1988), attended tafsir classes of *Jar Kas* which are conducted in the early morning hours, starting immediately after the morning prayer and continuing to around 10 am.²⁶

Between the 1950s and 1970s, as a result of the emergence of religious reform movements, the oral tafsir tradition began to spread increasingly

21 The ancient city of Zaria, today's capital city of Kaduna State

22 Andrea Brigaglia, *ibid*, p. 349.

23 Mukhtar Adam, interview, (9, July 2019). He gives tafsir lessons during Ramadan in Jos, Plateau State since 1970.

24 *Malam* Ali Abdullah was said to be among the scholars that emigrated from Mali to Kano land in the early 1930s

25 Andrea Brigaglia, *ibid*, p. 349-351

26 He is one of the first members of the Tijāniyah sect in Kano, he was more popular with his views and lessons in the Mālikīfiqh. See, Andrea Brigaglia, *ibid*, p. 352-353.

in Northern Nigerian societies. Thus, after the death of Malam Muhammad Salga (d. 1938)²⁷, some of his students travelled to Kaolack, Senegal and attended the *tafsir* lessons of Ibrāhīm Niasse (d.1975)²⁸ through 1950. After some time, these students returned to Kano and started their tafsir sessions in the heart of Kano's *birni* (city). The most famous with his commentary sessions among them is Ahmed Tijāni b. Uthmān al-Kanowī (d.1970). Tijāni Uthmān has commenced Ramadan tafsir sessions at a moderate mosque in *Zangon Berebari* neighbourhood at the beginning of the 1950s.²⁹ Through his tafsir sessions, the Salgawa (refers to their master) school of tafsir was introduced.

In a short time, the number of the students that attended Salgawa tafsir sessions increased tremendously, as a result of that, the session was moved to a large area near the central market of the Kano's *birni*. Tijāni Uthmān introduced several innovations in his session. It was said that he is the first, in Northern Nigeria, that use loudspeaker and sit on a chair when given public *tafsir* lessons. Also, it was believed to be the first *maitafsiri* (exegete) that brought *maijanbaki /aya* (those that recite Qur'ānic verses) to his sessions.³⁰

Although Tijāni Uthmān interpreted a *Hizb*³¹ in his interpretation session, he considered being the first scholar to systematize and promote changes in the oral *tafsir* tradition. Thus, Unlike *Jar Kasa* and *Kabara*³² school of tafsir, he used various sources. For, in his tafsir classes, apart from *maijanbaki* four other students from whom one would hold *Hashiyah al-Jamal*, the work of Sulaimān b. Umar b. Mansūr (d. 1204/1789) on the *Tafsir al-Jalalayn*, the other would carry *Hashiya as-Sāwī* the postscript of Ahmad b. Muhammad al-Sāwī (d.1241 / 1825) on the *Jalalayn*, the third Ismāil Hakki al-Bursawī's (d.1137 / 1725) *Rūh al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurān* and the last student with the work of Ali b. Muhammad Al-Khāzin (d.741 / 1341), *Lubāb at-ta'wīl fī ma'ānī at-tanzīl* and whenever Tijāni Uthmān wants to give a reference from the said *tafsir* works he said, for instance, *maisaw-*

27 The Senegalese Tijaniye Sheikh and Sahibul'-Fayda in the Tijaniyah doctrine

28 Andrea Brigaglia, *ibid.*, p. 360

29 Andrea Brigaglia, *ibid.*, p. 361

30 Hizb refers to the one-sixtieth of the Qur'an

31 Detail data on the school of tafsir of Malam Nasir Kabara will be given below

32 Andrea Brigaglia, *ibid.*, s. 361

iwurikaza (the holder of Sawi's work read so-so pages).³³

During the 1953s, in Kano, beside the Salgawa school of tafsir which founded by TijāniUthmān, there was also the *tafsir* session of *Malam Nasiru Kabara* (d.1996). *Malam Nasiru Kabara* was one of the founding fathers of the Qādiriyyah Sufi order in Kano's *birni*. He began his Ramadan *tafsir* sessions at the house of Muhammad Sunusi the first (1954-1963) (a member of Kano royal family), However, after Muhammad Sunusi became the sarki (king) of Kano in 1953, *Malam Nasiru Kabara* replaced *Malam Mustafa* (the former royal *maitafsiri*) and moved his tafsir session to Kano Emir's Palace. This session was continued until 1990 when he left it to his son *Malam Qaribullah*. Without detail discussion on complex doctrinal issues related to fiqh and tawḥid, *Malam Nasiru Kabara* in his Ramadan oral tafsir sessions interpreted the whole of the Qur'an within one month. Nonetheless, besides the oral *tafsir* sessions, he wrote two tafsir books one of which is *Ihsān al-mannān fī ibrāzikhābāyaal-Qur'ān*, an important source of *tafsir* in the Hausa language. This work was published in four volumes by a foundation in Libya. In it, the author relied on *tafsiral-Jalalayn* and its *Hāshiya* of as-Sāwī as his main source. The author's other commentary work is *Tanwīr al-Jannah fī tabwīb ḍiya' at-ta'wīl li ibrāzījawāhiral-Qur'ān*. This work is in Arabic language and it has not been published until the recent time.³⁴

Malam Abubakar Mahmud Gumi (d. 1992) is another significant *maitafsiri* (exegete) in the 1970s. Between 1962-1970s *Malam Gumi* became famous in Northern Nigeria for his oral *tafsir* sessions. Initially, *Malam Gumi* started his *tafsir* in the 1950s while he was still a student at the law school in Kano. In 1962, this *tafsir* session was transferred to the newly opened Sultan Bello Mosque in Kaduna State. Most of the people living in Northern Nigeria during the 1960s affiliated to either Tijāniyyah or Qādiriyyah Sufi order. However, *Malam Gumi* has affiliated to the Salafi ideology and to a certain point, he criticized some practice of Tijāniyyah and Qādiriyyah Sufi orders in his sessions. This tafsir session was said to broadcast on radio Kaduna between 1967-1976.³⁵

33 Roman, Loimeier, *Islamic Reform in Twentieth-Century Africa*, Edinburgh-United Kingdom, 2016, s.164; Andrea Brigaglia, *Two Published Hausa Translation of the Qur'an & their Doctrinal Background*, Journal of Religion in Africa, 35/4, p. 431-433, 2005.

34 Andrea Brigaglia, *The Radio Kaduna Tafsir (1987-1992) and the construction of Public Images of Muslim scholars in the Nigerian Media*, Journal for Islamic Studies, 27, p. 185-187, 2007.

35 Gumi, Abubakar Mahmud. «21-46 verses. » Surah al-Baqarah, tafsir. Kaduna, (tape

Although it is obvious from some available sound recordings³⁶ of *Malam Gumi* in his *tafsir* session interpreted *Jalalayn's* exegetical work, notwithstanding, in some sessions, he comprehensively commented on doctrinal issues related to *fiqh*, *tawhid* (monotheism).³⁷ Also, by studying his Arabic *tafsir* work entitled: “*Raddu al-azhānilāmaānī al-Qur’ān*”³⁸ as well as his Hausa translation of the *Qur’ān*, “*Al-Kurānima Girma da Kuma Tarjaman Ma’anoninsa Zuwa ga Harshen Hausa*”³⁹ it appears that he did not only rely on *tafsir al-Jalalayn* rather he use other classical *tafsir* literature such as Ibn Kathir’s (d. 774/1373) *Tafsir al-Qur’ān al-Azim* as a source. After the death of *Malam Gumi* in 1992, his method and teachings continued to be used in *tafsir* sessions in some of the Northern Nigerian cities like Kaduna, Kano and Jos.

One of the major factors for the emergence of a sectarian trend in public *tafsir* circle in Northern Nigeria is *Malam Gumi's* anti-Sufi and anti-*Yan gargajiya* (Nigerian traditional *ulamā*) project. *Malam Gumi* opposed the doctrinal ideas of the Sufi orders and criticized the teachings of *yangarkajiyaulamā* in his public *tafsir* sessions. Because of that, to promote the teachings of Tijāniyah Sufi order and oppose the thoughts and views of *Malam Gumi*, reaction started to increase from Sufi members. In 1977, *Malam Umar Sanda Idris* (d. 2004), a member of the Tijāniyah, commenced his commentary lessons and broadcast by radio Kaduna. Three years later he was succeeded by *Malam Tāhiru Uthmān Bauchi* (b. 1929), who was born in the Bauchi State of Nigeria. Since 1979, *Malam Tāhiru Uthmān Bauchi* continues to give *tafsir* session during the holy month of Ramadan at *Tudun Wada Mosque*, Kaduna State. Like his predecessor, he introduced anti-Salafi (Yan Izalah) project through this session.⁴⁰

In terms of the sectarian trend in public *tafsir* sessions, another two

recording).

36 For example, in his interpretation of the ayah related to the *ribā* (interest) in the Surah al-Baqarah, he provided an extensive explanation on interest. See, Gumi, Abubakar Mahmud. «275 verses. » Surat al-Baqarah, *Tafsir*. Kaduna, (Video Recording), 27 / March / 1991.

37 This work was published in a volume by Muassasah Gumi in 1897.

38 It was published in a volume by Saudi Arabia.

39 Andrea Brigaglia, *The Radio Kaduna Tafsir*, *ibid*, s. 194 ve 201.

40 More details on the the establishment, programs and activities of the Izalah movement see, Ramzi, Ben Amara, *The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship & Perception of Sharia Re-Implementations*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis), Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (BIGSAS), Bayreuth University, 2011.

school of tafsir with different method and approaches emerged in Jos (Plateau state) during the 1970s. One of these two sessions is that of *Malam* Ismā'īl Idris Zakariya, who, by the approval of *Malam* Abubakar Mahmud Gumi, founded *Jamaah al-izalah al-bidah walkamah as-Sunnah* (JIBWIS) movement in 1978. This movement was established to eradicate the Sufi doctrines and the teachings of *Yan gargajiya* *ulamā*. Among the programs introduced to promote *Izalah* ideology was the teaching programs which include public tafsir sessions. After the death of *Malam* Ismā'īl Idris in 2000, *Malam* Sani Yahya Jingir, a deputy to *Malam* Ismā'īl became the head of the movement and its council of the *ulamā*. Since then, he performed *tafsir* sessions at the *Yan taya* mosque in Jos in the holy month of Ramadan.⁴¹

The second school of *tafsir* that emerged in Jos, where *Izalah* movement was established, is the one that founded by the members of Tijāniyah order. The most popular among this school is the sessions of *Malam* Mukhtar Adam, a prominent Tijāniyah scholar who promoted the doctrine and ideology of Sufi order in Jos city. He is well known for his oral tafsir sessions that began in 1970. After commencing this session with two years *Malam* Mukhtar is said to have travelled to Kano to further his Islamic education. He returned from Kano in 1980 and two years later he continued his oral tafsir sessions at *Layin Zana* (*Zana* neighbourhood) until 1999. This commentary session was later in 2000 transferred to the central mosque of Jos and it continues there to date. *Malam* Mukhtar Adam performs oral tafsir during Ramadan not only in Jos but also in the central mosque of *Bukuru* (Plateau State). He applied traditional tafsir method in his sessions by reading and commenting on some classical tafsir works like *Tafsir al-Qur'an al-'azim* by Ibn Kathir (d. 774/1373) as well as some of the modern *tafsir* books such as *Safwah al-tafasir* of Muhammad al-Sabuni and the *Raddu al-azhān ilā mānī al-Qur'an* the tafsir work of *Malam* Abubakar Mahmud Gumi (d.1992). However, since 2000, he introduced a new commentary approach by using the information he obtained from several tafsir works, especially the tafsir of Sayyid Qutb (d.1966), *Fizilāli al-Qur'an*.⁴²

41 Mukhtar Adam, interview, (9, July 2019), it is important to note here that I have attended this commentary classes for a period of about fifteen years and in many sessions, I participated as the *majnanbaki* (the reciter of the Qur'an verses).

42 This session is taking place every Friday outside the Ramadan period

IV. Oral Tafsir Tradition in the Modern Period

Recent developments in the oral tafsir tradition have led to the emergence of new *masutafsiri* (exegetes) as well as new commentary sessions in Northern Nigeria. Thus, Between the 1990s and 2000s, there has been a rapid rise in performing *tafsir* sessions in the holy month of Ramadan. Some of these sessions have contributed significantly to oral *tafsir* tradition development. However, the most remarkable session among them is that of *MalamJa'far* Mahmud Adam (d. 2007)⁴³. According to the data collected from oral sources, *MalamJa'far* Mahmud was said to have begun his tafsir session since when he was twenty-five years old, while he was a student at the Government Arabic Teacher's Collage (G.A.T.C). Thus, in 1986, he commenced Ramadan *tafsir* sessions in Kano, at the *Triumph* Mosque. Aside this session *MalamJa'afar* on Wednesdays used to give *tafsir* lessons at *al-Haj Lawan Atna* mosque in Beirut street, Kano State. Moreover, he was said to be organizing tafsir classes for his schoolmates at the *Ihyau' as-Sunnah* school, *Ajasa* street, Railway Kano.⁴⁴

After *MalamJa'far* started his first degree at the Islamic University of Madinah in the early 1990s, he performed Ramadan commentary sessions in Maiduguri State when he came to Nigeria for the holidays. This session was continued until his death in 2007. When he graduated from Madinah Islamic University in 1995, he established an Islamic trust known as Uthmān b. Affān, in Gadon Kaya neighbourhood, Kano. Since then, he gave tafsir lessons every Friday (except in Ramadan) at that foundation.⁴⁵

MalamJa'far has become a famous scholar in Northern Nigeria for his commentary activities in Maiduguri State and at Uthmān b. Affān Foundation. In his sessions he gave a comprehensive discussion on subjects like *fiqh*, *nahwu* (Arabic grammar), Qur'ānic sciences and *tawhīd* (monotheism), also political and cultural issues are sometimes addressed.⁴⁶

43 For More details on the biography, life, intellectual and the da'wah activities of *Malam-Jafar* Mahmud Adam, see, Muhammad Sani Umar Musa, Ayyāmi Ma'a Dā'iyyati'l-jilwamufassirat-tanzilash-sheikh Ja'far Mahmud Adam, Kano, Dārual-hikmahli'l-kitabi'l-Islamī, 2011; Andrea Brigaglia, A Contribution to the History of the Wahabi Da'wa in West Africa: The Career & Murder of ShaykhJa'far Mahmoud Adam (Daura, ca, 1961 / 1962- Kano 2007, Islamic Africa, 3/1, 2012, p 1-23.

44 AlhassanBebeji, Muhammad Abu Bakr and *MalamSaifullahi Ibrahim Yusuf Gwale*, interview, (6/8/2019). AlhassanBebeji and Muhammad Abubakar are *MalamJa'far's*da'wah friends while Saifullah Yusuf Gwale attended his sessions for a long period.

45 *MalamAlhassanBebeji* and others,ibid

46 For example, See, Adam, Ja'far Mahmud. «Surat al-Baqarah» tafsir. Maiduguri, 2, Ra-

It should be noted here that oral commentary sessions nowadays in Northern Nigeria are performed for men and women in various mosques and schools, in the morning and afternoon (after Asr prayer and after Isha), especially throughout the holy month of Ramadan. Notwithstanding, to sum up, the contemporary situation of oral commentary tradition, the tafsir sessions can be categorized into three groups:

a) The tafsir sessions that lasted from the 1970s to the date (from systematization period to recent years): for example, the exegesis sessions of *Malamt-Tahiru Uthmān Bauchi* and *Malam Mukhtar Adam*.

b) *Tafsir* sessions that emerged recently and performed by the scholars who are well-grounded in classical Islamic academic discipline: for instance, the *tafsir* sessions of *Malam Muhammad Sani Umar Rijiyar Lemo* who commenced his sessions at Uthmān b. Affān foundation after the death of *Malam Ja'far Mahmud Adam* (d. 2007).⁴⁷

c) *Tafsir* sessions that are carried out by some students who are not experts in the field.

V. The Importance of Oral Tafsir Tradition in Northern Nigeria

The oral tafsir tradition has a great place in Northern Nigerian communities. Thus, within two-century, it has played a significant role in the developments of Qur'ānic studies and tafsir. However, the impact of oral *tafsir* tradition on Northern Nigerian society can be summarized under the following:

a) It played a significant part in the development of *tafsir* and Qur'ānic studies in Northern Nigeria because through it both oral *tafsir* materials and written *tafsir* works were produced.

b) *Tafsir* sessions in Northern Nigeria are considered as a *fatwa* centre. Thus, besides the knowledge that is given on *tafsir*, hadith, fiqh and other Islamic studies subject, the audience uses to ask Islamic verdict about some issues and gets the response of their questions.

c) It has an important role in addressing social and political issues in

madan, 1424/6, November 2003; «Surat al-Ḥujurah» tafsir. Maiduguri, 24, Ramadan, 1421/16, December 2000; «Surah Inshirah» tafsir. Maiduguri, 26, Ramadan, 1422/11, December 2001; «Surah of the al-Mujadalah» tafsir. Maiduguri, 9, Ramadan, 1422/24, November 2001; «Surat an-Nisa'» Tafsir. 14, Ramadan, 1425/10, October 2005 (tape recordings)

⁴⁷ Besides Uthmān b. Affan, He also gives commentary lessons in Gwallaga Mosque (Bauchi) during Ramadan. And he is one of the tens that give scholarly tafsir in Northern Nigeria.

Northern Nigeria.

Conclusion

Although this paper clearly has some limitations, nonetheless, it has highlighted the development of the oral *tafsīr* tradition which has lasted for a long period. As has been seen, oral *tafsīr* tradition emerged since the time of the Prophet (PBUH). Throughout this long period, it has played a key influence on the development of *tafsīr* and *Qur'ānic* studies. In Northern Nigeria, this hereditary tradition has begun in Kānim-Borno kingdom and Sokoto Caliphate. It contributed to the development of religious studies in Northern Nigeria. Thus, through this tradition not only many *mufasssīrūn* (exegetes) are trained but also remarkable and comprehensive *tafsīr* works were written in both Arabic and native languages. Also, it contributed significantly to the formation of cultural and religious identity as well as the political ideology of the Northern Nigerian region.

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Economic Regionalization in Africa: Challenges and Perspectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

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Abstract

The tendency of nations to resort to economic regionalization is a phenomenon which has intensified considerably from the years 1980. According to authors, this regionalization, responds either to a desire of countries to protect themselves against the misdeeds of globalized free trade or it is a new form of globalized free trade because regionalization and globalization are overlapping and entwined processes. The regional trade agreements which materialize this economic regionalization have exploded since that period. The reasons for this explosion is due to the fact that theoretically this regionalization is supposed to allow better integration, and can improve the welfare of households by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers in a region. This phenomenon of regionalization expanding all over around the world (Caricom, CIS, EU, Mercosur, NAFTA, ASEAN, TTIP, TPP ...) is also found in Africa with several regional eco-

conomic groups that often overlap between themselves. Today there are fourteen major Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa that are more or less integrated. Of these groups, eight have been recognized as RECs (UMA, COMESA, CEN-SAD, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC) by the African Union. Despite all these organizations that are supposed to boost intra-African trade, it is clear that it remains one of the lowest in the world. The emergence and integration of the continent have not yet been achieved; Africa remains a marginal player in world trade. In spite of this acknowledgment of failure, countries in Africa continue to believe that there is a saving solution in economic regionalization for their economic integration and emergence. That is why, recently African Union created the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Thus, this paper sets itself the objective of highlighting the challenges that AfCFTA must meet so that it will not fall into the same mistakes as the first African regional organizations, and also highlighting the perspectives offered by this great continental regionalization if it succeeded.

Key words: Economic regionalization, Free Trade Area, African Continental Free Trade Area

Introduction

Economic regionalization is a process by which a region concentrates, intensifies and focuses its economic activities in its regional territorial space. This would imply less globalization of economic activities for the benefit of the region. It would then be necessary to know what is a region? What are its limits and what type of economic activities should be considered as part of economic regionalization? several authors like Andrew Jones, Sallie A. Marston, and others have tried to give theoretical answers to these questions, but in practice it is the political authorities who decide as we saw the case in November 2018 with the agreement of the accession of Morocco which is completely in North Africa in the ECOWAS which is grouped the states of West Africa¹, and also the case of the African Union's refusal to admit Haiti to the organization as a full member in May 2016 is also revealing.

The expansion of economic regionalization in the world is a relatively new phenomenon if we compare it to protectionism or total free trade; it is interesting to see the evolution that led to this new form of economic integration.

I. From Mercantilist Protectionism to Economic Regionalization-

For several decades (from the fifteenth century to the sixteenth century) the powerful countries protected their industries by applying the mercantilist doctrine according to which the limitation of imports makes it possible to obtain commercial surpluses, sources of wealth. However, the gradual abandonment of this concept in favor of free trade led some countries to sign bilateral trade agreements in the second half of the nineteenth century. But the crisis of 1929 has led countries to retreat by erecting new barriers. The disastrous consequences of these measures, which only worsened the crisis, are leading countries to seek solutions in cooperative

¹ Tunisia, which is even more north-east of Africa than Morocco, has also become an observer member of ECOWAS since June 2017

multilateralism. Thus, after the Second World War in 1947, twenty or so countries sign the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Trade), which is based on three principles.

- Reciprocity: countries must grant each other advantages;
- Non-discrimination any advantage granted to a co-contractor must be applied to all others;
- National treatment: goods arriving in the national territory must be treated as locally produced goods.

After several rounds of negotiations, the GATT expanded to several countries and evolved into the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 1995 which now has more than 160 members. The WTO will continue the process of total trade liberalization through multilateral trade rounds.

For the question whether the fact that a country joins the GATT or the WTO increases its trade flows with the outside, Rose (2002)² attempts to respond from a gravity model, applied to the trade of 175 countries over 50 years. The author concludes that GATT or WTO membership has no effect on the volume of bilateral trade which depends on other factors, in particular, the GDP of the two countries, their distance, their geographical conditions, their common history, or the specific trade agreements between them.

Subramanian and Wei (2003)³ have tried to relativize the results of Rose by showing that trade between the industrialized countries that are members of GATT or WTO is at an average level 65% higher than that which would exist in the absence of GATT and WTO.

The trade liberalism promoted by the WTO has had effects on which there is debate among economists. But there is consensus on at least 2 points:

- The gap between the average GDP per capita of the richest countries compared to the poorest country is narrowing. The ratio of the average GDP of the 20 richest countries to the average GDP of the 20 poorest countries fell sharply from 60.4 in 2000 to 54 in 2008.
- the internal income inequality increases in all countries and especially in developing countries newly opened to international trade: between

2 Rose AK, "Do We Really Know That the WTO High Trade?", NBER Working Paper, No. 9273, 2002.

3 Subramanian A. and SJ Wei, "The WTO Promotes Trade Strongly But Unevenly", NBER Working Paper, No. 10024, 2003.

1980-1990 and 2000-2006, the Gini coefficient is multiplied by 2.75 on average in developed countries and by 2.78 on average in emerging countries⁴.

These data on the inequality of incomes have led some authors to establish a causal link between trade liberalization and poverty in developing countries (A. P. Thirlwall 2009).

From the 1980s, an intensification of economic regionalization has been observed around the world. The number of operative regional trade agreements (RTAs) reported to WTO has increased steadily since the 1990s, from 50 in 1991 to 472 in June 2019⁵, and comes in various forms presented as follows from least to the most integrated (Guillochon. B et al 2016):

- Free trade area: barriers to intrazone trade are reduced or abolished, but member countries do not levy common customs duties on imports from third countries; example: NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement);
- Customs union: it goes further than the free trade area since it also provides for a common external tariff (CET);
- Common market: it is a customs union in which factors of production circulate freely between countries;
- Single Market: it is a common market that involves the harmonization of certain internal standards or regulations;
- Economic union: This is a single market in which at least one common monetary policy has been established. The European Union is, in the light of this definition, an economic union.

These RTAs, in fact, contradict the principle of non-discrimination of the WTO since the co-contracting parties give each other mutual benefits, and discriminates all other countries that are not members, and also the negotiations that result in these agreements are always done outside and unbeknownst to the WTO, which is just content to take in consideration the agreement reached. That is why authors wonder whether this economic regionalization movement is an extension of global free trade in another form, or whether it is a tendency to fall back on oneself due to the harmful effects of global free trade promoted by the WTO. If we study the supply processes and value chains of big firms we may understand as economic regionalization and economic globalization respectively are

4 BEN Hammouda H. and M.S. Jallab «The evolution of global inequalities», Cahiers français, La Documentation française, n ° 357, 2010.

5 <http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx> viewed on June 05, 2019.

overlapping and entwined processes (Jones, A. 2017). On the other hand, it is also clear that a number of developing countries have resorted to economic regionalization to better resist against destructive effects of global free trade in which they have not been able to profit.

On a theoretical level, in the specific case of a free trade area, the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers within a region reduces the distortions associated with these measures and increases the volume of trade. It reduces customs revenue and improves the well-being of households within the zone. The establishment of an efficient free trade area also allows the expansion of efficient firms' production through economies of scale arising from competition following market opening.

In determining the impact of a free trade area, static effects and dynamic effects are distinguished. In static terms, it is noted that the removal of tariffs and other barriers within the zone can contribute to increased exchanges between partners. This increase is either a diversion or a trade creation. The effect is positive on household welfare only when trade creation is superior to trade diversion.

Similarly, the dynamic, growth-promoting effects in the partner countries are positive when the implementation of the free trade area is actually accompanied by economies of scale in the different branches of the economy and a more attractive large area to foreign investment.

This phenomenon of economic regionalization expanding around the world (Caricom, CIS, EU, Mercosur, NAFTA, ASEAN, TTIP, TPP ...) is also found in Africa with several subregional economic groups that often overlap between themselves.

II. Economic Regionalization in Africa

Since the independences, Africa has implemented several integration programs. Since the 1960s, many integration groups have emerged before disappearing. The African Common Market (1962) includes Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Morocco; the Equatorial Customs Union (1962) with Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic and Tchad, before becoming the current Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; and the former East African Community (EAC) (1967), which included Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and which, until its dissolution, was the most successful experiment in integration in Africa. New groupings have been created since then, demonstrating that African

countries continue to believe in the virtues and importance of economic cooperation and integration. On the continental level, all African countries were grouped in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Created May 25, 1963, the OAU was a simple tool of cooperation, but not for integration. Driven by a greater desire for integration and economic development, the OAU was dissolved and instead the African Union (AU) was created on 9 July 2002 with the aim of promoting democracy, human rights, and socio-economic development.

According to the calendar established by the Abuja Treaty in 1991 establishing the African Economic Community by AU, 2025 was to be the year of the consolidation and strengthening of the structure of the African Common Market through the free movement of people, goods, capital and services and the effective enforcement of residence and establishment rights. Before this deadline and to fight against the plethora of regional economic communities, the AU has elaborated the Minimum Integration Program (MIP) and decided in 2006 a moratorium for the recognition of new regional institutions.

Today there are fourteen major Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa that are more or less integrated. Of these groups, eight have been recognized as RECs by the AU⁶.

Main RECs recognized by the AU

Regional Economic Community	Effective date	Members	Target
AMU: Arab Maghreb Union	17/02/1989	Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia	Integral economic union

6 <https://au.int/en/organs/recs> viewed on June 05, 2019.

COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Af- rica	08/12/1994	Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauri- tius, Namibia, Uganda, Republic Democratic Re- public of Congo, Rwanda, Sey- chelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Zam- bia, Zimbabwe	common market
CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saha- ran States	04/02/1998	Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Zam- bia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Togo, Tunisia	Free trade area and in- tegration in certain sec- tors
ECCAS: Eco- nomic Com- munity of Central Af- rican States	01/07/2007	Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Con- go, Gabon, Equa- torial Guinea, Central African Republic, Demo- cratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe Chad	Integral eco- nomic union


ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States	24/07/1993	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo	Integral economic union
IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development	25/11/1996	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan	Integral economic union
SADC: Southern African Development Community	01/09/2000	South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Integral economic union
EAC: East African Community	07/07/2000	Burundi, Kenya, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda	Integral economic union

Adapted from UNCTAD, 2009, and ECA, 2010.



Economic Commission for Africa 2016

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars presents all the RECs in Africa with all the overlaps between them as follows.



African Economic Organizations

AMU: Arab Maghreb Union; CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa; CEN-SAD: Community of Sahel-Saharan States; CEPGL: Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries; COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC: East African Community; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States; ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States; IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority for Development; IOC: Indian Ocean Commission; MRU: Mano River Union; SACU: Southern African Customs Union; SADC: Southern African Development Community; WAEMU: West Africa Economic and Monetary Union

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Africa Program
2008

These organizations are often heavy administrative machines made up of a large number of agents. Without denying the effectiveness of some of them, but it is clear that in general, their results have been modest. For proof Africa does not weigh more than 3% in the world trade, the intra-African trade is barely 19%⁷, well below intra-regional trade in Europe, North America and the ASEAN countries with 70%, 50 % and 52% respectively (UNCTAD, 2013).

7 WTO, 2018 World Trade Statistical Review

Share of intra-regional trade in total trade in Africa

COMESA	7%
ECCAS	5%
ECOWAS	11%
SADC	15%

Source: McKinsey, 2011.

Its exports are almost 80% primary, coming from agriculture, forestry, mining, and oil. Manufactured goods account for only 5% of the total, and the share of exports in high-tech products is only around 3%. Africa remains a price taker and not a price maker. Agricultural and other prices are set in large stock exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), and the law of the single price tends to prevail everywhere. Physical infrastructure, including roads, railways and power grids connecting neighboring countries; information and communication technologies; human development, focused on health and education; Agriculture; promotion of diversification of production and exports is sorely lacking. The African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) estimate that it will take between \$ 130 billion and \$ 170 billion every year in financing to address the lack of infrastructure, with a gap of around 68 to 108 billion dollars. The free movement of people, goods, and services is not at all a reality in almost all these organizations, although some are ahead of others. This proves if need be that all these economic organizations did not fully play their role which was to allow the emergence of Africa through integration by the creation of regional markets, by the development of infrastructure projects, and by the adoption and application of common rules.

It is in this context characterized by the modest results of African regional organizations, that in accordance with the calendar established by the Abuja Treaty in 1991, and also in line with the "Agenda 2063" which is a pan-African vision for an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, that the AU has begun negotiations to establish a continental free trade area, the African Continental Free Trade Area(AfCFTA).

III. AfCFTA: An Economic Regionalization on A Continental Scale

Since the Abuja Treaty in 1991, the AU had planned to establish an integrated African Economic Community that would lead to an African

Common Market through the free movement of people, goods, capital, and services, as well as effective implementation residency and establishment rights.

Launched in June 2015 at the AU Summit in Johannesburg, negotiations for the establishment of AfCFTA were carried out not without difficulties by experts from States and regional institutions to arrive at a consensual text. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) provided technical support throughout the entire process. The issues that were difficult were numerous; it's included the dispute settlement mechanism, the rules of origin and the finalization of several annexes to the goods protocol. It was only on March 21, 2018, in Kigali, that forty-four AU Member States signed the agreement establishing the AfCFTA. a number of countries, including Nigeria, the continent's leading economic power, have still not signed the agreement because the country's authorities say they are in talks with the private sector to provide them with the necessary guarantees before hiring the country, but all the other heavyweight of the contains (South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Ghana, etc.) have signed the agreement.

The AfCFTA negotiation process is segmented into two large, but distinct phases. The first phase is about goods and services. For goods, the negotiations on tariff concessions were guided by modalities setting a high level of ambition, of the order of 90% opening over 10 years. On services, negotiators agreed to eliminate restrictions and other discriminatory measures affecting suppliers in signatory African countries, no sector, nor any mode of service delivery would be excluded.

The second phase will focus on investment, competition, intellectual property. These topics are very important for African countries. Their treatment must take into account the discussions taking place at the WTO. Commitments to be made on these topics will be at the heart of the policies of industrialization and structural transformation on the African continent. They will also be closely linked to topics such as trade facilitation, e-commerce, currently also in discussions at the WTO. The launch of AfCFTA will open a market of 1.2 billion consumers for a cumulative GDP of \$ 2.5 trillion. AfCFTA is expected to come into effect once 22 countries have ratified it.

Gambia, by ratifying the agreement on the creation of AfCFTA on

April 2, 2019, has just let crossed the minimum threshold of ratifications required to implement this agreement, so that the African continent will now be one of the largest markets in the world.

Despite its entry into effect this Thursday, May 30, the African Union still has one month to set up the operational phase and in particular the technical instruments to control this area. It should be noted that Nigeria, the largest economy on the continent, has not yet signed it, as the Nigerian authorities are pursuing internal talks with the private sector, But they will probably not be long before signing the agreement. As the Nigerian Minister of Commerce said About the AfCFTA "The train must not leave the station and get away without us taking it". So far, Nigeria refuses to join the AfCFTA, fearing that a large number of foreign products will ruin its nascent industry, as was the case with the liberalization wave of the 1990s. the Nigerian authorities had requested an impact study of the AfCFTA on the Nigerian economy. The study proved optimistic, especially since another study by the Lagos Chamber of Commerce reveals that nearly eight out of ten Nigerian bosses are in favor since they themselves will be able to export more easily to new markets.

The July 7, 2019 AU summit in Niamey, Niger, will be crucial, as African states have another month to establish the tools to ensure that competition will not be unfair within AfCFTA. The rules of origin, in particular, must be specified. The question is what proportion of African inputs is needed in a product to be considered African. Other challenges, dismantling non-tariff barriers, and also setting up the control and arbitration bodies to provide all the guarantees of a framed liberalization.

AfCFTA must therefore, meet clear and specific challenges in terms of creating an integrated African market, developing regional and/or continental infrastructure projects and allowing the adoption and application of common rules to accelerate industrialization and structural transformation of Africa, and not to fall in the gaps of previous organizations, that not all been up to expectations.

IV. Challenges and Perspectives of The AfCFTA

AfCFTA should face the challenge of intra-African trade, which is very often thwarted by abnormal practices which, despite the removal of tariff barriers, hinder intra-African trade by greatly increasing transaction costs. West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) conducted

a study in 2010 that shows the impact of these abnormal practices.

Abnormal practices in the WAEMU space

axes	Dis- tance (Km)	number of road- blocks	Addition- al time (mins)	additional cost in FCFA (\$ 1 = 584FCFA June 2019)
Bamako-Dakar	1476	39	196	55 500
Ouagadougou-Dakar	920	30	109	47 200
Tema- Ouagadougou	1057	25	190	20 000
Lomé- Ouagadougou	1020	19	81	20 400
Abidjan- Ouagadougou	1263	27	216	89 150
Abidjan- Bamako	1174	28	270	71 270

Source: Observatory of abnormal practices (OPA), WAEMU, 2010.

Cross-border trade in Africa is virtually everywhere expensive. The cost of cross-border trade is more than double the cost for OECD and East Asian countries (Jacquemot, Pierre, 2013).

It would also be necessary to face the challenges that geographically very close countries have close economic structures, and also similar activities, like that they will produce goods and services similar and therefore will have few complementary goods to exchange. This was the case of the ECCAS countries: Economic Community of Central African States, each with its own wood industry, cotton-based textile mills, some cotton, peanut or palm oil mills, at least one cane sugar refinery, breweries, a cigarette factory, and shoe factory.

The AU should, within the framework of the AfCFTA, bring the States to respect their commitment to make operational and effective the free circulation of people, goods and services that necessarily passes by rigorous follow-up and possible sanctions for the violators. As the World Bank recommends, it is also necessary to improve cross-border trade, especially for poor small traders, many of whom are women, by simplifying border procedures, by limiting the number of border agencies, and by improving the professionalism of civil servants, supporting traders' associations, improving the flow of information on market opportunities and encouraging the adoption of new technologies, such as cross-border mobile banking services, that improve access to finance. Future industrialization projects will need to be strategically coordinated to promote the complementarity of the products and services traded.

The AfDB's 2018 report on the African Economic Outlook explains that every year there are about 12 million young Africans entering the labor market. To absorb this youth, and to offer it a hope on the continent, it is imperative to move on to an industrialization and a structural transformation of the economies of this continent, if not this youth would be tempted to leave Africa by any means and to contribute to economies of other continents despite the risks of crossing the desert and the Mediterranean Sea. These young people must be trained qualitatively in all the professions of future and innovation, and also guarantee them a suitable environment for entrepreneurship so that they will be able to participate in this structural transformation. In addition, African countries have inestimable stock of agricultural, forestry, mining and oil resources that are highly prized all over the world. The structural transformation of the African economies will consist, in addition to the exploitation of these resources, to transform them into the finished product in Africa. This transformation into finished products will not only produce more added values, but it will also have a significant contribution to absorbing the 12 million new job seekers in the continent. The example of Botswana is illustrative on this issue. In addition to the exploitation of its diamond, the country has opted for the diamond to be processed and marketed domestically; this has helped to create several thousand jobs for Botswana youth.

The challenge of lack of infrastructure will also have to be met by Africa through the mobilization of necessary financial resources such as the tax of 0.2% on imports into Africa proposed by President Paul Kagame, also through the fight against tax evasion, which according to the data announced by Global Financial Integrity it is between 40 and 80 billion dollars which escape each year every year.

The industrialization of Africa cannot be successful without a minimum of intelligent protection in accordance with the theory of protection of the infant industry. Without a minimum of protection, industrialization in Africa is doomed to failure because the technological gap and the lack of financial capital would make any production in Africa uncompetitive. The American, European and Asian continents, which are far ahead of Africa in this field, will be able to produce the same products and with lower production costs. One example that illustrates this is the West African cement plant (CIMAOC) responsible for producing cement for Ghana, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire. The unit closed in 1984 after only a few months of oper-

ation. At the time, the cost of imported cement was half that of the factory. This protectionism will, of course, take into account the fact that some African countries are already bound by multilateral free trade agreements of the WTO, but also by the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Europe and many others. The experience of countries emerging from Asia (China, Korea, Taiwan, etc.) shows us that this type of protectionism if it is done with strategy is very beneficial for infant industries.

There is a significant share of intra-African trades which is done informally, and is therefore not taken into account in the statistics, if the states could take them into account, it would make higher the figures of the intra-African trade. The informal sector itself is very important in almost all African countries. It is necessary for those African countries to find good strategies for this sector to be accompanied to join the formal sector. That will open for it the doors of new markets, which will allow those African countries not only to improve their tax receipts but also to dispose of more realistic statistics.

Integration actions on the African continent have long remained focused on a globalizing and normative approach associated with the idea of uniformity from top to bottom. It is may be time to adopt the opposite and pragmatic approach which is based on the knowledge of the socio-economic realities. It is clear that nowadays, in many African countries, civil society, employers 'and workers' organizations, and even ordinary citizens are becoming more and more interested in economic issues. This new fact, if it is well exploited, will help to make the objectives of AfCFTA better known and to make it a matter of everyone, the only guarantee of success of this a promising project.

If the AU succeeds while implementing the AfCFTA to face these multiple challenges, then the African continent will be in the next years the largest common market in the world with for perspective of allowing an economic emergence and to be able to assert itself on the world plane.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to show how economic regionalization has gradually spread throughout the world, including in Africa with the objective of allowing more integration and therefore more intra-regional trade. Except that in Africa it has not been the case. Despite a large number of regional economic communities, economic integration and intraregion-

al trade in Africa have lagged far behind if we compare with other parts of the world. Nevertheless, the African Union wanted to go further by creating the African Continental Free Trade area (AfCFTA) that encompasses the entire African countries. For this free trade area to be a success unlike the other regional economic communities that preceded it, the article highlighted the main challenges to be met namely, to create a true African integrated market, which goes beyond the simple declaration of intention, to develop the necessary infrastructures, and to realize the industrialization and the structural transformation of the economies to allow and accompany the economic integration, to ensure the qualitative training of human capital that will accompany this transformation.

Although this list is not exhaustive because of the large numbers of the challenges, it is clear that if the African Union through AfCFTA succeeds in those main challenges, it will make Africa the future largest common market in the world given the potential and resources available on this continent.

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Institutional Framework of the Intellectual Property System of the Republic of North Macedonia

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Abstract

Building a modern and effective system of intellectual property that will rely on established international and regional standards is a challenge for the Republic of North Macedonia as a developing country. In its attempt to stimulate innovation, attract foreign investment and to build a competitive atmosphere the Republic of North Macedonia must create a quality system of intellectual property. The intellectual property system undoubtedly relies on quality institutions that have adequate facilities for active protection of intellectual property rights expressed through an operation of the registration procedures and taking appropriate measures when the achievement of these rights is jeopardized. Within this paper, the basic structure of the administrative placement of the bodies in the system of the state administration, the need and the basic characteristics of the system of intellectual property in the Republic of Macedonia will be considered, with particular reference to its institutional framework.

Key words: *Intellectual property system, institutional framework, Republic of North Macedonia.*

Introduction

The significance of intellectual property is understood with consideration that the full protection of the intellectual property rights as a significant part of the commerce and economic growth and development of countries including the Republic of North Macedonia, are directly dependent on management.

Since its independence, the Republic of North Macedonia has been investing in the establishment and implementation of an effective system for protecting intellectual property rights, increasing capacity of institutions, ensuring compliance to intellectual property rights and raising awareness for the benefit of reform.

Rigid protection of intellectual property rights in the Republic of North Macedonia directly affects many sectors such as information technology, creative arts, film production, music production, publishing, pharmaceuticals, food and beverage, consumer goods and advertising. The protection of intellectual property rights is already a significant area of focus for small, medium-sized enterprises that develop unique products, as well as large, established and international brands. This issue is the key to the competitiveness of the country, which is both an exporter and a host for foreign investors. Therefore, all institutions must make more efforts to increase their effectiveness in this field.

The state policy pursued by the Republic of North Macedonia in the field of protection of intellectual property in recent years can be observed in the consistency of the system of measures and actions, as well as in a number of important strategic documents, legal arrangements and initiatives. All such efforts are aimed at increasing the level of protection and the capacities of subsidiaries and employees, creating an objective environment and opportunities for all members of the community (businesses, universities and researchers, consumers) to raise awareness in the field in order to

use appropriate tools for the protection of intellectual property rights.

I. Structure of Public Administration in the Republic of North Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia had been part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until 1991. Macedonia is the only republic that gained independence after the division of Yugoslavia in 1991 without experiencing ethnic or other armed conflicts.

The first multi-party democratic parliament was elected in November 1990 and the independence referendum was held on September 8, 1991. On the basis of this referendum, the Parliament declared the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia. On November 17, 1991, Parliament adopted the Constitution, which laid the foundations for parliamentary democracy, civil society, the rule of law and the market economy.¹ On June 17, 2018, the Prespa Agreement was signed between Greece and Macedonia to settle the longstanding name dispute between Macedonia and Greece. On October 19, 2018, the required two-thirds majority in parliament was reached and a long process began to rename North Macedonia. The last vote on the certification of the agreement in the Parliament in Skopje took place on the date of January 11, 2019, reaching the majority required to adopt constitutional amendments. The name of the country was officially changed to North Macedonia with the constitutional amendments.²

The state powers are divided into three categories as legislative, executive and judicial. These powers are used by the unicameral parliament, the president, the government and the courts.

The parliament consists of 120 members elected for a four-year term by secret voting in general and direct elections. The parliament has a legislative role; it undertakes legislative power and approves the government as a whole and by each minister separately. The Parliament also appoints a number of independent authorities which report to the Parliament.

The executive power belongs to the government and the president of

1 Nedim Emin, *Makedonya Siyasetini Anlama Kılavuzu*, (Istanbul: SETA Print House, 2014), 19.

2 Ioannis Armakolasvd., *North Macedonia: What Is Next?* (Skopje: Open Society Foundations,), 1, 2019.

the republic. The government is elected by parliament upon the proposal of the prime minister, who proposes the government structure and in addition to the government program.³ The government determines the policy of implementing parliamentary laws and other regulations and is responsible for the enforcement of these laws and regulations. The government proposes laws, the state budget and other general laws to the parliament, and also adopts internal regulations and other legal acts for the implementation of the laws.

The President of the Republic is elected by direct voting for a renewable term of five years. The President of the Republic represents the republic and has some important competencies in the field of foreign policy within this capacity. The President of the Republic is the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces and the President of the National Security Council. The President of the Republic also has the authority to nominate candidates and make appointments to some institutions.

The judiciary is the third wing of power. Under the Constitution, the courts are autonomous and independent. The judges shall be appointed / dismissed by parliament upon the proposal of the Council of Courts, irrespective of their term of office. Jurisdiction in the Republic of North Macedonia belongs to the Court of Cassation of the Republic of North Macedonia, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Republic of North Macedonia, the Administrative Court of the Republic of North Macedonia and the Courts of Appeal and the Courts of First Instance.⁴ There is no

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The government consists of prime minister and ministers given below: Deputy

Prime Ministers (5) coordinating the works of ministries in specific political field and aiding the duties of prime minister, ministers ministering the ministries (there are currently 15 ministries: Foreign Affairs; Internal Affairs; Defence; Justice; Finance; Economy; Transportation and Communication; Local Autonomy; Employment and Social Policies; Agriculture, Forestry and Water Sources Management; Environment and Physical Planning; Culture; Education and Science; Health; Information Society and Management) and State Ministers (currently 6).

4

The judicial authority in judicial system of Republic of Northern Macedonia consists of 27 courts of first instance, 4 courts of appeal, Administrative Court, High Administrative Court and Supreme Court of Republic of Northern Macedonia. The courts of first instances are established for one or more municipalities and the judges of such courts presides the courts of first instance (16 courts) and courts with widened judicial authorities (11 courts). Courts of appeal are established as per the regions of courts of first instance. There are four courts of appeal in Manastir, Gostivar, Uskup and Istip in Republic of Northern Macedonia. The Administrative Court in capital Uskup, High Administrative Court and Supreme Court of Republic of Northern Macedonia has the judicial authority within the borders of Republic of Northern Macedonia. The Administrative Court has the authority to decide against individual actions of state admin-

specialized court.

The Constitutional Court is responsible for the protection of constitutional and legal rights. The Constitutional Court consists of 9 judges elected by parliament for a one-time term of office of 9 years. It is the duty of the Constitutional Court to ensure that there is no conflict between the responsibilities of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.

The public administration carries out its activities independently within its jurisdiction and as part of the constitution and law as part of the executive body. However, it is accountable to the government for its activities. Public administration bodies within their rights and duties are directly responsible for the implementation of laws and other general regulations against the government and, through government responsibility, to the Parliament of the Republic of North Macedonia.

The position of public administration in the Republic of North Macedonia is not fully defined in the constitution. However, this issue shall be regulated by a law adopted by a two-thirds majority of the total number of deputies. In an organizational sense, the constitution stipulates that public administration shall be composed of ministries and other administrative bodies and organizations designated by law.⁵ Furthermore, the Constitution prohibits political organization in public administration bodies and their involvement in political actions (Article 95 of the Constitution).

The Constitution emphasizes three basic principles for the work of administrative bodies: the principle of autonomy, the principle of constitution and legality, and the principle of responsibility (Article 96 of the Constitution).

In the Republic of North Macedonia, the current organization of public administration and the organization and activities of public administration bodies are determined by the Code on Civil Servants and the Code on General Administrative Procedure.

The public administration in the Republic of North Macedonia consists of the following bodies: 32 independent public administration bodies, 29 bodies within ministries, 16 legal entities with public powers, 15

istrative organizations and determine their legality. The High Administrative Court finalizes the appealed resolutions of Administrative Court. The Supreme Court is the third and last part of resolutions taken to appeal.

5 НаумГризо и др., „Административноправо, (Скопје: Правенфакултет „ЈустинијанПрви“, 158, 2011.

ministries, 12 independent state institutions, 10 regulatory bodies, 3 secretariats within the government, 1 private body public administration (intelligence), and 1 service administration within the government.⁶

According to the European Commission's Report on Countries 2018, the organization of public administration is divided. The reason for this is that the Code on the Organization and Functioning of State Administrative Bodies does not make a clear distinction between different types of institutions. The lines of accountability between and within institutions are not clear. There are many institutions that are directly subordinated to parliament. Some of the government agencies report to both the "responsible" ministries (the ministry responsible for their activities) and the government. The government should prepare and implement a review to assess the effectiveness of the Macedonian public administration organization as part of the new public administration reform strategy.⁷

The public administration reform strategy for between the years of 2018 and 2022 and the sequential action plan, including the implementation of such strategy, were adopted in February 2018 after a comprehensive consultation process. This strategy addresses all areas of public administration, including the removal of politics from public administration and the professionalization of public administration. The government must now focus on implementing the strategy. A current concern regarding the implementation of the strategy concerns the capacity of the Ministry of Information Community and Administration on effectively coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the strategy with other government agencies related by the strategy. In December 2017, the government established a senior Public Administration Reform Council to provide political support and strategic guidance to reforms. A strong political obligation from the highest political leadership is necessary to ensure that the priorities of the reform are fully understood and implemented.⁸

6 Драган Гоцевски и Неда Малеска – Сачмароска, Колкав и каков јавен сектор имаме во Република Македонија?: Анализа на карактеристиките во јавниот сектор во Република Македонија, (Скопје : Центар за управување со промени, 11, 2017.

7 European Commission, *Commission Staff Working Document, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2018 Report*, (Strasbourg: SWD), 16, 2018.

8 European Commission, *The FYR Macedonia Report*, 17-18, 2018.

II. Intellectual Property System of the Republic of North Macedonia

The Republic of North Macedonia is a candidate for EU membership, a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is a party to the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) and other WIPO conventions and agreements. The Republic of North Macedonia, which assumes responsibility for membership in intellectual property organizations, is seeking to establish a modern and effective intellectual property system for the benefit of all stakeholders.⁹

The Republic of North Macedonia considers intellectual property rights as one of the developmental tools that will lay the foundation for the formation of a knowledge-based society. The ultimate goal is to create a competitive economy based on knowledge and production, which particularly uses intellectual capital. It will support all other forms of education related to national intellectual property rights, and enable them to add value and quality to practical applications and their products and services by encourage scientific studies and researches. The Republic of North Macedonia is also aware of the need for foreign direct investment as a resource for the creation and development of the domestic economy and productive, creative and export-oriented sectors. In particular, worldwide researches show that direct foreign investments are proportional to the level of protection of intellectual property rights in any country. The Republic of North Macedonia therefore considers intellectual property rights as one of the instruments that promote foreign direct investment. North Macedonia recognizes the need to promote the creativity and innovation initiatives of individuals and teams through institutional actions. The Republic of North Macedonia considers intellectual property rights as a means of establishing a stronger and lasting relationship between educational, scientific and research institutions, the cultural and commercial sectors to provide a commercial environment for creative and innovative work. This will be reflected to the intellectual creators, writers, artists and innovators as financial rewards and personal satisfaction, thus preventing human capital from leaving the country and reducing the number of

⁹ Macedonian-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, *Macedonia Land of Investment Opportunity*, (Skopje: FORTON Macedonia and MATTO,), 10-12, 2016.

talented and educated graduate and PhD students leaving the country. The Republic of North Macedonia recognizes the flexibility, possibilities and importance of small and medium-sized enterprises for the development of its economy. It recognizes intellectual property rights as a tool that should contribute to the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises, especially in the market.¹⁰

The structure of the intellectual property system of the Republic of North Macedonia consists primarily of a legal, institutional and judicial framework, as well as other stakeholders such as communities, collaborations, universities and R&D organizations for joint management of intellectual property rights agencies, copyright and related rights.

Current legislation on intellectual property is based on the Constitution of the Republic of North Macedonia, the relevant laws and regulations, and international instruments signed and participated by the state. Some of the more important legal regulations that regulate intellectual property rights in the Republic of North Macedonia are: Copyright and Associated Rights Law, Industrial Property Law, Law on the Protection of the Topography of the Integrated Circuit, Law on the Rights of Plant Breeders, Law on Measures for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and Quality of Agricultural Products Law.¹¹ Pursuant to the obligation imposed by the application for membership to the European Union, the national legislation on intellectual property is aligned with the European Union legislation accordingly. The basic laws regulating intellectual property rights are mostly aligned with EU legislation. Although the laws are good legal arrangements, which are largely in line with European standards and legislation in the field of intellectual property, certain interventions are still required.¹²

The institutional framework for the protection of intellectual property

10 Jadranka Dabovikj-Anastasovska and Neda Zdraveva, *Strategy for Intellectual Property of the Republic of Macedonia 2009-2012*, (Skopje: Ministry of Economy and USAID,), 13-15, 2009.

11 Јадранка Дабовиќ-Анастасовска и др., Интелектуална сопственост во економија та, (Скопје: Државен завод за индустријска сопственост на Република Македонија, 5, 2011.

12 Јадранка Дабовиќ-Анастасовска и др., Развој на правот на интелектуална сопственост на Република Македонија – усогласување со правот на ЕУ и со Европската патентна конвенција, (Скопје: Државен завод за индустријска сопственост на Република Македонија,), 62-65, 2011.

rights in North Macedonia is very complex. This is because most institutions have the power to protect the intellectual property rights. The institutions involved in the administration, protection and implementation of these rights, including its establishment and powers, are as follows: Relevant intellectual property management offices: Industrial Property State Agency, the Ministry of Culture and the Copyright and Associated Rights Department, and the Seed and Seedlings Directorate within Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economics. The institutional infrastructure of the system also includes institutions for the implementation of Intellectual Property Rights such as State Market Inspectorate, Customs Administration and Ministry of Interior.

Courts play a key role in the protection of intellectual property rights. The courts of first instance, which have extended powers in the legal protection of intellectual property rights, are primarily competent.¹³ The courts competent for penal protection of intellectual property rights are the courts of first instance (27 courts). This does not include cases where a criminal offense is committed by a minor. Although it is one of the basic conditions for ensuring effectiveness in the protection of intellectual property rights procedures, there is no specialized expertise in the field of intellectual property rights in the courts of first instance. The courts of appeals have the power to decide on appeals against the decisions made by the courts of first instance in their regions, including cases concerning the protection of intellectual property rights. The Court of Cassation of the Republic of North Macedonia, as defined by law, has the authority to decide on extraordinary legal procedures against the final decisions of the courts. The Administrative Court has the power to decide on the legality of the acts of state bodies in the field of intellectual property rights and the decisions of the state administration bodies in regulating individual relations. The Supreme Administrative Court shall finalize the decisions of the appealed Administrative Court.¹⁴ There is no specialized court for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The protection of these rights shall be enforced by the civil court, the criminal court and the administrative court.

13 Makedonya Cumhuriyeti'nde butürden 11 mahkeme vardır.

14 Borce Davitkovski, Ana Pavlovska-Daneva and Nikola Tupancevski, *Administrative, Judicial and Criminal Law Enforcement of Intellectual Property*, (Skopje: Cyril and Methodius University, Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law,), 102-103, 2012.

The main elements of the system for the protection of intellectual property rights are intellectual property proxies. These IP agents are organized within the Association of Intellectual Property Proxies of the Republic of North Macedonia with main purpose to improve the protection of intellectual property rights as a result of carrying out certain actions required in this respect. The role of intellectual property agents in the protection of intellectual property is of paramount importance, given their direct contact with rights holders. Therefore, it is important to further develop the professional skills of intellectual property proxies.¹⁵

Another important part of the infrastructure for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is the Professional Associations of Copyright and Associated Rights, which are regulated in accordance with the Copyright and Associated Rights Law, the contents of which are defined by law and authorized for the collective management of copyright. The professional associations of intellectual rights carry out their activities on the basis of an approval from the Ministry of Culture. The current professional association is operated by the Association for the Protection of the Rights of Music Composers.¹⁶

The commerce industry and its usage method for the intellectual property system are an important issue in the functioning of the intellectual property system. General assessments of Chambers of Industry and Commerce on the level of intellectual property legislation in the Republic of Macedonia indicate that this legislation is good. The Code on Chambers of Commerce is a code that defines the competence of Chambers of Commerce in the field of industrial property. It is possible to speak of good cooperation between the chambers and their members and the competent authorities in the field of industrial property. The situation with regard to intellectual property rights in the country has improved as a whole, but there are still important steps to be taken as per the Chambers of Industry and Commerce.

Another issue is the system of creation of protectable material, in which universities and R&D institutions play the most important role.

15 Јадранка Дабовиќ-Анастасовска и др., Улогата на застапниците во системот на заштита на правата од интелектуална сопственост, (Скопје: Државен завод за индустриска сопственост на Република Македонија, 17-20, 2011.

16 Jadranka Dabovikj-Anastasovska, *Strategy*, 30-31.

The universities and R&D institutions have a bilateral role in this context as highly educated people (lawyers) directly involved in the implementation process and institutions that train and educate people in the fields of mathematics, technical and technological sciences, medicine, biotechnology, social and human sciences directly involved in the creation of intellectual property works.¹⁷

According to the European Commission's Report on Countries 2018, the country is moderately prepared in this area. Although limited, some progress has been made on improving the legal framework for copyright. Following the cancellation of the license in 2016, with respect to copyright and related rights, the associations of related rights exist only for music rights. There is a shortage of personnel in the responsible department in the Ministry of Culture. Both national and international cooperation is limited. In the field of industrial rights, the industrial property strategy was adopted after postponement and only without an update to the action plan on risks that compromise its credibility. The State Agency for Industrial Property has rejected plans to establish an information platform for law enforcement agencies to share data on industrial property rights. There are still some difficulties in providing quality service to the public. Intellectual property rights are often violated and the lack of reliable statistics on how these violations are handled by law enforcement agencies is an obstacle to the safe implementation of laws.¹⁸

III. Institutional Framework of the Intellectual Property System of the Republic of North Macedonia

III. 1. State Office of Industrial Property of the Republic of North Macedonia

The authority for the protection of industrial property in North Macedonia belongs to the State Office of Industrial Property of the Republic of North Macedonia, which implements state policies in the field of industrial property. The Office was founded in 1993 and has become an important national and regional factor in the field of industrial property over a

¹⁷ Аднан Јашари, „Капацитетите на Република Македонија за трансфер на технологија“, Научен форум за индустријска сопственост: 121-122, 2011.

¹⁸ European Commission, *The FYR Macedonia 2018 Report*, 59-60.

period of 25 years.

The State Office of Industrial Property of the Republic of North Macedonia, which is on its way to becoming a modern institution, is the target of the European Commission, which is the only institution that directly protects the industrial property rights in the country, as well as awareness, promotion and new training modules of a new intellectual property policy. The functions of the organization as a modern industrial property office include the registration and protection of industrial property rights, industrial property access services, the promotion of innovation, the promotion of the use of industrial property rights, the promotion of compliance with international treaties and conventions, the promotion and awareness-raising activities of property rights.¹⁹

The Office must play an active role in raising public awareness of intellectual property rights, promoting and evaluating intellectual property rights, and coordinating all stakeholders in the field of intellectual property rights. The creation, protection and promotion of the use of intellectual property is an important tool in creating conditions for transition to an innovative model of economic growth.

Organization structure of the Office:

- Department of Patent and Technology Monitoring and Bilateral Cooperation with EPO (European Patent Office). The department personnel receive rigorous academic training in the fields of electro-energy, mechanics, physics, pharmacology, patent law and biotechnology, natural sciences, chemistry and biology. In addition to evaluating patent applications, auditors play an important role in the promotion of patent information, industrial property assessment processes and training.
- Department of Brands, Industrial Design and Geographical Indications and Bilateral Cooperation with WIPO and EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office). The Department is directly related with the registration of trademarks and industrial designs, which are easier to apply than patents in developing countries. The department has the authority to manage the geographical indications and topography of the integrated circuits as well as the only trademarks related to the workload. The department also participates in promotional, training material prepa-

19 Мирјана Поленак-Акимовска и др., Интелектуална сопственост I: Индустриска сопственост, (Скопје: Правен факултет „Јустинијан Први“, 2004), 283.

ration and awareness raising activities.

- Department of General Matters. The Department of General Matters is responsible not only for the increased workload in line with international activities and international agreements, but also for the rapid integration into European structures.

- As an integral part of the activities carried out in the office, Information Technologies is of particular importance not only in terms of registration and protection, but also in raising awareness throughout the society.²⁰

The decisions of the agency on industrial property rights are final. The Parties have the right to initiate administrative disputes against the decisions of the agency. The administrative dispute is initiated by a case brought before the Administrative Court of the Republic of North Macedonia. The case is filed within 30 days from the date of the decision.²¹

The State Office of Industrial Property should be oriented to serve its customers in accordance with European practices in such institutions. This requires the preparation of different actions for different customers and the development of staff capacity. The scope of the legal framework covering the work of the institution is almost complete. Accession to the European Patent Convention also provides adequate legal support for the role of the Authority in the European patent system. The Office also continued to carry out activities that are part of the Cooperation Agreement with EUIPO.

III. 2. Ministry of Culture / Copyright and Associated Rights Department

The Ministry of Culture, which is concerned with the protection of cultural heritage, publishing, music, stage and art, film, gallery, library, archive and museum activities, copyright protection and related rights, is the second institution in the intellectual property system. The fulfillment of these responsibilities is related to the promotion of the author's work and the protection of copyright and related rights, expressed through analytical and legal activities within the Ministry, and through the numerous

²⁰ Kostadin Manev and Andrea Kushti, *National Strategy on Industrial Property of the FY Republic of Macedonia*, (Skopje: AECOM International Development Europe, 2016), 54-56.

²¹ Davitkovski, Pavlovska-Daneva and Tupancevski, *Administrative*, 82.

programs and activities carried out by the Ministry.

The Department of Copyright and Associated Rights in the Ministry of Culture carries out analytical and other normative activities to monitor the implementation of the regime on copyright and related rights in terms of regulation and local and international legislation. International and European standards activities in this field are as follows: participation in the preparation of bilateral and multilateral agreements, ratification of international agreements, monitoring of activities and cooperation with international organizations and local and international non-governmental organizations, implementation of administrative issues arising from legal obligations, harmonization with other international agreements, administrative oversight of the legality of transactions and the collective management of copyright and related rights. The Department also takes measures to prevent unauthorized use of copyright and related rights (piracy activities) and conducts other activities.²²

Activities in the Department are carried out by the Copyright Unit and the Associated Rights Unit. The Ministry of Culture signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Customs Administration and relevant associations such as associations of representatives and associations of rights holders to improve co-operation in the implementation of customs measures for copyrights and related rights.

III. 3. Broadcasting Council

The Broadcasting Council is an independent, regulatory and non-profit board with public authority in the field of publication. In exercising its powers as defined by the Broadcasting Code (Official Gazette RM / 100/2005), the Council guarantees freedom of opinion and pluralism and the existence of independent and impartial media organizations. It also ensures the economic and technological development of the activities and the protection of citizens' interest in the broadcasting area. The Council is obliged to inform the body responsible for the protection of copyrights and related rights.²³

22 Adnan Jashari, "Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the Republic of Macedonia Conformity with European Standards", *International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology* 2/4 : 10, 2013.

23 Jadranka Dabovikj-Anastasovska, *Strategy*, 30.

III. 4. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economics

There are several departments that fulfill the responsibilities of this Ministry within the intellectual property system at the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economics.

The Standing Interdepartmental Advisory Committee for Geographical Indications and Traditional Product Name operates under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economics. It provides the European Commission with the name of origin and geographical signs for registration. Currently 7 objects are registered.²⁴

The Seed and Seedling Directorate within the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economics is the administrative body for the protection of new plant varieties. Its task is to implement the administrative procedures of the Code on Breeder Rights for the protection of new plant varieties.

Within the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economics, the Department of Standards and Quality in Agricultural Products, which is responsible for Quality Management systems and “quality markings”, was established. The protection of geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy with the Code on the Quality of Agricultural Products. In addition, several amendments were made to the Industrial Property Code.

The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economics should continue its development by directing service-oriented efforts as an organization directly linked to the acquisition, management and protection of intellectual property rights in their respective fields. Conflicting areas must be identified and institutional changes taken into account for the most efficient intellectual property system.²⁵

III. 5. Coordinative Body for Intellectual Property

The Coordinative Body for Intellectual Property was established to coordinate efforts to achieve an effective integrated system for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Its main purpose is to establish coordination in providing an effective system for the protection

24 Kostadin Manev, *National Strategy*, 22.

25 Kostadin Manev, *National Strategy*, 23.

and enforcement of intellectual property rights. The Body is responsible to the Prime Minister of the Government of North Macedonia and is linked to WIPO, EPO, EUIPO, AMCHAM, USAID, INTERPOL and the EU.²⁶

The Coordination Body, led by a committee appointed by the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia, consists of representatives of all government agencies involved in the implementation of intellectual property rights. The Coordination Body prepares a report on its activities twice a year to be submitted to the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia and the results after each coordinated activity are announced at press conferences. Although the Body does not have a fixed income, it receives financial and technical support from the State Office of Industrial Property Agency and the Ministry of Economy.²⁷

The Coordination Body monitors and manages industrial property rights, copyrights and related rights. The Body participates in legal proceedings and establishes and implements appropriate policies for compliance with intellectual property rights with all institutions that protect and implement intellectual property rights at home and abroad.

The Coordinative Body for Intellectual Property has a positive impact on the intellectual property system, but the level of law enforcement varies between different institutions. However, in some cases, the responsibilities shared by different institution of law enforcement are to provide more effective investigations and legal steps to be taken. Cooperation between these institutions is strong and continues to enforce laws for the functions of laws. This is supplemented by coordinated actions carried out four or more times per month if necessary, and this is confirmed with the Coordination Body reports submitted to the Government of North Macedonia.

III. 6. State Market Inspectorate

The State Market Inspectorate is a legal entity within the Ministry of Economy. It supervises the lawfulness of the actions of commercial companies, other legal persons and natural persons and citizens engaged in economic activities in the territory of the Republic of North Macedonia. It undertakes the protection of industrial property rights, copyrights within

26 Kostadin Manev, *National Strategy*, 40.

27 Jadranka Dabovikj-Anastasovska, *Strategy*, 29-30.

the market and connected rights in the field of intellectual property rights.

It is understood from the organizational structure of the State Market Inspectorate that it has no inspection department in the field of protection of intellectual property. It is necessary to establish a separate unit for the control of intellectual property rights and to provide continuous training for state market inspectors in this field.²⁸

The State Market Inspectorate supervises the provisions of the laws on the trade and use of protected intellectual property rights.

III. 7. Customs Administration

The Customs Administration of the Republic of North Macedonia is a government agency within the Ministry of Finance and is administered by a director appointed by the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia. The Customs Administration is responsible for implementing measures to protect intellectual property. It also supervises the import, export, transit operations, customs warehouses and the temporary import and export of goods within the customs territory of the Republic of North Macedonia.

The Code on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights is applied in the field of protection of intellectual property rights. The same code regulates the procedures and conditions for customs authorities to subject goods subject to intellectual property rights to customs inspection and customs control within the customs territory of the Republic of North Macedonia in accordance with the customs regulations related with this code. When there is any suspicion that intellectual property rights are infringed during a customs procedure, the customs officers are responsible for the identification of the goods and the temporary seizure of these goods. Temporarily seized goods are stored in customs warehouses until the intellectual property owner provides a reply. The intellectual property may be returned or destroyed according to the owner's response.²⁹

The trade of counterfeit and pirated goods is a global problem that requires strong cooperation between customs and rights holders. Such

28 Борче Давитковски и Ана Павловска-Данева, „Управно-правна заштита на авторските и сродните права“, Авторско право и сродни права: домашна и меѓународна теорија и практика, (2007): 569.

29 Kostadin Manev, *National Strategy*, 27.

collaborations will also enable effective intellectual property practices at the borders. International cooperation between customs authorities and international organizations must be encouraged, and the institutions must focus on information exchange and good practice to improve the overall efficiency of the desired results.

III. 8. Ministry of Internal Affairs

Another important pillar of the national intellectual property system is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Interior acts in accordance with the criminal proceedings related to infringement of intellectual property rights, in accordance with its competence on protection of intellectual property rights. The legal framework defining the powers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the field of intellectual property is drawn by the Industrial Property Code, Copyright and Associated Rights Code, the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure.³⁰

If the Ministry of the Internal Affairs had a unit or department specialized in the protection of intellectual property, the Ministry could have been more actively involved in activities related to the national intellectual property system. The market size of North Macedonia must also be taken into consideration.

Conclusion

As a result of the globalization process, there have been major technological, economic, political and social changes in the last decade. These changes affect the world's regional and national economies and their actors. The way in which tangible value is created increases as a result of intangible values, therefore material production is based on knowledge.

Therefore, the need for the protection of information by means of intellectual property is increasing with each passing day. The establishment of a quality intellectual property system is one of the prerequisites for the participation of the Republic of North Macedonia in the innovation movement in the world and Europe. The main locomotive in the intellectual property system is the institutions that protect the intellectual property rights and ensure their performance. Therefore, one cannot speak of a quality intellectual property system without well-equipped and efficient

30 Davitkovski, Pavlovska-Daneva and Tupancevski, *Administrative*, 156.

institutions. This is one of the main criteria that must be met in order to realize the European aspirations of the Republic of North Macedonia.

The position of institutions in the Macedonian intellectual property system is suitable. The country needs to focus on ensuring the effective functioning of these institutions and the provision of adequate equipment and the employment of personnel within these institutions. It must also strive for continuous training in parallel with new technological developments.

An important link in the effectiveness of institutions is mutual cooperation. Cooperation between individual institutions in the intellectual property system should be based solely on the fact that each of the administrative bodies carries out activities aimed at meeting the interests of the public. On the other hand, cooperation between bodies means a joint action in accordance with their competence to effectively implement and simplify the protection of intellectual property rights.

In modern society, there is a physical limit to property, which is expressed as material capital in movable and immovable property. Intellectual capital, expressed in the topography of patents, brands, designs, geographic markings, integrated circuits, know-how, computer programs, can be reproduced indefinitely and reach enormous values. Therefore, the intellectual property system and the institutions that guarantee the protection of these rights must be encouraged to raise awareness in the whole society. A society acting for the protection of intellectual property rights, and institutions that ensure the effective protection of intellectual property rights, can contribute to the development and integration of their country.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina War and the Power Of The Media

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Introduction

The beginning of the end of Yugoslavia was inevitable. The Serbs regarded themselves as the successors of Yugoslavia and argued that all the lands inhabited by Serbs should be within the same borders. The seeds of war were sown when the countries demanded independence one by one. In this way, the way that media devices were used played a very important role, and showed who had the power. Sarajevo, besieged from all sides, was attempted to be disconnected from the world for 1425 days without electricity and water in addition to media blockade. 11,541 people were killed, of whom 1,601 were children during these 1425 days. The number of people killed by snipers was 3798. The number of wounded in the war was close to fifty thousand. On June 22, 1993, Sarajevo was engraved with the highest number of missiles in history, totaling 3777. A total of 500 thousand missiles were fired. Massacres took place as bombs were thrown in the Markale market in 1994 and 1995. The market was

full of people during both attacks. As the United Nations carried out the investigations secretly, there was speculation in the media that the missile could not be detected. These speculations were supported by Serbian authorities as the Serbian authorities tried to bring the blame to the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the report prepared by UNPROFOR¹ in 1999 for the United Nations General Assembly proved that the missiles in the second massacres were thrown by the Serbian Republic army. In 2004, the trial of Serbian general Stanislav Galić at the War Crimes Tribunal has proved that the Serbian army fired the missiles in 1994. On July 11 and 12, 1995, 8,373 people were killed in a planned organization in the city of Srebrenica. Although the city was declared a safe zone by the United Nations, 400 Dutch soldiers could not prevent the genocide. The article will answer the question whether the radio-amateurs, independent local journalists and foreign reporters stopped the war as they somehow managed to inform the world about what was happening between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I. Years Before the War

I. 1. The Division of Yugoslavia

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is the name of a former socialist state within the borders of today's Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Northern Macedonia. It had existed between 1943 and 1992. The country was recognized internationally thanks to its struggles against fascism. Josip Broz Tito, head of the Yugoslav Communist Party, had served as head of state since 1953. After 1980, more precisely after Tito's death, economic crises and conflicts of ethnic origin occurred. Foreign debts made high inflation unable to sustain production and caused an economic crisis which would continue until the disintegration of Yugoslavia. There were political crises as well as the economic crises, the first of which took place in Kosovo after Tito's death.

As a result of increasing inequalities and conflicts of ethnic origin, the Serbian national movement was becoming increasingly prominent. In fact, they aimed to become a hegemonic country by keeping the disintegrating Yugoslavia countries together under the name of 'Greater Serbia'.

Although the states wanted this crisis to be solved peacefully, the Yugoslav National Army did not only take sides but also armed the Serbian people.

With the abolition of the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo in 1989, people within the close circle of Slobodan Milošević began to take up top positions. Slovenia also organized its own national movement against the Serbs' aggressive national movement, but their aim was to leave Yugoslavia and join the European Union. Slovenia began to move away from communism and announced that the first free elections would take place in 1990. The referendum resulted in 88.5% affirmation. The situation in Croatia was not very different, a referendum took place in May 1991, resulting with 94% of the citizens demanding Croatia's independence. When the Serbian leadership rejected Croatia and Slovenia's proposal to re-organize a confederation of Yugoslavia and demanded central power, the two states declared independence on June 25, 1991. Soon the Yugoslav National Army first attacked Slovenia's not-so-large army to stop independence. The short-term war resulted in the defeat of the Yugoslav army. The war in Croatia lasted much longer but ended with a victory.

I. 2. Declaration of Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Results

On November 18, 1990, the first multiparty and democratic general elections took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. SDA, HDZ and SDS, the national parties of Bosnians, Croats and Serbs won the elections. At a meeting in parliament on October 17, 1991, Radovan Karadžić, the representative of the SDS, told members of parliament that Bosnia and Herzegovina's path was not very different from that of Slovenia and Croatia, noting that the war was not far. Holding the Bosnians responsible for this course, he stated that they would "drag them into hell and perhaps cause the extermination of Muslims". In response, Alija Izetbegović, who initially did not think of giving a speech, stated that these hate speeches were the reason why Bosnia does not want to be a part of Yugoslavia. In addition, he gave the message that the Muslim people will not disappear.

A referendum took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina between February 29 and March 1, 1992. It resulted with 99.7% of the votes demanding independence. The Serbian Democratic Party prevented elections in some

areas by inviting the Serbs to boycott. Additionally, they threatened those who wanted to vote and that they would betray the Serbian nation and be declared a traitor if they participated in the independence voting of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One month after the referendum, the Serbs' open attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina began. On April 1, Arkan, who was a war profiteer and a criminal, and his team named "Tigers of Arkan" attacked Bijeljina and killed numerous civilians. On April 4, the European Union declared the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the night between April 4 and 5, Serbian paramilitary units attacked Sarajevo's police station.

When Sarajevo's communication with the outside world was cut, thousands of citizens took to the streets and protested. Regardless of their nationality, they were all against the war and were trying to protect Yugoslavia's solidarity and unity.

Nearly 40,000 people were protesting against the war in front of the parliament building in Sarajevo on April 5. Afterwards, they entered the national assembly building and decided that the People's Liberation Committee should be established in order to stop the war and protect the citizens, none of which took place. Protesters were under fire by Serbian paramilitary units in front of the Holiday Inn Hotel, the centre of the Serbian Democratic Party. 5 people were killed, including Suada Dilberović and Olga Sučić, who were considered the first victims of the war. On April 7, Serbian representatives declared the independence of the Serbian Republic. A day later, Alija Izetbegović, the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared a state of emergency in Sarajevo. Planned genocides and a real massacre had begun in many cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnians never lost their hopes and fought for their homeland during this blood struggle.

II. Media and War

II. 1. The Battle of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Media

"Nije ozvaničen, nije objavljen i vodi se, za sada, na ograničenim teritorijama i specijalnim metodama, ali možemo slobodno reći - OVO JE VEĆ RAT. Rat protiv nedužnih, rat protiv naše djece i rat protiv svih nas".

"It is driven by unofficial, unregistered and restricted areas and special methods, but we can confidently say - THIS IS A WAR. The war against the innocent, the war against our children and the war against all of us."

On April 2, 1992, the news program began with these words. All journalists were reluctant to give the news, while the youngest news editor in Yugoslavia, Senad Hadžifejzović, told on Sarajevo TV that the war had started.

On May 2, 1992, the Yugoslav National Army and Serbian paramilitary units attempted to enter Sarajevo and occupy the Presidential building. The people of Sarajevo opposed the attacks with Bosnia and Herzegovina's Regional Defense and the Special Unit MUP, Sarajevo's main post office building was burned down and telephone connections in the city were cut as a result of critical activities. On that day, the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović was returning from the negotiations in Lisbon and was taken prisoner by the YUO at the Sarajevo airport and taken to Lukavica. On Sarajevo Television, a meeting was held with Izetbegović who was imprisoned with the presentation of Senad Hadžifejzović, and Ejup Ganić and Stjepan Kljuić, who were connected from the Presidential building. Izetbegović was released on 3 May.

Slobodan Milošević quickly recognized the power of the media to gain power, as a result one of his first goals became winning the media space. There was a major media blockade in Sarajevo, and what was happening could not be presented clearly by the media because the media had been captured by the Serbs. The media and journalists were under Serbian propaganda, replacing their ideological predecessors with the nationalist one. Mass media have a major role in preparing the war, identifying the key elements and actors in defining the crisis.

The media were trying to transmit messages about the wars in Bosnia and Croatia that were really far-fetched. Serbian nationalists successfully marketed their propaganda strategies to both the domestic and international media and portrayed themselves as the deprived Serbian people. In making this news, they were pushing the crimes against them to other side by adding semi-facts and lies to the partially real information. They used various means to show that they were righteous and that all Serbs should live within the same borders, some of which were crimes against the Serbs in the Second World War, fabricated lies from the Ottoman occupation. Radovan Karadžić's previous parliamentary speech had appeared in the newspapers, in the news he called Muslims a genetically corrupt nation and insultingly called them 'balija'.

In an interview with Milošević's regime, Arkan stated it was a defense

war. He explains the events in Bijeljina as 'if we hadn't, muslims would have it'².

This media blockade was partially destroyed by radio amateurs. Radio amateurs were first used in April 1992, joining families separated from the war and forming a single bond with the world. During the war years, telephone connections were completely disconnected, and amateur radio work was crucial. They conveyed the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Europe and other parts of the world. Messages reached individuals, governments, media and charities, and religious communities. It is considered that more than three million messages were sent during the war.

In addition to the independent local journalists who tried to present the situation objectively to the world, many foreign journalists and writers came to Sarajevo and tried to fulfil their duties. Although the forces of these foreign correspondents were not enough to stop the war, they produced enough evidence to bring war criminals to justice, some even sacrificed their lives.

World media have been reporting on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the news were not fully published in the Sarajevo media. Serbs' 'Glas' newspaper, did not only transmit what the Western media wrote about the war deficiently, but also listed countries as enemies and allies. In response, Sarajevo's 'Oslobođenje' newspaper reported that the United Nations was seeking a military solution. When Bill Clinton came to power, optimistic expectations continued and the issue dominated the media, and in 1995 the war was intervened.

As a result of the visitation of the United Nations Force Commander, Philip Morillon to Srebrenica in 1993, 'Oslobođenje' wrote that Morillon was a symbol of honour, courage and determination. But the fact was that the local people prevented Morillon from leaving in order to stop the attacks and civilian casualties of Serbian soldiers. 'Glas' newspaper described this behaviour of the French general as 'contradictor to the agreement'.

Conclusion

The role of the media is very big in the wars, but is the power of the media enough to stop the war, was it enough for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina? It is difficult to answer the question of whether the power

of the media or the media of the powers in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the answer to both questions is partly positive. On the one hand, independent journalists and foreign reporters were able to make their voices heard and present what was happening on the battlefield to the world, but it was not enough to stop the war. According to a foreign correspondent in Sarajevo during the war years in the newspaper 'Sky News', if the media had a real impact on the United Nations, the intervention would have taken place in 1992 because the most disturbing images of the brutal war had emerged at that time. The one who controlled the media controlled the situation, the Serbian paramilitary units and the Yugoslav National Army held the media and used it to defend the atrocities they were doing to protect themselves. Former NATO commander general Wesley Clark stated in the promotion of his book 'Waging Modern War' that they allowed violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and stood aside. He also said that there were many people who stated that fighters must be allowed to fight until their power is exhausted.³ The media is a very important tool and evidence, but the responsibility for intervention was in fact political and strategic, not a reaction to what was shown in the media and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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3 'Prva Linija', newspaper of Federal Defense Ministry and Bosnia and Herzegovina Army, June, 2001, page 53

Turkey-Egypt Relations During Sisi Period: Where is the Problem and Resolution?

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Introduction

The relations between Turkey and Egypt is based upon a long history. The relationship between these two important Islamic countries is significant in the context of the Middle East region, the Islamic World and the regional policies of global actors.¹ This study will first provide a breakdown of relations historically, will discuss focused upon problem-solution in Turkey-Egypt relations especially focusing periods of Mursi-Sisi.

1 Mensur Akgün & Sabiha Senyücel Gündoğar, “Mısır-Türkiye ilişkilerinde daha iyi bir geleceğe doğru...”, <http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/M%C4%B1s%C4%B1r-T%C3%BCrkiye-ili%C5%9Fkilerinde-daha-iyi-bir-gelece%C4%9Fe-do%C4%9Fru.-12-Mart-14.pdf> (Access: 8.6.2019); Samet Kavoglu, “Mısır’da Değişen Dengeler Bağlamında Türkiye’nin Mısır Yazılı Basınında Sunumu: Al-Ahram Newspaper Example”, *Journal of Communication Theory & Research*. Autumn 2017, Issue 45, p. 225-242.

Egypt contains the oldest civilizations within the world.² Egypt is located in the north east of the African continent. In this historical process, the Turks established first Tolunoglu and then the Mamluk states there. Egypt belonged to the Byzantine empire before entering Islam. Egypt began to be conquered by Muslims by the end of 639 years and got under the Ottoman rule during the reign of Selim I.³ The Egypt Turkey relations started at the last periods of the Abbasid state in the historical sense. After Turkey was acquired by Ottomans after Byzantium, Egypt became an Ottoman state. This relationship ended after the British occupation.

The most fundamental difference between Turkey and Egypt within their social development is secularism. Founded in 1923, the Republic of Turkey was based upon secularism while there was no secularism in Egypt at any time. The relations of the Republic of Turkey with Egypt began with established diplomatic relations in 1925. As a result of the development of diplomatic relations in 1948, Turkey was represented at the ambassadorial level in Cairo. After the establishment of socialist regimes in Egypt, Turkey had suspended its diplomatic relations between the years 1961 and 1963 to be resumed in 1963.

While the multi-party system dominated Turkey, a single party system had dominated the political life of Egypt until 2011. As to compare the ruling parties of Turkey and Egypt, Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Muslim Brothers party in particular, AKP is the continuation of tradition of parties within the political arena in the history. The Muslim Brothers party did not participate in any government of Egypt while being in the politics directly or directly before the revolution.

While the parties in Turkey and Egypt are considered to have similar characteristics, it is possible to say that they are different from each other in principle. The Turkish and Egyptian communities were severely separated in terms of piety / secularism, westernization and the level of development of democratic institutions. This was due to the different development vectors and the different ways of modernization and Westernization of society of the two countries over the last 100 years.

2 Mehmet Özkan, *Mısır Dış Politikası: Dünü, Bugunu, Sorunları*, 2014

3 Yunus Özger, *History studies*, Middle East Special Edition 2010, p. 302.

I. Historical Background of Relations

The Ottoman governance in Egypt started during the times of Selim I in 1517 and continued until 1922. In the meantime, Shah Ismail Safavi declared Shah Ismail Safavi state in Iran. Selim I deceased only after 3 years of rule. After Selim I's death, his young son Süleyman ascended the throne. He was able to end the rebellion against the Ottoman rule in Egypt and Damascus during his rule. Meanwhile, Grand Vizier İbrahim came to visit Cairo and arranged his works there. This visit, according to historians, was a good beginning of the Ottoman administration. Egypt provided a great gain and contribution to the Ottoman Empire both politically and economically during this period as Abantsy of Egypt was the caliphate. The two sacred mosques in the Hijaz, the Al Aqsa mosque in Damascus, show the transformation of the Islamic power of the Ottoman state. In addition, the eastern part of the mediterannean sea and the red sea were open for the Ottoman. Thus, the burden of the state increased. In other words, the Red Sea increased the burden of preventing European attacks in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf.⁴

At that time, Al-Azhar scholars and sheikhs were the sanctuary of the people. They were with the people against the power. The Sheikhs of Al-Azhar were at the front of the scene when there was a complaint or conflict. They had extraordinary social status. The Ottoman Empire weakened over time and as a result, the Mamluks in Egypt expanded and became real rulers in the state. The Mameluke Ali al-Kabir was able to capture the administration in Egypt with strong, efficient, skillful and intense violence and blood. This also ensured security and stability for Egypt. Additionally, he prevented the Ottoman governors from going to Egypt. Then, he wanted to take over Damascus and Hijaz same as the previous three times. However, he was defeated and killed in 1757. This campaign, which constitutes the infrastructure of the future influence of France on the Nile, started the occupation period which would last for three years. Napoleon took steps to form such infrastructure. He did not only enter Egypt as an invader. He got there with a large library and many scholars. He opened two schools, published two newspapers and opened a scientific institution, a theater and a printing press. This occupation, which at least extinguished the Ottoman-French relations for a while, ended with

the defeat of the Napoleon's armies to the forces of Cezzar Ahmed Pasha in Akka in May 1799 and Bonaparte left Egypt in August 1799. The Ottoman Empire made an agreement with Russia in 1798 and with Britain and France in 1799. After this event, the time of the governor of Egypt, Kavalaiian Mehmed Ali Pasha began. However, France has never lost contact with this region.⁵

Mehmed Ali Pasha sent his son, Ibrahim Pasha to the Wahhabis. Ibrahim Pasha devastated the Wahhabis, seized Deriyeyi and returned to Egypt. Upon this, Mehmed Ali Pasha launched a campaign to Sudan to expand his area of domination and appointed Ismail Pasha to this position. Thus, Mehmed Ali Pasha, who saved Hijaz from the Wahhabis, increased his fame in the Islamic world and his influence spread all over Arabia.⁶

After a while, on June 24, 1839, the Ottoman armies and Ibrahim Pasha forces met in Nizip and the Ottoman soldiers suffered a heavy defeat. The death of Mahmud II before the news of the defeat and ascension of young Sultan Abdulmecid set a new stage in the course of the issue. Thus, the second stage of the Egyptian issue started, and an agreement was reached between England, Austria, Russia and Prussia on July 15, 1840 in London in order to find a solution to the problem. Accordingly, the Sultan, left the duty of governor of Egypt to pass from father to son, and the governorship of Southern Syria and Akka to Mehmed Ali Pasha for the duration of his life. On February 13, 1841, the new status was determined with publication of Concession Edict for Governorship of Egypt.⁷

The problems in Egypt, as mentioned before, have never ended completely. During the last years of Mehmed Ali and the short-term governorship of Ibrahim Pasha and the governorships of Abbas, Said and Ismail Pasha, Egypt became increasingly separated from the Ottoman Empire and came under the European political and economic influence.⁸

Staying under the governance of Ottomans from its conquest in 6th Century to its conquest of the World War I, Egypt had gone through various troubled periods during 19th Century. Without doubt, the largest of

5 Yunus Özger, Ibid, p. 304.

6 *Türkiye Mısır İlişkileri*, Egyptian Institute For Studies, Istanbul 2017, p.18.

7 Özger, Ibid, p. 305.

8 Özger, Ibid, p. 306.

these was the British occupation of 1882.⁹ First, Egypt began to get rid of the British occupation then problems with Israel problems emerged. In Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk mimicked the struggle with the new western Turkey. The Arab nationalism started with the military coup of Gamal Abdulnâsır between 1952 and 1980 in Egypt. Turkey made a deal with Israel during this period. Then Turkey has become a member of NATO. During the time of Adnan Menderes, Turkey decreased its diplomatic representative with Israel in the tripartite aggression against Egypt (1956). But this did not last long because when Syria-Turkey relations are tense, unity of Syria and Egypt came into a union. Syria and Egypt united to form a new state under the name of the United Arab Republic in 1958. This resulted against the expectations of the cadres of Baath. Within three years, the power of the Baath Party in Syria has greatly weakened. When Nasser banned all political parties to take control, the Baath Party was also dissolved and their leaders were not allowed to rule the Egyptian-controlled United Arab Republic region.¹⁰

During 1970s, Sadat came into an agreement with Israel and opened a way into Turkey, but internal problems of both sides prevented continuation of such relation. Sadat tried to reach a peace agreement and worked to resolve the regional situation. The situation in Turkey was tense at the same time. Süleyman Demirel was dealing with the power of the Turkish left, students and street protests turning into fights; this period ended with a military coup in Turkey at the end of 1981 finally ended in a military coup in Turkey. Sadat was assassinated in Egypt within the same year.¹¹

Hosni Mubarak was a normal figure in Egypt from 1981 to 2002. He was a normal officer, compared to leaders and politicians. Therefore, he did not think of establishing relations with Turkey. At that time, Turkey was also dealing with political wars and then coalition governments.

II. Turkey-Egypt Relations during AKP Period: 2002-2013

Turkey and Egypt, which are considered to be the two most import-

9 Özger, Ibid, p. 320.

10 <https://marksist.org/icerik/Tarihte-Bugun/2896/27-Eylul-1961-Suriye,-askeri-darbe-nin-ardindan-Birlesik-Arap-Cumhuriyetinden-cekildi>

11 *Türkiye Mısır ilişkileri*, Egyptian institute for studies, İstanbul 2017, p. 29.

ant countries within the Islamic world, have failed to develop a qualified political and economic relations. Neither Enver Sedat nor Hosni Mubarak did not reach a certain level of relations between the two countries. Winning the elections in 2002, AKP realized a significant transformation in such paradigm. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who tried to achieve political legitimacy in the first years of his rule, AKP started to increase its relations with Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries. In this sense, he wanted to improve relations with Egypt.¹²

During these periods, visits between the two countries took place. In February 2004, the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak visited Turkey. Mubarak meeting with the President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his requests to increase cooperation with Turkey regarding foreign politics and the field of energy. A year after this visit, Ahmed Necdet Sezer went to Egypt at the invitation of Mubarak. He signed several agreements during this visit. In May 2006, Erdogan went to Egypt. He participated in the meeting of the World Economic Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh. In 2007, Hosni Mubarak met with President Abdullah Gül on his way to Ankara and signed several agreements.¹³

In parallel to Turkey's growing relations with Egypt, the senior visits continued until the revolution in 2011. 11th President of the Republic Abdullah Gül visited Egypt four times between 2008-2010. During the same period, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Egypt once.¹⁴

Although there is a cultural affinity between the two countries, Turkey and Egypt did not become strategic allies excluding the administration of Muhammed Mursi between 2012-2013. Especially in 2013 Mursi's president of the republic changed, and then diplomatic crisis between two countries arising from contrary attitude of Sisi Regime against Turkey has continued until this day. The last field that reflects the ongoing state of crisis between Turkey and Egypt are the cultural values of five years.¹⁵

12 Telci, *Ak Parti'nin 15 yılı*- SETA Books 29, Sakarya University, Middle East Institute, Istanbul 2017, p. 297.

13 Telci, *Ibid*, p. 299.

14 Muhammed Berdibek, "*Türkiye- Ortadoğu İlişkilerinde Karşılıklı Üst Düzey Ziyaretler: 1923-2014*", *Akademik Ortadoğu* v. 10/2, 2016, pp. 83-86.

15 Telci, *Ibid*, pp. 121-122.

III. Turkey-Egypt Relations during Sisi Period: 2014-Today

They have aimed at close relations established during Muhammed Mursi period and aimed to end this situation. Turkey was the country showing the highest level of response in the international level for the removal of Muhammed Mursi from his duty with military coup. At the time, Prime Minister Erdogan pushed the administration of Cairo to take a serious stance against Turkey with his statements targeted at the coup administration in Egypt. The political relations strained by mutual explanations resulted in a diplomatic crisis of 2013.¹⁶

The ambassador of Turkey was expelled when the tension between the two countries started. The reasons for this action were that Turkey was trying to affect the public against the benefits of Egypt and tried to cause instability in Egypt.¹⁷

Therefore, the two countries began assigning tasks to a new ambassador to Alexandria while the diplomatic representation between two countries continued at charge d'affaires level. Egypt participated in D8 Summit of Ministers at deputy minister level.¹⁸

The ruling party had a hard time. The demonstrators in Turkey, gathered in Taksim Square to overthrow the regime same as the revolution cases in Egypt. These events were portrayed by international channels. Big international channels broadcasted the events in Turkey at Taksim Square as if there was none in Brazil or London.¹⁹

IV. Economic Relations

With the entry into force of the free trade agreement signed in the year of 2005 during 2007, the volume of trade between the two countries increased significantly. As can be seen in the table in detail, the mutual trade volume, which was 1.5 billion dollars in 2007, increased by over 50

¹⁶ Telci, Ibid, pp. 308-309.

¹⁷ Yasir Abdelaziz, Mısır Rejiminin Türkiye İle Yakınlaşması, (Mümkün ve İmkansız) Türkpress, Kahire December 2017.

¹⁸ Telci, Ibid, p. 123.

¹⁹ Elzawawi, Ibid, El-bayan, September 2013.

percent in 2008 and rose to 2.3 billion dollars.²⁰

Trade between Turkey and Egypt (2002-2010, million dollars)									
TURKEY-EGYPT	2002	2003	2004	2006	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Importation	118	189	255	267	393	652	886	641	926
Exportation	326	345	473	687	709	902	1.426	2.599	2.250
Trade Volume	444	534	728	954	1.101	1.554	2.312	3.240	3.176

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

In addition, the 3rd terminal of Cairo International Airport, which was opened by the Egyptian President Mubarak on December 18, 2008, was built by TAV for approximately \$ 400 million. The agreement on the Turkish industrial zone, which was intended to be established near the capital Cairo, was signed in October 2007 and the foundation laying ceremony was realized with Abdullah Gül's visit in 2008.

Commercial relations and investments between the two countries have experienced a serious tension. In 2012, mutual trade, which exceeded the level of 5 billion dollars, decreased to 4.4 billion dollars in 2017. The trade volume between Turkey and Egypt in 2018, the highest level again surpassed the \$ 5 billion and reached to \$ 5.2 billion. Compared to 2017, trade volume increased by more than 20 percent.²¹

Turkey-Egypt trade volume (2017-2018 Million dollars)			
TURKEY - EGYPT	Importation	Exportation	Trade Volume
2017	3.055	2.191	5.246
2018	2.360	1.997	4.357

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

V. Cultural Relations

The ongoing crisis between the Egyptian and Turkish governments have remained at a limited level over the social field. The youth of Egypt takes great interest in Turkey and Turkish. Throughout the year, wide participation was observed in the activities of the Yunus Emre Institute Turkish cultural centres in Egypt. In addition, Yunus Emre Institute for

20 Telci, Ibid, p. 301.

21 Telci, Ibid, p. 124.

the Turkish courses announced to be organized in the central building caused confluence.²²

In parallel to the increasing commercial and cultural relations and positive perceptions between the two countries, there is a serious demand for Turkish Airlines' flights to Egypt. THY organizes additional flights especially in Alexandria city due to high demand on particular days. Bilal EKŞİ, the chairman of the board of Turkish Airlines, who went to Cairo for a meeting of the Arab Airlines Association, stated that they would increase the number of flights between the two countries as soon as possible as three times a day to Cairo, nine times a week to Alexandria.²³

Conclusion

The relations between Turkey and Egypt are experiencing its worst times in the history. In this process, the removal of Muhammad Morsi from power was called a coup by some countries, and the coup was deemed legitimate by some countries. However, the point to be noted in this study is whether the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has been rapidly circulated since 2013 and accused of being a terrorist organization by the ruling administration, is a "terrorist organization" or not.

If the relations between Turkey and Egypt are corrected for normalization of relations in the future, both the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish politics and Prime Minister of Egypt, Abdulfattah El-Sisi and Egyptian politics must leave their ideological perspectives and return to the old ways. Not everyone will interfere in and within that country and will return to promote interrelated relations. If the two states do not take steps on these issues, both Erdogan and Sisi may not have a chance of recovery soon.

Turkey's influences and power in the area diminished considerably in recent times. The normalization with Egypt may open a process where Turkey may become influential in the region, albeit slowly. Turkey is currently at odds with Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Iran time to time. Being at odds with so many countries harms the regional power of Turkey. There-

22 "Kahire Yunus Emre Enstitüsünde Türkçe Izdihami", Anadolu Agency, February 2018.

23 - *Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı* 2018, pp. 127-128.

fore, normalization with Egypt may be positive in this sense.²⁴

We can see a significant increase in economic relations despite the political tension and the diplomatic crisis. The impact on cultural relations has also been minimal, since the cultural centre in Egypt is of great interest to the Egyptians. In addition, many institutions continue to operate in Egypt such as THY, Tika, Yunus Emre Centres, clothing stores and many companies.

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24 - <https://tr.sputniknews.com/columnists/201508051016952244/>

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Afghanistan, an Important Country in Migration Movements in the World: Which Factors are Affecting Migration?

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Abstract

When the recent migration movements in the world are examined, Afghanistan is in a tragic position with its high number of emigrants and thus with melting human resources. Causes of Afghanistan's migration must be deeply discussed in political, security, economic, social and cultural aspects since each title produces a contribution to the migration of Afghans to other countries. Poverty, unemployment, fragile economy, ethnic divisions, chain murders, civil war, and insecurity leads to intensive migration of young people and families. The main problems facing Afghanistan are the increasing threat of TALIBAN, ISISL and other rebel groups and the ongoing competition of foreign countries in Afghanistan. In parallel, the most critical events triggering migration from the country are the suicide fighters, continuing air strikes and murdering of civilians. The aim of this study is to reveal the main causes of the phenomenon of

migration by discussing the internal and external dimensions of the migration factors in Afghanistan. In this framework, both descriptive and analytical methods were used.

Key words: Migration, Migration Factors, Difficulties, Afghans

Introduction

Migration is a different demographic position in one country, one of the major demographic events is the transfer of population analysis from one place to another. Migration and the place of humanity have attracted the attention of scholars as a permanent subject in various disciplines of the humanities and social sciences. The phenomenon of migration is strongly linked to human life, as witnessed by history. Due to the large scale of migration in today's world, all human communities have somehow faced the difficulty of migration (Sajadpour, 2005). Migrations as a social phenomenon with different implications and reflections are economic, social, cultural, environmental and political events while migration causes different origins.

Its relation with security, which is one of the important issues in migration, has been in different dimensions in political, economic and cultural terms. The negative consequences of this migration may be the loss of national integrity and the fragmentation of the ethnic-religious composition of the host country, the creation of spy networks and anti-security activities, and the rise of riots and conflicts between refugees and indigenous peoples in a country. Elsewhere, the country faces many challenges and, in the absence of control and management of the country's migration, in the long run, negative consequences will arise. The present research is based on the nature and method of the descriptive-analytical research component. The information needed for the research was collected from library studies.

The main question of this article is the Afghan immigration based on the causes, the classification of the causes and the endangerment of the contents.

I. General Information On Afghanistan

Afghanistan is bordered by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan

in the north, Iran is on its west, and south and east of Pakistan and north of China. Afghanistan has a total border of 5514 kilometers with its neighbours.¹ The population of Afghanistan is 31.6 million according to the Central Statistical Institute.²

Afghanistan is of great importance in the region in terms of its geographical and geopolitical position, geostrategic, geoeconomic and geopolitical aspects. Throughout its history, this country has become one of the most important ways of exchanging culture, commerce, immigration, invasion and prosperity of the peoples of Central Asia.

Afghanistan is located in South Asia, Central and North Asia, the Middle East and the Far East, rich in mineral resources in the world, among the four major countries of the world. Afghanistan has small parts of each of these areas, has common cultural, racial and commercial interests with them, but has nothing to do with any of them. Although these areas are not separated, it is observed that Afghanistan has involved these borders of gigantic areas). This country is located as a bridge between them.³

In Afghanistan, various Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek tribes live in different cultures and ideologies and form an unbalanced power structure. The diversity and existence of different ethnic groups increasingly influenced society's unity for progress, economic development and security, as well as contradictory ideologies. According to the statistical institution most of the population of Afghanistan is Pashtuns. Other ethnic groups such as Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Pamiri, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Nurustani and Baluch have lived together despite ideological and cultural changes throughout history and have preferred to emigrate when they are subjected to some historical persecution. Contradictory ideologies among ethnic groups have led to ethnic divisions and serious disagreements on governance. The Pashtun supported the establishment of an Islamic society through the establishment of a traditional society, strict rules and regulations, the establishment of a basic rule of Sharia, and the establishment of a non-violent justice system throughout the legitimacy of civilian institutions in Afghanistan, which changed the existing structure through


1 Rahimi, 2012.p, 108.

2 <http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan>.

3 Bina, 2008, p. 10.

the transfer of power to religious leaders and institutions. The government and the constitution fought.⁴ Although the state is of ethnic origin in the country and has not become a universal and national component as in the demographic composition, Pashto constitutes 42% while Tajik 27%, Hazaras 9% Uzbeks 9% and the rest of Amak, Pamiri, Karghiz, Turkmen, Nuristan, Baluchi, Hindu, Camii, Arab groups 12%. All these groups are Muslim except the Hindus in Afghanistan.⁵

Map 1: Afghan Ethnic Groups




The ethnic structures of Afghanistan reflect the cross-border ethnic fabric of Afghanistan with a common racial and ethnic dimension in other countries. This research also refers to the relationship between countries preferred for emmigration and ethnic members. For example, the Afghans, Tajiks of Herat province prefer Germany while Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzspreferemigratingto Turkey. Most of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan are the Pashtuns, who have chosen to emigrateto Pakistan since the Pashtuns live on both sides of the Diyorandjudicial border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The participants prefer European countries and especially Germany (42,7%) followed by Iran (37,9%), Turkey (26,7%) and Pakistan (8,6%).

4 Mussa, 2015.

5 Halilullah, 2015.

Graphic 1: Desire to Leave Afghanistan in terms of Ethnicity



(Asian Foundation Institute 2017)

II. Theoretical And Conceptual Framework

The first conceptual explanation of migration rules were discussed in two articles in 1885 and 1889 by Ernest Jourge. For the first time he argued that migration is not a coincidence but there are some law ruling on migration. He presents a model of migration which involve to reason of migration beside the geography element.

1. The reasons that cause to leave homeland or start point,
2. The reasons that attract on target points.

Migration not only as a phenomenon but also as a process is affected by political, economic, cultural and social elements beside the geographical factors, that is why migration causes are studied across many reasons and aspects. The leaving and attraction are the most motivational points for migration from starting point to target points. The different between start and target point such as life standards, salary, security, cultural, religious and social reasons are most important on migration movements. Afgan migrants are divided in three categories, political migrants which immigrated because of their political believes, lots of immigrants leave their homeland cause of security issues and many others has been immi-

grated to reach and gain economic opportunities. (Research foundation 2016) The first two categories are related to oppression factors and the third category is related to stress factors.⁶

A number of immigration experts emphasize the oppression on the migration to Afghanistan. The internal distrust is a factor of oppression to gain power in some areas, such as the Taliban competition and some other military groups. The weakness of governance and corruption in Afghanistan (especially since the departure of ISAF forces) has been increasing and this is a significant factor on oppression. Among the other pressure factors, there are unemployment or underemployment, especially among young Afghans.⁷

An important development is the exposure to global high standards for life.

TV, internet and mobile phones throughout the country have made the Afghan people more accessible to information through the media. They communicate with friends and family networks living abroad and receive information on quality of life and placement in other countries. Their positive experiences and the information they provide affect the emigration from Afghanistan.

The causes and factors of migration vary for people in each region and country, and each person chooses emigration as per their needs. However, factors that make emigration more and more continuous are evolving, and each country and region has its own separate factors. Instability, unemployment and poverty, insecurity, discrimination, misunderstandings from other countries, injustice, corruption, poor education and training quality, disappointing future, weak government, one of the most important factors affecting immigration in Afghanistan. But a few leave their dreams to be proud of the attractiveness of more salaries, the benefits of living and prosperity, and the great prosperity and pride for themselves, the opening of migrants who are aggravated by them, and the place they are going to.⁸

III. Reasons Of Emigration From Afghanistan

III. 1. External Factors

6 Enstitü araştırma, 2016.

7 Zarghani, 2016.

8 <http://asiafoundation.org/ag2014poll>.

III. 1. 1. Proxy Wars

The wars between India and Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the US and Russia are governed by the regional and global powers sacrificed to the Afghan nation, and the Afghan people are victimized by regional and global rivals. In particular, the Pakistani state, which is adjacent to the south and south-eastern parts of Afghanistan, intensifies the war. The lack of co-operation between government leaders in Afghanistan and the world's major forces and neighboring countries contributes significantly to increasing distrust in the country: the background of security threats, intelligence from regional countries and the world forces within the Afghan arena reflect the geographical expansion of the civil war. While the region's neighbors, including China and Russia among others, share this political and military game, Afghanistan's strategic allies maintain their regional interests.

Since Americans cannot stop the war for more than a decade, they support the formation of a monopoly power in one nation otherwise Afghanistan does not play an important role in current politics. (Afghanistan Foreign Forces 2013)

The geopolitical and geostrategic aspects of Afghanistan are important to the United States, but after the 18-year war in Afghanistan, the US failed to establish a sustainable political and security structure in Afghanistan with the presence of 140,000 soldiers, the most expensive US military approach in Afghanistan is much more compared to its own interests.⁹

9

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/afghanistans-proxy-war>.

Map 2: Political Situation in Afghanistan



<https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/afghreg.htm>

III. 2. Internal Factors

III. 2. 1. Political and Security Factors

The ability of the Afghan government to ensure the safety of citizens is very low. In the survey conducted by the Asian Foundation, one in four respondents did not want to participate in the survey and stated that the reason was injustice and corruption in the state. In general, the tendency to emigrate is higher among those who do not trust the government than those with a high degree of trust in the government (Asian Foundation Institute 2017)

III. 2. 2. Weak Domination

18 years have passed since the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, but the security and domination of the state in Afghanistan is still a serious challenge. BBC research shows that about 15 million people, half of the Afghan population, live or are clearly found in Taliban-controlled areas being regularly attacked.

In the northern, western and eastern regions, the extent of their progress beyond their main centers in Southern Afghanistan is clear. The Taliban fell to areas like Sangin, Musikhla and Nad Ali in Helmand, where the

US-led forces decommissioned the Taliban in 2001.

Map 3: Taliban Presence in Afghanistan by Region



Sources: BBC, 23 August-21 November 2019

III. 2. 3. Political Instability and Security

Political instability was one of the main reasons for the country's composure and caused illegal emigration. In particular, over the past few years, the nightmare of the elections has brought the greatest material and moral losses to the people of Afghanistan, huge opportunities have been sacrificed to the government, and young people have been exposed to the most vulnerable, insecure, economic and political threats in society.

This political instability and internal difficulties caused youth to flee the country. Today, political instability in Afghanistan has not only increased emmigration, but has also caused great hardship. As long as Afghanistan does not have a stable political environment, the country will not be able to provide jobs, career, life and youth development, and the country will be emptied from a young and professional power. Increasing insecurity: security is one of the immediate needs of the Afghan people, otherwise no progress can be made. Peace and security are one of the people's unattainable hopes and no government has been able to provide comparative security in the country. Throughout the history of the country, war and insecurity aggravated the lives of the Afghan people and caused displacement, disability and the loss of millions of Afghan citizens.

Everywhere in their lives people need to secure their lives and property, and according to the Afghan Constitution, the government is responsible for ensuring security in this country. Without having a strategic plan and providing security, they cannot prevent the increase of illegal emigrants (Asian Foundation Institute 2017).

III. 2. 4. Organized Targeted Murders and Massacres


The targeted murders or organized murders are referred to when the government and elements of the government operate within the law or when the same actions are organized by organized groups (Taliban and Kurds). Such murders are religious ideological issues as well as those of foreign intelligence agencies in the past who oppose the interests of the opposition for freedom, independence and territorial integrity. Afghanistan has lost its elders and seniors from the intelligence agencies of neighboring countries in recent years. These factors have jeopardized the security of various ethnic groups and caused insecurity in society.

Between January 1 and June 30, 2018, UNAMA recorded 5122 civilian casualties (1,679 dead and 3430 injured), representing a total 3 percent drop over last year. It was also recorded in 2017 and 2016. Civilian loss rates increased by one percent to 5%.

Although the UNAMA mission has recorded a decline in civilian casualties due to certain incidents, a significant reduction in civilian casualties resulting from targeted and deliberate murders, in particular 18% of civilian casualties due to land conflicts. However, it has seen a dramatic increase in civilian casualties due to suicide bombings by anti-government elements.

Although UNAMA mission has recorded a decline in civilian casualties due to some incidents, a significant reduction in civilian casualties resulting from targeted and deliberate murders while the civilian losses increased by 18% caused by land conflicts. Of course, more than half of these figures are attributed to the militants of the Islamic State Horassan branch (ISIL).

Figure 2: Dead and Wounded Civilians between January-June 2009-2018




Source: (UNAMA Afghanistan 2018)

III. 2. 5. Effect of Drug Factor

The new survey shows that the rule of law, political instability, insecurity and corruption are weak, increased Afghan drug trafficking, unemployment, lack of adequate training facilities to achieve better jobs, lack of legal product markets, and lack of financial services. For the villagers, the country's social and economic reasons are increasing. There is a local and regional accusation, such as a chain linking the transfer of refugees from one place to another by small groups of local, regional and international. Trafficking people, under the control of the Taliban, plays an important role in the production and trafficking of narcotics. Smuggling is being realized. Herat, which has a common border with the northeastern part of Iran, plays an important role in opium smuggling and exchanges between local smugglers. Tajikistan is another region in Fayzabad in the Badakhshan province on the border of China and Pakistan regarding smuggling.

Figure 3: Drug Production between 2001-2017



Source: UNODC

The security concerns over the last decade dramatically increased from 2007 to 2016. Fears rose in question interviews with Afghans living in insecure areas, most of them in provinces. For example, Civilians do not have security in Sar-i-Pul, Faryab, Ghor and Kunaris increased more than 90% and fear of personal security increased significantly (80.3%).


In addition, the interrogation interviews gave clues to a positive change in reducing panic in the southeast. Mostly Pactia and Pacticawere found. In the interviews conducted with the Paktia Regional Office, the reporting rate increased by 29.5%. The mentioned panic was compared to the original sample, which means that the amount of panic decreased. Sampling in Pactia is probably the result of limitations. As ethnicity was affected by insecurity, ethnic differences decreased in the reported panic. (Asian Foundation Institute 2017)

III. 3. Economic Factors

One of the main problems of emigration is economic problems; the creation and expansion of the gap between the rich and poor countries, the negative change relationship between these societies, the high inflation rates in poor and developing countries, the low level of life and per capita income, the attractiveness of developing countries, the existence of living conditions in developing and developed countries, the difference is

the unbalanced movement of economic development in developed societies. In developing countries, inequality of income and expenditure, lack of job opportunities and job security, adaptation of graduates' expertise and lack of compliance with the needs of the country and the slow process of economic growth in developing societies are one of the reasons for the emigration of manpower. Employment and earnings are directly effective. When the salary of an external expert is the same as ten times that of a person in the country, emigration to that country will certainly be considered. (World Bank 2018)

Figure 4: Per Capita National Income and Poverty Ratio



III. 3. 1. Poverty and Economic Problems of Citizens

Poverty and economic problems in Afghanistan have become one of the factors that increase the flow of emigration between Afghans, many of which are the result of poverty and economic problems. The reduction of financial resources and low government interest in agriculture and animal husbandry, job constraints in the country, lack of suitable grounds for the growth of individual youth, the emergence of permanent natural disasters such as floods and droughts and the development of provinces with unfair and discriminatory government relations have increased poverty. The continuing war and poverty caused the Afghans to immigrate to other countries.

The national unity government cannot prevent an increase in illegal migration unless it takes practical measures to combat poverty. The government should make slogans and promises in the field of job creation within the country and provide workforce with young people. The World Bank recently published a report on the state of poverty in Afghanistan. The Bank published a report on the analysis of the poverty situation in Afghanistan on the years of 2014 and 2013. It attracted one million and 300 thousand people from the population of 32 million people (according to World Bank data). They live below the poverty line and earn less than \$ 1.25 a day. Approximately 35.8% of the Afghan population in 2012 transferred the responsibility of security to the internal forces; foreign institutions in Afghanistan supported the government. (Worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/latest-poverty-numbers-afghanistan-call-action)

III. 3. 2. Unemployment

Unemployment and wandering of the young and educated people increased the phenomenon of migration, today thousands of young people with high academic qualifications are ready to serve their homeland but have no space to work. Except for a small number of mediators or young people with money, these young people work but other talented and skilled young people are unemployed and have to leave their homeland and emigrate. The youth is the source of sustainable development, ensuring sustainability and full adoption of economic growth and control of consumer resources. When the youth are neglected by the government officials and people, the youth must emigrate and leave the country. In general, corruption and neglect of the fate of young people have deterred the country and the government.¹⁰

III. 3. 3. Unstable Employment

The main problem in the labor market is the creation of job opportunities in the last decade by grantor institutes. These are mostly temporary while focusing on long-term employment. "With the deterioration of the state of Afghanistan, Afghanistan's help desks have run out, leaving job-seekers or migrants unemployed. According to the report, there are more than 11 million people in Afghanistan and 7.9% of the Afghan people are

10 World Bank, 2018.

unemployed. The International Labor Organization stating that there are 823,000 estimated unemployed people in Afghanistan causing a major challenge for the Afghan government.¹¹

III. 4. Social And Cultural Factors

III. 4. 1. Injustice and Discrimination

Discrimination and injustice are one of the biggest problems of the youth of the country. To support, the mediator of an increasing number of staff has contributed to migration and increase of migration. However, the Afghan people made great efforts and sacrifices to ensure justice and governance. But so far the injustice and corruption in the country remained intact. Until now, employees of public and private organizations are employed on an intermediary, coercion and bribery basis, not on merit basis. Due to corruption, discrimination and mediation, many important state responsibilities remain to be unemployed and non-professional people and are greatly affected by the disappointment of the government and the people of the government. The first national unity government should provide justice in the country to prevent the increase of illegal immigration.

III. 4. 2. Education Problems:

Another factor contributing to the increase in migration is the lack of a healthy education and training system in the country. Many families are leaving their houses to educate their youth since the education and higher education system in Afghanistan faces major challenges such as lack of academic and educational facilities, lack of professional professors, lack of balance in the system, lack of meritocracy, insecurity and certainty, moral corruption and social insecurity in the environment. Unfortunately, the lack of education and admission capacity in public universities has been created to earn money and establish the role of a certification facility in some private educational institutions. On the other hand, public universities are not capable of attracting all graduates, and the number of graduates of the twelve classes is falling each year. The government of national unity should increase the migration of Afghan people by rearranging and strengthening the education and public and private education system in

11 Jamshidi, 2014.

the country, paying attention to the status of teachers and professors in the country and attracting young people to education and higher education.

III. 4. 3. Cultural Problems:

One of the factors contributing to migration is traditional and superstition: customs and traditions have left many young people with unsolved problems. The spread of non-patterned folk culture to the religious and economic agenda of the people and the increase in forms, the color of the luxury market, the paralysis of state and family management organizations made life scarce.

A typical wedding will cost at least one million Afghans, making the same amount of money in Afghan society is difficult and young people have to go to other countries to make money. Young people pay a heavy fee for their migrant lives due to wedding expenses, and we have heard many times that the ship carrying Afghan refugees sank at sea.

III. 4. 4. Having Relatives Abroad

Having relatives abroad is still accepted as a common factor in decisions on migration. According to a recent meeting of migration experts, Afghan families who try to live abroad usually send a family member (usually male) from abroad to prepare for the migration of all members of the family abroad through capital and communication. This year's survey asked Afghans whether a member of their families or relatives lived abroad. The results show that 38.5% of Afghans have a family member or relative living abroad and more than one-third (37.3%) of their relatives provide financial assistance to their families. When asked to choose most of their relatives lived in the two countries, the answer is Iran by 43.0%, Turkey by 16.5%, Germany by 23.9%, Pakistan by 36% increased from 10.6%. The vast majority of respondents [87.1% (US 7.8) and Saudi Arabia (7.1%)] had family members in Western countries, while almost one-third (30.5%) reported family members in non-Western countries. Having a family member abroad may be a factor in the desire to leave Afghanistan. Afghans with relatives living abroad are likely to say that they will leave the country if appropriate. (1% and 20%, respectively). It is less important if relatives provide financial assistance to their families.

Financial aid or not, the percentage of those who have helping rela-

tives living abroad and relatives abroad is 30%. (Survey of Afghan People, 2016)

IV. Demographic Factors

The findings of the research on the desire to migrate reveal important differences in demographic structure as the determinant of migration. For example, frequent insecurity as one of the reasons for leaving women is much higher than for men (81.0% and 72.4%). On the other hand, men may migrate more than women because they are unemployed (60.5% vs. 47.7%). Married Afghans deny the existence of more frequent job opportunities than other Afghans (13%, 6% and 7.3%).

V. Special Factors

In addition to those factors and factors allowing migration and escape from community and other issues causing the scientific elite of the society to escape;

V. 1. Ignoring Research in the Country:

Qualitative growth and research neglect in universities in underdeveloped countries, and education, research, computer and scholarship opportunities, and scholarships are several reasons that bring many students to the United States. In recent years, the number of private universities in the country has increased exponentially without the appropriateness of any curricula or disciplines, and more emphasis has been placed on quantification, since the teaching methods of many classes are based solely on traditional and theories and memories. Lack of information, the use of traditional and old methods and non-standard tools, low level of research and research in scientific centers and lack of coordination between research and practice, the allocation of inadequate funds for research and development, the development of evidence, among other factors that cause the most dissatisfaction among students. Interestingly, the 159 independent countries in the world attract one-third of their population, between fifteen and thirty countries, 95% of the elite budget (18), and attract researchers and elites from all over the world due to the applicability and scope of research and development activities in developed countries. has provided them with an ever expanding field of development that deepens

the gap and distance between developed and underdeveloped countries.

V. 2. Lack of Merit in the System

As has been seen in Afghanistan, most enterprises are assigned to incapable people, and the assignment of jobs are based on the relationship between criteria, the incompatibility of jobs with the expertise of individuals, the state bureaucracy and the monopoly of the profession have caused the emigration of the elite. There is no precise statistics on this subject.

V. 3. Hopelessness for the Country's Future:

The spread of insecurity and unemployment continue to worry people for the future. Lack of hope and uncertainty about the future led to an increase in emigration. Afghanistan Independent Commission on Human Rights issued a report on the state of economic and social rights in Afghanistan, arguing that about 15% of Afghans say they are disappointed with the future situation. The 34th presidential elections in 1392, a widespread and powerful election campaign, were seen as a window of hope for people where people showed hope for a better future. However, tough elections and subsequent political tensions have negatively affected people's hopes. Reports show that over time, people have less hope for the future. A recent poll by the Asian Foundation shows that Afghanistan's optimism for the future has reached its lowest level in the last decade. Approximately 36 percent of Afghans in 2015 and 54 percent last year state that the country is on the right track. This report shows that confidence in military forces is 1 percent higher than last year and that confidence in national police forces has decreased by 3 percent (Afghanistan Human Rights Commission, 2015).

V. 4. Future Expectations: Afghanistan is in difficult conditions and aspirations of its citizens as well. Like the bright future in peace and prosperity having a job having a home having security these are the basic elements for immigrants who want to return to their country again.

VI . Summary Of Emigration From Afghanistan

The table below gives information about the emigration from Afghanistan.

Table 1: Impressive Factors for Afghanistan Emigration

Origin	Objective	Effective Factors	Evaluations
Afghani- stan	Nearby countries Iran Pakistan - Tajikistan - Uzbekistan, Turkmeni- stan, China	Lack of sovereignty in different regions of the country	Lack of migration management.
Centre KA- BUL	Countries in the region India-Tur- key-Kazakh- stan,	Afghanistan contin- ues war and lack of security for citizens	Lack of a strategy to eliminate war
Eastern Asia	Asia	Economic weak- ness, unemploy- ment in society	Lack of specific infrastructure and strategy to elim- inate and reduce poverty
South-East	North Amer- ica	Chain murders, kidnappings, rob- bery	Lack of govern- ment attention to ensure the safety of various groups
Southwest	Europe	Discrimination and prejudice	Inequality and in- justice on behalf of the government.
West	Russia and Eastern Eu- rope	Paying money to get married.	Education, level of poverty, unhealthy competition in the community.

Northeast	UAE countries	Unknown future	Lack of development paths in the country, strategic economic, political, security plans.
HAZARAJAT CenterBamyan	Oceania countries	Cultivation, production, narcotics process, formation of internal, external and human mafia groups and the shape of small nets	Lack of government governance over poppy cultivated field. State support from major regional mafia groups
Northwest	North Europe	Afghanistan's intervention in the political affairs of neighboring countries.	Specific, ethnic, religious, linguistic, financial and party relations by neighboring countries.

Source: Afghan Refugee Ministry

VII . Migration Of Afghanistan According To The United Nations Statistics

1. About 2.5 million registered Afghan refugees live in countries in the region.
2. 30% of Afghanistan's population returned as refugees.
3. There are more than 68 million refugees in the world; Afghanistan has the largest number of refugees in the world after Syria.
4. One of the five Afghan refugees in the world.
5. Afghan refugees account for about 70 percent of the refugee population in Asia and the Pacific.
6. 2.6 million Afghan refugees were registered in more than 70 countries.
7. Iran and Pakistan jointly host 95 percent of Afghan refugees in the world.
8. More than 50% of Afghan refugees are under the age of 18.
9. In 2014, Afghan asylum seekers were the fourth largest group of

asylum seekers in the world.

10. In 2014, Afghan children are the largest non-affiliated or unprotected group applying for citizenship.

11. Half of the Afghan population is immigrants to other countries.

12. In recent years, in addition to the civil wars during the Soviet period and the Soviet invasion, the migration in Afghanistan, which we will present with the following statistics, has accelerated.

13. Today, seven children die every day in the country.

14. 50 mothers die every day during birth.

15. 1 in 5 girls of school age can attend school.

16. 80% of schools have been destroyed by wars.

17. 2 million readers out of 6 million students and 1 million do not have access to education.

18. 70,000 Afghans lost their husbands in the war.

19. There are 60,000 children only in Kabul exposed to child traffickers and sexual harassment or organ transplants.

20. Afghan refugees make up 15% of the world's refugees.

Source: (Return Migration to Afghanistan 2016)

Conclusion

The migration must be different types of local or international, compulsory or optional, individual or group, legal or illegal, permanent or temporary. In addition, the quality of migrant labor is now seen as a criterion for the classification of migration: factors that play an important role in migration, such as political factors, security, economic factors or human and cultural factors, can be considered as the main roots of migration. Afghanistan is one of the high-income countries in the world. Effective factors contributing to the migration of Afghanistan are the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the roots of this imposed war. Afghanistan's geographical location contributed to the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. The external forces in Afghanistan have created an alarming situation in the region: there are other factors that continue the war in Afghanistan in addition to the different ideologies of the regional countries that added the war to the region and internal problems that the government cannot guarantee. And the lack of security has led to organized murders among Afghan citizens, and daily civil and military losses have been experienced,

while economic issues, poverty, lack of employment, lack of development strategies to improve livelihoods, lack of sustainable jobs have become the main cause of Afghan migration, and today Afghanistan migration has taken a second place in the world in the last decade. Most of the Afghan people immigrate to neighbouring countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. An increase in the migration of young people to European countries can be emphasized. Lack of clear hopes to improve the situation in Afghanistan and lack of better prospects for immigration to neighboring countries increased migration. Other factors, measure of migrationalthough developed countries are far from Afghanistan, migrants try to reach their and keep the lowest cultural and social ties with the origin country. Some Afghan refugees try to live better that is why they are often forced to follow this path of death. In last years, several Afghanistan citizens have drowned in the sea.

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Agricultural Imperialism in Africa

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Abstract

Agriculture is the main activity of the African population and provides an important part of jobs in Africa. About 48% of the total population lives of agriculture and represents a large part of the continent's economy. Agriculture, apart from being a subsistence crop, agricultural products are the main products that are traded between the countries of the continent. In some ways, this helps to combat food insecurity for the benefit of the country affected by the food crisis and also to boost relations between neighboring countries. Today, although the continent has most of the uncultivated arable land on the planet, it is still the most continent affected by the scourge of famine. The main causes are climate change, irregular rainfall in some areas, particularly the Sahel, inadequate crop cultivation and population growth. To these edaphic factors is added a new

phenomenon of land appropriation for the benefit of foreign investors. An increasingly worrying situation in countries where the only source of income for the population lies in the agricultural exploitation of land. This phenomenon remains alarming since, after soaring food prices around the world in 2008, the African continent land has been coveted by foreign investors from the North. Their aim was for some to exploit the agricultural potential of these lands in order to guarantee food security in their origin country by exporting the cultivated products, and for the others to increase the production of bio-fuels. These land-grabbing transactions only worsen the situation of the countries where it is practiced. It leads to a rural exodus from the peasants to the big cities, a decrease of arable land, a drop in the national agricultural productivity and without counting the environmental damages that it can have. Nevertheless the presence of all these investors should not be seen from the same angle, some can boost the economy of the region where they are located, creating jobs, equip farmers for good performance improvement practice or help them to sell their crops easily.

Key words: Africa, agriculture, imperialism.

Introduction

Africa, a continent covering an area of 30 415 873 km² of the earth's surface, extends over 8000 km from north to south and 7400 km from east to west (Continent Africain, liste des pays d'Afrique, regions, climat, cartes, 2012). It is composed of 55 countries, which divide the continent into five major parts which are: North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa. Because of its vast expanse and immense wealth of natural resources and fertile lands, the continent has been coveted by foreign powers for centuries. This covetousness results in an invasion of the continent by the West with the simple and only goal of distracting the sons and daughters of the continent from their natural treasure and removing them from their cultures and civilization. This as well as missionaries have entered in Africa and this step announce the beginning of the 300-year-long colonization, during which time the poor African people suffered all forms of torture and humiliation on their own continent under the complicit look of some of his sons. As this is not enough, after the colonization, tribal wars (Rwandan genocide) and religious (Muslim and Christian: case of Central Africa) are fueled and epidemics (Poliomyelitis, AIDS, Ebola) spread. All this, for the sole purpose of exterminating a people whose only crime is inherited from a continent with extremely rich soil and subsoil.

I do not want to dwell too much on the harmful effects of this colonization suffered by the african people and not on the invasion of the continent; but rather to try to show that it is not yet too late to save at least what remains of it. Today, Africa is the continent with more than half of the world's not yet exploited arable land (Comprendre le potentiel agricole du continent africain, 2019), about 60% of the total surface area (Agriculture et sécurité alimentaire, 2017). So turning to responsible agriculture is it not the solution to end the food crisis that is plaguing the continent and the chronic begging of African states who spend all their time

begging for food for their people? From our point of view God has given us everything and by will and the commitment of all we can turn the tide and talk about the continent this time in the positive sense that will not be reduced to its old image of the rich continent but with the poorest people on the planet. Africa has all the potential to take care of itself. According to (TRANSFORMATION DE L'AGRICULTURE EN AFRIQUE, 2015) Africa has land, water resources, skilled labor and a young population.

The vast majority of the african population is present in rural areas and lives mainly of activities such as agriculture, livestock and hunting. However, agriculture is very diverse and differs by region. In West Africa, for example, farming is done seasonally and the harvest is usually for local consumption: it is subsistence farming. In addition to this form of agriculture, since the rainy season lasts only 3 to 4 months in most Sahelian regions, another form of agriculture called "off-season" or market gardening has developed. It is practiced mainly along the river and permanent or temporary water courses such as ponds, lakes and oasis. The main food crops include cereals (millet, sorghum, maize), tubers (yams, cassava), legumes (beans, peanuts) and many vegetables and fruits. It should also be noted that export crops particularly concern cotton, coffee, cocoa and vanilla.

Today Africa is still the target of a new and very disturbing phenomenon, which is land grabbing by foreign powers, otherwise called land grabbing (Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012) and 'accaparement des terres' in French.

This process of land grabbing takes the form of land contracting for the benefit of foreign or domestic investors. For the first case, there is generally an implication of the State which defines the clauses of the contract with the new acquirer, in this case the State is the only master and judge even if that displeases the customary owner. The latter helpless in the face of the state sometimes receives prejudices for damages. As for the second case appropriation of land is a form of acquisition by purchase or lease.

The countries of the continent most affected by this plague are Sudan with nearly 4 million hectares, Ethiopia nearly 1.2 million hectares and Mozambique or at least 50% of 2.7 million hectares are granted to foreign investors (Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012).

Like any system this phenomenon in turn has its advantages as well as its disadvantages. For foreign investors the acquisition of land in Afri-

ca will enable them to guarantee food security in the countries of origin where arable land is becoming less and less scarce.

I. The Causes and Consequences of Land Grabbing in Africa

The motivation of investors to own land in Africa, has never been for a goal of helping developing countries to better guarantee food security but rather to satisfy their own interest ie to produce export crops (agro-fuels, flowers, cereals, etc.). According to Castel and Kamara (2009), three main reasons underpin these investments are the growth and transformation of demand for food, fertilizer and biofuel; a scarcity of agricultural land in the world; and the fact that developed countries do not have enough land and water to feed their people. This phenomenon of land grabbing has increased with the rising value of agricultural products and the food crisis that shook the world in 2008 (Hopsort, 2014). As a result, land in african countries is the most sought-after, given the often fragile land status that facilitates the installation of external investors. Is it not in this sense that the Export-Import Bank of China encourage Chinese farmers to go to Africa to exploit the opportunities offered by agribusiness?

Today about most than 10 million arable land of the continent are affected by these transactions, we can mention among other things, in Sudan alone by the investor of the private group Jarch Capital the United States has an area of 400, 000 ha, the United Kingdom with 45,000 ha through the CAMS group (company of electricity production) with the goal of producing 250 million liters of ethanol per year from sweet sorghum, 28,000 ha for government EAU used in the cultivation of alfalfa and we also note the presence of Saudi Arabia through the group Hail Agricultural with an area of 9200 ha acquired (Castel and Kamara, 2009).

These investments raise several controversies on the use of the grounds (The consequences on are multiple. We can cite.) the massive displacements of a section of the local population towards the big cities or the search for new lands, land insecurity, an increase in regional conflicts, etc. There is a growing interest for agrofuels, particularly to supply the growing market of the European Union and public companies SINOPEC (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation) and CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation); while the FAO has consistently reminded that more than a billion people on earth still do not eat their fill and most of them are located in Africa (Dabat, 2011).

Table: Realized and actual land acquisitions in several African countries (Gabas, 2011).

Pays	Announced projects	Announced surfaces (ha)	Projects effectively implemented	Lands actually acquired (not necessarily highlighted)
Madagascar	60	4 100 150	7	18 900
Malawi	8	196 037	6	171,037
Mali	21	695 105	6	180,105
Mozambique	51	11 058 913	10	71 000
Zambia	13	3 701 515	1	45 000
Ethiopia	76	3 844 647	10	395 500

II. State Responsibility

The role of the state is paramount in this context of large-scale land acquisition for the benefit of foreign investors. Southern governments are often the first to make hundreds of thousands of hectares available to investors (Merlet, 2009). It is even very difficult for an individual to do it without the approval of state institutions. This practice is sometimes done in a form of bilateral cooperation between the state and the investor in total disregard of the rights of the inhabitants, and the contract of acquisition when it is established, rests most often on principles "we you give up our land and you help us to reduce the unemployment rate by creating jobs in your turn or in return to build a hospital or asphalt us such number of km of road to facilitate access between cities etc ...". Under the "domaniality" principle inherited from the colonial period, the state sells or sells land that has been traditionally occupied and used by people during a generations for a long time (Merlet, 2009). What is very unfortunate in this form of bilateral cooperation, most often it is the investor who sets its own rules of the game with the support of some corrupt authorities. This is how the poor ordinary citizen who is not aware of anything will be grabbed from his piece of land with a promise of compensation. The latter when done is very insignificant vis-a-vis the value of the land or will end up in the courts in an interminable justice process. The state sometimes even gives the reserves destined for the preservation of the environment, reserves prohibited from all activities whether agricultural or other uses.

The reasons for all these ills could be amputated to the mismanagement that prevails in most African countries. This results in an accentuation of corruption, the misappropriation of public denials, favoritism and social injustice etc ... the irrefutable proof is justified by the fact that only a handful of men in the service of the state holds the great part of the country's wealth.

III. Land Marketing: Purchase or Rental

Family conflict is one of the main causes of land sales in towns and villages in african countries. In general, the land represents the common heritage of the whole family and the principal responsible is the head of the family who has the heavy responsibility of safeguarding it. The land is inherited from father to son, above all it represents the dignity of the family. A landless family is like one without a reputation. During this time, no family is spared from the conflicts that can arise around the grounds. It is most often triggered as a result of the disappearance of the family caregiver otherwise the death of the father. After his death, all the family's eyes are focused on the inheritance distribution, and sometimes in this spot there may be a conflict of interest around the plots of land left by the deceased. The difficulty of understanding obliges the sale of the lands of times at ridiculous prices. Another form of land marketing is the purchase of land for the poor in need at very low prices which they resell after more expensive. This practice is a boon for the rich, since generating exorbitant profits, it could be resold after a few years at most three times its purchase price.

Leasing, a practice generally based on debt against land "you lend me a certain amount of money and I give you my piece of land until repayment". In this case you will find that the person is in need but does not want to get rid of his land. So it is better for him to conclude this kind of market until change of situation. As its name suggests, some give themselves to a pure and simple lease of their lands, they fix you an amount to give and in turn you will have a free access to exploit it according to the term of the lease.

IV. Conclusion

On the sidelines of some negative point of the system, bilateral co-

operation between foreign investors and states of African countries based on a modernization of agriculture for a better agricultural production could be a good thing in general for Africa. But for the smooth running of the transactions the local population must imperatively be involved when making decisions because it is the first link in the chain that will suffer the impacts. Compliance with the rules of the contract by both parties is an asset. The exploitation contracts must be based on one form of winning winner so that no one party will feel aggrieved for the benefit of the other. A reformation of the land of the agrarian system in Africa is essential.

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Historical Developments and Challenges of Ethiopian Education

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Abstract

The paper is a subsequent review of historical development and challenges of Ethiopian education, a short glance of the generic overview about the historical evolution of Ethiopian education and a brief snapshot of the some challenges encountered since the current regime with a rough focused on the last three political systems dominant churches education since 1908 along with its primary mission of training individuals for priesthood, Christian faith and culture.

Key words: Ethiopia, education, Derg regime

Introduction

Education is not unimaginably novel to a country like Ethiopia which is a home of human civilization. Religious education were prominently dominated by the education of the country, orthodox Christianity had monopolized education in Ethiopia since 1908 by Emperor Menelik, and Church schools prepare individuals to a clergy and many other religious duties. Access to education were only allowed to children of nobility, very limited number of tenant farmers and those associated with elite families. All the rest personalities were hardly get education to themselves and to their children. Similarly Quranic education were given by Islamic institutions particularly in eastern and western community of the country. The Ethiopian government declared modernization of its education in 1908. This modern education was so called to be more organized and institutionalized during the last three systems of political governance, each distinguished by its own education policy. Namely Emperor Haileselassie's regime (1930-1974), the military government or Derg regime (1974-1991) and the present regime (1991 onwards). Despite its recent establishment, the Ethiopian education was not yet completely secular in practice. Aweke (2015) stated the rote memorization of content was the sole philosophical manifestation of church education and are still practiced in modern schooling of Ethiopia today.

1. Education in The Imperial Governments (1930-1974)

The period between 1941 and 1970 is usually known as imperial era. The emperor being the primary figure of the monarchy excised a power of purse, education was seen as vehicle of progress with all power dictated by the emperor, and the centrality of education was one of the believed principle. The education sector of this era were assumed a one of the best staffed and financed as well. The emperor used by his personal motto of

education and progression, but still there is no consensus of what emperor had exactly mean by this statements except various speech on the sector where the emperor addressed civilization and modernization of the country through education. The coverage and quality of education is not in a good manner, the were variety of external actors who affiliated the sector, like World Bank, USAID and UNESCO as the major partners in planning, financing and supporting the sectorial developments.

These external actors played the major role and influenced the content “what to teach” and the process of teaching “how to teach” and even to whom education was supposed to represent. According to Tekeste one of the persuasive message that these external education actors including World Bank, and UNESCO preached in all developing countries was the role of education in economic developments. In this regard some important elements were overlooked and due to widespread poverty and low economic status of these developing world education sector was strategically opined by World Bank and USAID. Countries like Ethiopia UNESCO was highly dominated of how educational betterments has to be to ensure and expand education system in the country.

The education of empirical era had yet offer a room for a certain tumbling steps to move the country to modernization mainly western ideology. Beginning from 1940s to 1950s there were considerable expansion of schools with certain incentive boarding of which students freely access certain schooling facilities such as school uniforms. Suh an intensives were common in vocational secondary schools to lure brilliant students and up on completion of their vocational education there were availability of jobs opportunities for these graduate with attractive pay in accordance to academic qualification and market requirements. Even though, the empirical period return to educational investment was found to be understood, high discrepancy existed on the issue of employments. With only few years of schooling children from nobility position themselves in a higher ranking post with a rewarding income. Schooling was free of charge and appealing more lower class children, but those who were from humble family background were less likely to worry about educational investment, rather employment and individual income liability was determined by the royal kinship and close tie to the aristocracy.

Education had no clear direction and strategies that reflect the country's position in the continent and intergenerational heritage line. In prac-

tice empirical governments had geared its educational objective towards modernization of the sector through western assumption. Teachers and education administrators were expatriate from western world while the content of schooling were foreign to the country's context and children has to be ready with this new challenging to be effective in the government offices. Curriculum was irrelevant although there were some graduate who count on government employments with good remuneration. This was because the curriculum were developed by foreign educators with different background since the demise of Italian colonial occupation. According to Negash the curriculum in place was incapable of producing citizen who had the capability to interpret, enrich and adapt the country to a new need and changing condition.

Ethiopian education of these era was clearly influenced by Orthodox Church of which the emperor had used it as his main yardstick. Due to these Christianity was found as the sole religious right in the country and any other religious morality were not allowed, the education was geared towards Christian missionaries particularly by the teaching of Lutheran missionaries whom were entitled to produce well equipped Christian missionary citizen who respect the king, Christianity and the country. All other religion particularly Islam which had widespread of followers were deprived the right to inculcate and even claim as a followers.

According Aweke (2015) all none Christians were obliged to learn the Bible as an Amharic text book in schools. Another important factors which influenced Ethiopian education of this era was modernization of education to produce well trained elite with western ideology. These also assisted by emperor's propensity of Christian supremacy as westerner's invasion was initially religious in disguise.

Another visible factor that impacted Ethiopian education was the role of education to economic development of the state proposed by UNESCO, but this was basically rooted from a pioneering study carried out by Theodore Schulz. Schulz study which was originally based on American context had created serious distortion and misconception of whether investment on education had directly linked and leads to increased income at both collective and individual level in the context of Ethiopia. International agencies like World Bank and UNESCO adopted this study on the context which also aggravated the issues.

Here one could easily understand that the contextualization of such

a study result on Ethiopian context one has to take into account the economic status of the country. Only when economic of a particular nation is growing investment in education may lead to considerable returns by its investors which In turn leads to increased income, but country like Ethiopia where stagnant economic record is being registered investment in education didn't lead to tangible return.

The education system of Ethiopia in between 1941-1970 was directed towards more on academics who could be entrusted with clerical tasks and the curriculums reflects modernization of education, but not the socio-economic condition of the country. Finally, before the down fall of the empirical government World Bank confirmed that education sector is facing a delicate crisis, subsequently the majority of school age children had no access to education and the country's goal of universal primary education for all by 1980 became knowingly unrealistic.

Due to variety of internal factors raised against monarchy political upheaval became inevitable, among these was the serious famine hit on Muslim community in the northern part of the country of which the emperor ignored and tried not address at all, the government also diligently strive to hide the situation from the international community according to Tekeste more than 1000,000 individual died others displaced from their settlement as consequence of this epidemic famine. Gradual change in both living standard and dissatisfaction of the people became visibly widespread. Soldiers opposed of how government is dealing with secessionist in Eritrea, university students demonstration against government which draw international community attention to situation of the country particularly the famine in northern part of the country and increased price of the fuel which aggravated the cost of living money other factors contributed the down fall of the empirical government system in 1974 with its education policy.

II. Education in Derg Regime (1974-1991)

After the downfall of the monarchy ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie, a military governments come to power and the country announced republic ruled by communist workers party. All power was centralized by the central government, land were under state control and country followed by command economy. Under the military government the path of scientific socialism were considered as the most appropriate strategy to bring

the country out of its back work stage of scientific developments. The military leadership implemented what is so called provisional military administrative council literally known as Derg to rule the country and were referred to us one of the most doctrine Marxist regime in the 20th century.

Subsequently after the coming of power the military governments announced a nationwide campaign know as *development in cooperation campaign for knowledge and work* with in which eradicating illiteracy and right to primary education to all children was one of the visible elements. The governments emphasized a nationwide implementation of mass education through formal schooling and national adult literacy with particular reach to rural areas including very remote and neglected part of the nation. In its literacy campaign the Derg governments carried out sequential campaigns to ensure literacy in the country which was considered as one of the best achievements of the regime with its numeric increase of enrolment rate in the country.

Tremendous quantitative expansions of the primary education were recorded during military government than any other regime in the history of Ethiopian education. According to Zenebe (2009) the enrolment rate increase from 15.8% in 1974 to 36.2% in 1988-89. With this increase of enrolments the country adopted shift system of schooling where students follow their schooling duties either in morning or afternoon for effective utilizations of limited schooling facilities.

Many changes were taken place in the sector including increased number of schools availabilities especially in rural areas and small towns. Education of the country during military government were supported primarily by Sweden. However, the expansion of the primary education faced various impediments of which lack of sufficient financial resource was the prominent obstacles which later on resulted a complete decline of enrolments, equity, equality and relevant at all level of education system.

III. Education in The Present Government (1991- onwards)

The military ruling came to an end due to prolonged devastating civil war against which it was finally overthrown from the ruling on May 1991. Political transformation from military to parliamentary democratic ruling were declared by the current ruling party known as Ethiopian people's revolutionary democratic front (EPRDF). Immediately EPRDF call for a nationwide conference where transitional government with a new charter

allowing multiparty system were established until the election scheduled in 1993.

With its new charter Ethiopia ethnic diversity were empowered and recognized 12 autonomous regions and two chartered cities. However, a subsequent new constitution clearly came into effect in 1994 reduced the number into a nine autonomous regional state. The regions were based mostly by ethnic language and its historic homeland of the people. These nine regions were Somali, Oromia, Gambela, Benishangul gumuz, Harari, nations, nationalities and People of the Ethiopia, Amhara, Afar and Tigray. Among these autonomous regional states Tigray which is minority in comparison with other regions except Harari, Gambela Benishangul entertain the long term ruling of the country from 1991-2018, with principally paper value democratic, Amhara also ruled the country before 1991, all other regions were politically oppressed and deprived the right to rule and political affiliation particularly Oromia which is majority in Ethiopia's population, Somali (Ogadenia) which also falls the second largest region in terms of geographic territory and rich natural resource, Harari and Afar.

These four region were marginalized in the overall Ethiopia politics in terms of education and infrastructure and except Oromia, Tigray, Amhara and SNNP. The rest are commonly known as the least developed regions in the country's context.

Hence, Ethiopian education and politics has its root from Christianity the countries politics has never been free from religious discrimination geared towards Muslim belonging. In 2013 Muslim students in the public universities were obliged not to perform prayers in the university dormitory and almost all of the public universities forbid Muslims women cover their head in the campus. Many Muslim students withdraw from the universities while many other innocents were arrested.

EPDF government which ruled by the people in principle not in practice declared decentralized education system. Regional governments were given authority to administer their education; however, the secondary education remain under federal government. Federal government take also the responsibilities of implementing primary education.

In comparison with other regimes EPRDF rebuild the education system and set a new education and training policy with the main objective of answering certain educational problems which has not been addressed

by the former regimes such as inequitable distribution of schooling service, lack of quality and relevance and the long term undemocratic nature of the previous regimes. Primary education was prioritized in the new educational training policy and more emphasis were put on access to primary education with enhanced quality, equity and relevance.

The new education and training policy had implemented various educational sector development programs (ESDP), for a maximum time span of five years beginning from 1997 with its long term objectives of achieving universal primary education by the year 2015 even though this was not successful. However a significant increase on enrolments, number of professional teachers were observed while unfortunately the country have been registered the highest illiteracy rate in the continent.

IV. Major Difficulties

The Ethiopian education had encountered numerous problems and still stand least to its counterpart nations in the continent. Due to variety of political unrest and subsequent regimes change, each with its own political philosophy the sector has evidenced huge progressive impediments mainly on access, relevance, equity and equality. Even today there are high regional disparities of which some regions like Afar, Somali, benishangul gumuz and Gambela are highly marginalized, especially in these regions the education quality is extremely poor with inadequately trained and poorly motivated teachers and also lack of instructional material. One fundamental problem faced by the country was that the aim, organization and philosophy of education were predominantly foreign to the country's context which in turn lead to the sector lose its functional role.

The widespread use of English a medium of instruction from secondary to higher education had also negatively impacted the quality of education, as there were no dependable prediction made prior to its eventual implementation rather than blind westernization of education. The system was criticized for discriminatory and irrelevant to the employment markets. During the Italian occupation the country's education were obliged to reflect the fascist ideology and produce more soldiers, assimilate Italian culture and geared in a way that improve Italian ambitions, therefore, the curriculum syllabus and teaching material were forged from other countries. After the Italian invasion in 1936-1941 Ethiopian education was modeled and framed to British education system and teacher were im-

ported from England, Ethiopia faced many social historical and political obstacles that have impeded education progress for centuries of which the country has got today the highest illiteracy rate and least economic growth.

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Knowledge Economy and Economic Growth: Cameroon Case

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show the importance and impacts of knowledge economy on Cameroon's economy growth. Concept of knowledge economy and its growth

is defined in the firstly. Then the digital economy boom and its contribution on growth analysed. In Cameroon, the digital economy encompasses economic and social activities that are enabled by platforms such as internet, mobile and sensor networks, including e-commerce. Since the arrival of the digital economy in Cameroon, its total contribution to the country's growth is composed of a direct effect via the accumulation of digital capital and the indirect effect measured by the diffusion of digital capital into the productive system. In full swing, the knowledge economy is a strategic sector of the Cameroonian economy and its contribution to the growth of the country is not negligible. It creates added value for the economy and its weight in the contribution to growth is greater than that of certain sectors.

Keys words: knowledge economy, economic growth, Cameroun

Introduction

“The digital economy defined by the changing characteristics of information, computing, and communications is now the preeminent driver of economic growth and social change. With a better understanding of these fundamental transformations, we can make wiser decisions whether we are investing in research, products, or services, or are adapting our laws and policies to the realities of a new age.” Neal Lane, April 1999.

However, the knowledge-based economy is the result of a shock and a close relationship between a relative tendency towards of increasing the share of intangible capital (education, training, human capital, research and development, etc.) and Dissemination of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) (Internet, broadband infrastructures). Thus, this relationship has considerably altered the sources and velocity of innovation and technological change, after the stability of the Fordist production regime. Knowledge, education, information and innovation are the main indicators of the economic growth at the globalization process. Therefore, knowledge importance for economic growth is deepened by the late economic crisis, which interfered with the all developed countries. In their development programs, African countries in general and Cameroon in particular have a growing interest in promoting and developing new information and communication technologies. Compared with developed countries, whose competitiveness is much more dependent on technological progress, African countries, on the other hand, rely on comparative advantage in lower factor prices, especially on labour force. Therefore, technological progress depends on the access to more knowledge and information. Today, the concept of digital economy or knowledge economy is more used. In this type of economic model, education, knowledge, research, innovation, technology infrastructure are more interconnected.

The purpose of this paper is to define importance of knowledge economy as well as human capital onto economic growth, in the Cameroon case. The concept of knowledge economy and economy growth are presented in this paper.

More developed countries invest in knowledge more than less developed countries, consequently the more investments in knowledge the country has, the more developed is and vice versa, *ceteris paribus*. Nowadays, the rule of knowledge into growth is very important. Knowledge economy is indicator of economic growth that means the more country invests in knowledge, the higher rate of economic growth it will have in future, *ceteris paribus*.

The database of Cameroon in the database of the World Bank are explored to see how much Cameroon invests in knowledge economic between 2010 and 2018.

I. The concept of Knowledge economy

The term “knowledge economy” seems to have been used for the first time by Peter Drucker in 1969 for all “knowledge intensive”¹ activity sectors. The expression is then flourished and gives rise to a rich discourse, but it is clear that there is no definition of the knowledge economy that consensus. The OECD characterizes it as “based directly on the production, dissemination and use of knowledge and information”². For Dominique Foray, it “essentially corresponds, in each country, to the sector of production and service activities based on knowledge-intensive activities”, which are “usually identified by combining indicators relating to production and management. knowledge, such as research and development (R & D) expenditures, the employment rate of graduate workers and the intensity of the use of new information technologies”³. For others, it refers to a form of economic and social organization in which the dynamics of development and growth are based on “the systematic exploitation of knowledge and new information”⁴. Some authors emphasize that this convenient name

1 Peter Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity. Guidelines to our changing society*, New York, Harper & Row, 1965, chapter 12

2 OCDE, *L'économie fondée sur le savoir*, Paris, OCDE, 1996, 3.

3 Dominique Foray, *L'économie de la connaissance*, Paris, La Découverte, 2009, 5.

4 Antonelle Corsani, Patrick Dieuaide et Christian Azaïs.

covers a multiple and multifaceted⁵ reality, a “black box”, or even a vague concept, catch-all, lacking a solid theoretical foundation.

The emergence of economics of knowledge is concomitant with the historical phenomenon, even though knowledge has been a subject of study for economists long before. It is important to note that the historical phenomenon has been strongly territorialized: it is in the most developed countries, and particularly in the United States, that it first appeared, even if it later spread to other territories. Currently, the production of research in the field of the discipline knowledge economics, like the territory of the knowledge economy, is developing beyond the national borders in which they have emerged.

Furthermore, we can also use the definition of knowledge economy according to the approach of the World Bank, which set up “Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM) that describes Knowledge Economy Index and Knowledge Index”, “Knowledge Index (KI) measures a country’s ability to generate, adopt and diffuse knowledge”. This is an indication of overall potential of knowledge development in a given country. According to World Bank can measure by Knowledge Economy Index (KEI), it takes into account whether the environment is conducive for knowledge to be used effectively for economic development. It is an aggregate index that represents the overall level of development of a country or region towards the Knowledge Economy⁶. The KEI consists of four sub-indexes – economic and institutional regime, education and human resources, the innovation system and ICT.

II. Economic growth concept in knowledge economy

Knowledge, information or new economy mean the growing importance of human capital foreconomic growth. Human capital (education and qualification of the labour force) replaced the main factors of economic growth, capital and labour, and has become its most

Vers un capitalisme cognitif : entre mutation du travail et territoires, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001, 10.

5 Benoît Godin, “The Knowledge-Based Economy : Conceptual Framework or Buzzword ?” *Journal of Technology Transfer*, Vol. 31, 2006, 17-30.

6 WORLD BANK INSTITUTE. *Measuring knowledge in the world’s economies*. Knowledge for development program.

important indicators. The change of the conception of human capital on economic growth has shown in the theory of economic growth and has led to creation of new growth theory in the eighties of the 20 century.

By the end of the 18th and the middle of the 19th century, the work of Adam Smith and Karl Marx already showed the importance and importance of training, know-how, and skill in productivity. The relationship between master and apprentice also allowed a transfer of knowledge via a transfer of skills.

Adam Smith, in Chapter 1 of Book 1 of *Research on the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* states that "some of the tools and machines were originally the inventions of simple workers who, being employed to a very simple operation, have naturally applied their thoughts to find easier and more prompt methods to execute it"⁷.

After Smith, Karl Max in *Capital*, Third Book (Marx, 1977, V, 113), in the paragraph titled "Economy resulting from inventions", he states: "It is only the experience of the collective worker who discovers and shows where and how to save, how to apply in the simplest way the discoveries already made, what practical difficulties must be overcome in the implementation of the theory in its use in the process of production, etc.". He dissociates then general work and collective work. General work "is all scientific work, it is all discoveries, all inventions Collective work presupposes the direct cooperation of individuals"⁸.

Besides Smith and Marx, Neo-classic growth theories undervalued the importance of capital because return from human capital put down to labour and reduced share of capital in income this way. According to the new growth theories it is necessary to implicate its tangible and intangible forms in capital. Getting knowledge and skills by way of qualification and education rating is one of very important forms of its accumulation.

Human capital has become the least mobile component of the producing fiction and it is one

of the reasons why education has become key variable in the equation

7 Jaudel and Servet, 2000, 14.

8 Amable et Askenazy, 2005, 13.

explaining differences in the competitiveness of the national economies. The increasing of the human capital investments influences the growth of productivity of labour. Higher education is very important source of economic growth and promotively acts on the efficiency of the others

factors of economic growth, for example on utilization of effects of technological progress,

production control and organization etc. The value of human capital is growing because of

ability to produce more and more goods and services but also because of ability to produce

superior goods or services. The importance of human capital for the development of

competitiveness of the national economy is growing because human capital is much more

resistant to total globalization of conditions of the economic growth, compared to the other

factors in production function.

In the end, great economists have always perceived the essential role of training, knowledge, know-how, skills, experience in productivity and growth to the point where we consider it wise to conceive, as Adam Smith wrote more than two centuries ago, human investment from both an individual and a collective point of view. In many ways, this perception of human investment refers us to the role of basic education, which in turn refers us to the choice of the educational system to facilitate access to useful knowledge.

III. The impacts of knowledge economy observed in Cameroon

"Investment in innovation, research, education and technological changes have the most central point to economic performance. The growth of economy can be analysed by the investments in higher education, innovation and research, and software."⁹

Today in Cameroon, debates on the digital economy are increasingly raised. The knowledge-based economy or the digital economy is booming and represents a strategic asset whose contribution, which is by no means

⁹ BATAGAN, L. Knowledge Dynamics and Economy Growth. Revista Informatica Economica [online]. Nr. 4(48), 2008, pp. 27-30.

negligible, could change the national game. Being a major challenge for achieving the objectives of digital emergence in 2020 and the emergence by 2035, the situation of this technology is not good. Internationally, Cameroon is lagging behind in growth with an Internet penetration rate of around 21% and a contribution to growth of 3.5% of GDP. To make up for this delay, since 2016, it has been organizing trade fairs, forums and days dedicated to the digital economy, in order to get back on track and to benefit from the advantages and opportunities that the use of the Internet and ICTs provide. These prerogatives relate to improved productivity improvement and state-of-the-art technology.

In Cameroon, digital is seen as a strategic link for the economic development of the country. The State of Cameroon believes that the digital sector can significantly help to improve the country's revenues. From the point of view of Cameroon's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, it is a vision that has prevailed over the development of the Cameroon Digital Strategy Plan for 2020. Thus, the government has planned to raise the average annual contribution of the digital sector to taxes at 300 billion CFA against 136 billion CFA francs in the past. He believes that this improvement in the contribution of the digital sector is due to the "boom" that the telecommunications sector in general has experienced, but especially to the "dynamism" that the mobile sector knows.

The expected increase in the digital sector should not be seen only at the level of the contribution to the revenues of the State. According to government sources, the digital contribution to Cameroon's GDP is expected to double from 5% in 2016 to 10% in 2020. At the same time, the number of direct jobs created in the sector is expected to increase fivefold from 10,000 to 50,000 jobs. The government explains that to achieve this, in terms of local development, the Cameroonian state plans to densify from 6% to 20% the rate of households with access to the Internet and the rate of access to broadband in large companies to 95%.

With the arrival of the knowledge economy in Cameroon, several sectors have undergone restructuring such as trade, tourism, insurance, health and others; but it has also given birth to new innovative areas. In March 2016, the opening of the first day of the digital economy in Cameroon marked the production of a report by the World Bank: "The divi-

dends of digital 2016". These days originated in the desire of Cameroon to participate as other countries in this revolution in the sector of new information and communication technologies and to seize the opportunities and benefits of development that ensue. This is why the country expresses its desire to become digital.

Since the advent, online purchases, management of bank accounts, the feasibility of transactions, access to banking and insurance services on the Internet is gaining momentum in Cameroon. Today, it is more than 6 million users in Cameroon for the payment and transfer of money through mobile money (against 26 million in Kenya and 24 million in Nigeria¹⁰). Today we have more than 10 million mobile users in Cameroon. The rapid growth of the digital economy in Cameroon has had as a factor the arrival of 3G and 4G in 2016. The new version of mobile phones and the installation of optical fiber linking Cameroon to Brazil in May 2018, innovation in the field of education with the development of new applications for the intellectual development of children in kindergarten and even higher classes created by young Cameroonians in 2018 and sponsored by some structures such as Orange Cameroon. According to Journal Actu Cameroun, the country currently has a total linear of approximately 12,000 km of interurban optical fiber (compared to 2150 before 2012), i.e. 209 out of 360 districts and 52 departments out of 58 served by optical fiber, with braces to neighbouring countries.

Telephony is not left behind. The fixed line segment has grown from 55,220 subscribers in 2010 to 71,463 in 2016. The mobile phone numbers are the most revealing of this digital progression. In 2016, the directory has more than 18 million subscribers, a penetration rate of 83% (compared to 44% in 2010). The Internet penetration rate has increased from 0.24% in 2011 to approximately 35.43% in 2016 and the Tic Development Index (Idi) between 2014 and 2017 the index has increased from 2.030 to 3.852.

On the other hand, in Cameroon digital economy continues to grow, intensified by the increasing migration of social interactions, economic activities, and transactions online. In fact, ICT sector is powering multiples activities, such as buying and selling goods and services, banking activities, access to health, education and entertainment. In Cameroon, nowadays, innovation, increasing affordability of hardware and internet

connectivity are propelling the central Africa's digital economy, but there remain challenges to growth. Internet penetration in central Africa in general and Cameroon in particular is very low. According to the latest data obtained in 2018, digital transformation in Cameroon is in good shape. The penetration rate of the Internet in the country has indeed increased from 4.3% in 2010 to nearly 35% in 2018, according to the National Agency for Information Technologies and Communication (ANTIC).

According to the GSMA, the number of SIM cards in use in Cameroon reached 19.9 million at the end of 2018. By this time, the number of mobile broadband connections will reach 25%, more than double the number at the end of 2018. Thus, the use of mobile-based transaction platforms has grown exponentially, bringing the unbanked population and the informal sector in Cameroon to more structured financial transaction systems. Additionally, digital applications have encouraged the growth of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises through access to ICT-enabled financial services and marketing¹¹. In turn, the digital economy's contribution to Cameroon's GDP continues to grow.

Other benefits related to the use of digital for consumers are not quantified (online job search, access to education and culture etc.). Part of these purchasing power benefits are re-injected into the economy and translate into significant revenues benefiting most Cameroonian enterprises.

Conclusion

The rise of the knowledge economy or the digital economy in Cameroon is associated with a new industrial revolution affecting social, economic, political and cultural spheres.

In addition to the observed and empirical impacts of the knowledge economy on the growth of Cameroon, it also has a disruptive effect on all sectors of activity and the economy in general: consumer behaviour has been modified, the functioning and the organization of companies have also been transformed, especially through the improvement of value chains, production processes, managerial organization and their business model is constantly being questioned.

The development of the digital economy brings many benefits for

11 KESA Pharatlhathe, The Digital Economy in Sub-Saharan African: What's missing? CIPESA 16. 1. 2018

some companies ready to embrace change, dematerialization of distances, in particular, eliminates barriers to entry in certain markets and results in massive access to new opportunities for businesses. It also contributes to the birth of new start-ups in several fields.

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Migration of the Bulgar Turks and the Their Experiences of Cru- elty in Balkan Wars

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Abstract

The very first decade of XX. Century is a period of upsand down sa-long with geopolitical changes. These years have forever changed the way the world mapis drawn. Balkan war caused many casualties and caused most of the population of the Balkan countries to migrate. "Ethnic Clean-sing" term, in fact, begun to be used during the Bosnian War in the 90s of the last century; however, it can also be used for the Balkan incidentsin the lastcentury. The massacre sandtens of thousand of people being forced to migrate caused radical changes to the ethno-demographics of the Balkans, and destroyed hundreds of years long existing multi-cultural model of the region. A huges calepur gewas carried out against the Bulgar Turks in Bulgaria.

This study analyses the forced migration of the Bulgarian-Turks and their exposure to the torture due to Balkan War.

Key Words: Balkans, Bulgarian Turks, Migration, Cruelty

Introduction

Balkans and the Balkan countries geographical layer of a significant importance. This is because of the natural, economic and human characteristics of the region and the countries within the region. The Balkan Region has great geographical advantages. Balkan countries have suitable conditions for human life with its natural structure, fertile soil and favorable climate conditions. Balkans are a peninsula located on the south east of the European continent. Balkans are named after the Balkan Mountains located in the same region. Balkan name has been used since the beginning of the 19th century and the name means "mountain range covered with dense forests" or "rugged terrain covered with bushes". Balkans are also named as Southeast Europe.

"Balkan" word has its roots from Turkish language, and it means "mountain" (Castellan, 1995). As a word it has a common use within the Ottoman Turkish. In the vocabulary *Kamus-i Turki* of Shemseddin Sami, who was a prominent vocabulary writer in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, Balkan word is mentioned as "The mountain range dividing the rumeli continent from west to east,, in addition to the previously mentioned area, is called the balkan peninsula. (ÖzeyR., 2017).

Balkan region has been home to various different ethnic groups for hundreds of years. When taken into consideration of the Ottoman Millet System, despite the existence of groups from different ethnic backgrounds and from different religious beliefs, the groups have coexisted peacefully for hundreds of years. In fact, due to the various races and religions within the region, Balkans are likened to a disorganised anthropology museum when the region was being described (Sloane, 1987). According to the Ottoman, the name given to the countries in this region is Rumelia. Balkans history is often known for their brutal conflicts and the most peaceful period of Balkans has been under the rule of the Ottoman Empi-

re. William M. Sloane, an American journalist visiting the area before the war, noted that there are 7 million Romanians, 6 million Turks, 4 million Bulgarians, 3 million Serbians, 2,5 million Greeks, 250 thousand Montenegrins in the total of 36 million population of Balkan (William M. Sloane, as cited in Yıldırım Akağanoğlu, 2001).

Table: 1 The Surface Area and the Population of the Balkan States

STATE	SURFACE AREA	NÜFÜS
BULGARIA	96.345	4.338.000
GREECE	64.85 9	3.041.000
SERBIA	45.427	3.000.000
MONTENEGRO	9.427	274.000

The causes of Balkan Wars had different dimensions. The Treaty of San Stefano (1878), Macedonia being included within the borders of Greece, Serbia gaining independence and independent Serbia continuously attempting to annex new land, Berlin Treaty (1878) not meeting the expectations of Greece, and Greece attempting to annex against the Ottoman Empire can be said to be the causes of the war (Halaçoğlu, 2014). One of the other reasons of war was Russians gathering Slavic people and attempting to go against the invasive policy of Austria which annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite the conflicts between the Balkan nations and the critical "Churches Problem", Balkan nations were able to form an alliance against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire boycott of Greek goods due to Cretan Issue was another factor that pushed Greece to join in the alliance. (Özgür, 2008). New nations in Balkans were in conflict with each other; however, they all showed a desire to throw the Ottoman Empire out of the Europe and agreed to an alliance (Zürcher, 2010). Throwing Turks out of the Europe was the priority. This has been a successful endeavour due to Russians encouraging Balkan nations to throw Turks out of the Europe and due to weak state of Ottoman rulers.

All sides suffered heavy losses in Balkan Wars as in any war. Bulgarians were victims of atrocities in the same manner. The atrocities were mostly caused by all states attacking one another during Second Balkan War. (McCarthy, 2008).

Peace and political balance in Balkans have started to turn against Turks as the Ottoman Empire started to lose their power over the region at the end of XVII. Century. This situation caused Turks to migrate to various regions of the northern Balkans and especially to Anatolia. A considerable

amount of Turk and Muslim people were forced to migrate in Bulgaria where the Balkan War had taken place.

There are various reasons to them igrations from Balkan region to Turkey. The bigges treason for them igrations in Balkans is the extreme anti-Turkish sentiment from the Christian Balkan States under the influence of Pan Slavism movement of Russia (Yağanoğlu, 2001). In general, opportunities of Turkish people living in this region for hundreds of years have been abolished either partially or completely by exclusionary and ethno-nationalist state policies. Bulgaria declared independence with Berlin Treaty that was signed after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. After this date, Bulgarian authorities, like Russians in the past, attempted to carry out massacre against Muslims whom the Bulgarian slived to get her for centuries.

Bulgarian atrocity backed by Russia is the most brutal incident within Balkan peoples that has been carried out in both 1877-1878 and 1912. After the with draw of the Ottoman Empire from Balkans, Russian armies disarmed the Turks while arming Bulgarians in the places they advanced and implemented a policy of extermination of Turks to carry out massacres at ease with Bulgarians. Russians also punished those Bulgarians who didn't join forces with them and consequently burned their villages.

Photograph 1: Bulgarians reading out the death sentence of refugees who are sentenced to death.



Source: Pictured Book 8, Ağanoğlu Yıldırım, From the Ottomans to the Republic The Balkans› Misfortunes: Migration (3rd edition) Kum Saati Yay publishing house., Istanbul.

The event that happened at that time, known as the Hannah massacre, is the biggest and most frightening in terms of the number of people killed in at once.

In January 1878, troops composed of Russians and Don Kazakhs soldiers carried out a massacre at Harmanli on a huge group of refugees of 20,000 and children who were mostly women and children. Survivors of this massacre were also died of cold and starvation at the bank of Evros River and between the mountains (İpek N., 1994; as cited in Ağanoğlu, 2001). Journalist Leon Trotsky, who was following the Balkan War closely, criticised atrocities of Balkan people and the actions of Bulgarians heavily in his writings. While criticising the atrocities taking place, he also criticised the bans implemented to hinder the journalist to report about the existence of massacres to Europe. Leon Trotsky protested against these atrocities by publishing open letters in his column on the news paper dated January 12, 1912, to Todorov, a high ranking Bulgarian authority. Trotsky wrote, at the beginning of the war, Bulgarian forces in the Rodop territory destro-

yed the Pomak Village with cannon fires, the population of Pomak Village was entirely composed of civilians, and he also wrote, a cavalry troop in Didymoteicho killed the unarmed civilians by hauling them into the river and then hunting them like wild ducks.

The writing also states that, under the excuse of eliminating the spies, in Veliko Tarnovo and Kichevo the, Bulgarians killed Turks they encountered on the road by tying their hands from behind and cutting their necks until the neckbone, while children, older Turk women and men were died near their homes from the blows they have taken to their heads (Trotsky, 1995).

Leon Trotsky's extra parliamentary question to the State Duma's Member of the Parliament, Pavel Milyukov, about the massacres against Muslims in the "Liç" Newspaper on January 30, 1913, asks the following:

"Indisputable truths, didn't the insufficient demographic of Bulgarians and Serbians make you come to a conclusion that they carried out systematic massacres on the Muslim population in order to restore their national interests?" (Leon Trotsky's extra parliamentary question to the State Duma's Member of the Parliament, Pavel Milyukov, "Liç" Newspaper, January 30, 1913.)

Bulgarians, during the Balkan War, were carrying out massacres " in a systematic fashion or whenever they got the opportunity starting from the Muslims living in their land, then the Muslims in Bulgarian occupied Macedonia, settled Muslims in Western and Eastern Thrace and the refugees in these regions (Yağanoğlu A., 2001).

Bulgarians that occupied Serres had arrested 200 people, including prominent preachers, lawyers, bank managers, etc. and massacred these people after torturing them. Bulgarians threw the bodies of the Muslims they have killed into the well and piled the tombstones they have collected from the Turk cemeteries on top (İlker Alp., Belge ve Fotoğraflarla Bulgar Mezalimi(1878-1 989), Ankara 1990, p.31, as cited in Yağanoğlu A., 2001).

Once again in Serres (also known as "Siroz" in Turkish), 800 Muslims were strangled and no Muslim, mosque or house that belonged to a Muslim survived in the towns of Cuma-iBala, Petrich, Melnik and alike. A common practise of atrocity used by Bulgarians was blowing up the mosques with the Muslims inside. A Bulgarian gang under the command of the brigand called as Donço had blown up a mosque filled with women and children (Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi, Türkiye Uyan, Dersaadet 1329, p. 22., as cited in Ayağanoğlu,2001).

As stated previously, one of the major causes of the migrations during the Balkan War was religious oppressions. Bulgarians forced Muslim Turks and Pomaks to change their religion in the Bulgarian occupied territories. There are various sources regarding this matter. A petition sent by refugees to the Ministry of Interior of the Ottoman Empire (Dahiliye Nezareti) on November 5, 1913, documents this very atrocity. A. Halaçoğlu reports the following (op. cit., p. 35-36 references) regarding to the Effort (İkdam) Newspaper (no 5812, 5922; August 15-16, 1913): *"Bulgarians arrived to the lands where Pomaks live in Rhodope Balkans and in Arda river basin. They first killed the imam, mukhtar and prominent people, then they converted them mosques to churches and placed priests, and tortured those who rejected the Christianity by pulling their nails and teeth out, by cutting their mouth and noses, and they even killed some rejecting Christianity with other unspeakable tortures. After the invasion, those who emigrated to Komotini and Xanthi were turned away to their village and the woman's veils were removed, their names were changed with Bulgarian names, Muslim women were forced to marry with Bulgarian men and Muslim men were forced to marry with Bulgarian women."*

This forced religious conversion was described by J. McCarthy as the following: *"Groups of Bulgarian resistances and priests would enter the Muslim villages, they would line up the people and give them Bulgarian names, they would anoint holy water to each of the people's foreheads, and then the people would be forced to eat a piece of sujuk made out of pork. The ceremony would end after people were given a baptism document indicating that the person became Christian. After this, men would be banned to wear fez and women would be banned to go out with a burqa."* (op. cit., p. 171-172, BOA., January 18, 1914, regarding to BEO 318730 – 318774 no documents)

Records in A. Halaçoğlu, op. cit., p. 4 show that 2840 people in the 25 villages related to Nevrekop incident, and people in various villages (two villages related to Razgrat incident, another two villages related to Cuma-iBala incident, one village related to Istenimaka incident and seven villages related to Peshtera incident) were forcefully converted to Christianity. On top of these incidents, in the occupied areas, Bulgarians were attacking to the mosques, Muslim mausoleums etc.. They were taking down the crescent moons and replacing it with crosses. These were causing psychological breakdowns in Muslims and speeding up their migrations. During Balkan War, Bulgarians wanting to demolish the works of Muslims in Dobruja took down the crescent moons on the Akyazı Sultan

Mausoleum in Tekke Villageto humiliate Turks, and they threw a bomb from the window to kill the tomb keeper inside. During the Second Balkan War, when Homens entered the region, Homen General ordered his men to take down the cross and put the crescent moon back (Temo, 1987).

After Second World War, a new migration wave emerged due to the challenges minority Turks experienced when Bulgaria had undergone a regime change. The major causes for the migration were the obstacles in education after the expropriation of the Turks' schools, collectivisation of Turks' lands, settlement strategy implemented by Bulgarian Government and Turkey becoming a member of NATO in terms of security. It can be concluded that the migration policy of Bulgaria during the first big migration between 1950 and 1951 left Turkey in a difficult situation rather than solving the Bulgur Turks situation. Bulgarian government, with the influence of Moskow, planned to carry out deportations by attempting to send 250,000 migrants in 1950 within a short term of three months. This migration policy was implemented by Bulgaria to damage the economy of Turkey and its Democratic Party of which recently came into power and supported USA during the Korean War. As a result, this policy has left Turkey in a very difficult situation. The migration in 1950 occurred after the tensions over foreign policies. It was an attempt to punish Turkey over sending soldiers to fight against communists in the Korean War. However, more importantly, Soviet leader Stalin wanted to use these Turks he was sending away to Turkey as a communism propaganda (Yalimov, 2002, p.307).

When the migration during 1950-1951 was stopped abruptly in 1951, a great number of Turk families were separated. In March 22, 1968, close relative migration agreement was made to get these parated families back together. This allowed the relatives of migrants until 1952, who were left behind, to migrate back periodically under specific conditions until 1978.

While people migrated in 1950-1951 are considered migrants under the settlement law, people migrated in 1968-1978 were returned to their homeland as free migrants. Migrants migrated in 1950-1951 were offered good opportunities by the government. They were given land and agri cultural vehicles to provide them a better life and to speed up their adaptation process to Turkey.

Researchers studying the Balkan demographic structure know

that the huge Turk population has always been a worry in issue for the nationalist Bulgarian authorities. Historically, Bulgaria formed the most centralland of the Ottoman Empire, and despite the assimilation policies of the Bulgarian Government, Turks living in Bulgaria kept their thnic identity and their traditions safe. Ottoman mosques, foundations, inns, imarets (professional and social institutions) are still prevailing in Bulgaria. Bulgarian government tried to demolish these Ottoman works as soon as it rose to power (as cited in Karpat, 2004).

Migrants from Bulgaria left everything but a blanket on their backs behind and came to Turkey. They tried to save their religion and lives by taking refuge in their homeland. Some sources say that this policy in Bulgaria still continues to this day, and Muslims in Bulgaria are still living under the religious oppression.

In conclusion, Bulgaria is seen as one of them ajor countries within the Balkan region. Since the subject we analyzed is a very broad topic, there area vastamount of information available; hence, we can't cover everything. According to some writers, the same policy implemented against the Bulgarian-Turks during Balkan Wars is still on going in different forms. Nationalist policy on Muslims in Bulgaria is still a reality.

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Fictionalization of International Relations in the World War I Period

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Abstract

One of the historical periods when the Ottoman and European and World states reached their peak in international relations was perhaps the World War I period. The European forces had the opportunity to take over the abundance of land and wealth that the Ottomans had for centuries. The events began to get tense and the war broke out in this period of history.

The plans for the Straits, the Balkans problem and the plans related with Near East made the separation of the Ottoman Empire clearer. Plans and groupings before the war made war inevitable and it was almost impossible to prevent it. Europe was strictly divided into two different groups; the Ottoman Empire could not remain neutral while being in such a plan. After long discussions and speeches within the plans of Europe, the Ottoman Empire was forced to choose the bloc of Austria and

Germany.

Many states that entered the war had big plans for this war. For example, the British plans for the Near East can be listed as follows: Having Iraqi oil; Seizing the straits; Having the Ottomans bound; Ensuring the safety of the road leading to East India and Suez.

The consideration of Germany's plan indicated that it aimed to dominate the Balkans, Turkey and the entire Near East.

The plan of the Russians was to move to the Mediterranean Sea by advancing at Black Sea and Rumeli by dominating the Straits; moving from the Caucasus to dominate all of Mesopotamia and Iran along Iskenderun and Basra, then to the Indian ocean. The French were also trying to have the Near East. Greece later joined the war on the side of the Entente during the war to capitalize the opportunity to organize attacks on the territories of Turkey.

The secret treaties made before the war began for the realization of these plans continued until 1917 while the plans constantly changed. By the end of 1918, World War II was nearing the end. The Ottoman allies were defeated in successive battles. Turkey has ended the war for it least itself with Armistice of Mudros on October 30.

As a result, a series of treaties and agreements were initiated at the end of the war to break apart the divided world. Diplomatic debates began to increase at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Turkey was among the topics discussed, which was discussed adequately but could not be decided upon. It appeared that the subject of Turkey had clearer results in the Versailles conference. But it was not possible to execute such resolutions in Turkey, because the Turkish nation reached to this decision greatly and fought for independence. Thus, the decisions imposed by the great powers became invalid.

It is quite important to learn about Turkey's relations with the world in this historical period to understand and discuss the modern diplomacy since the similarity of political events at the beginning and end of XX century is quite remarkable.

Keywords: World War I, International Relations, Ottoman Empire, Plans.

Introduction

The World War I emerged at a time when the accumulated influence of the ideas of Clausewitz, which developed on the idea that “war was the extension of politics by other means” continued on the foreign policy agenda. The misconception that the power balance maintained by the states that pursued a power policy through mutual alliance would prevent war ended in the end of July 1914 during the last stage of this period. While these two were seen as important instruments of 19th century European politics, the emergence of geopolitical theories formed within the framework of “world domination” towards the end of the century gave a new instrument for world politics.”¹

During and after the World War I, both Turkish and world scientists has investigated on this subject. However, they could not move from certain topics as they only evaluated the issue from their own point of view.

It is found within the question “How much and how has this topic been investigated in the world resources?” that S. Tanselin’s book “*From Mundros to Mudania*” is particularly valuable for investigating efficiently under the title of Fictionalization of International Relations during the World War I Period. Furthermore, the issues regarding division of Ottoman lands in K. Tekin’s writings are particularly carefully researched.

Foreign writers also have tried to draw attention to this issue in addition to Turkish scientists. G. Jaevskin’s book, published in Ankara in 1970, is one of the most remarkable researches. The author tried to reflect the Independence War period and the treaty plans of the Entente states with rich contents based on various sources.

Hovardin, M. Payers, R.Lansing, H.U.Temperlin, A Toynbe, J. Mak-kartin from western writers and many historians have valuable works re-

1 Burak Çınar, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Osmanlı Jeopolitiğinin Rolü*, Akademik Bakış, Volume 8. Publication 15. Winter 2014. p.40.

flecting upon Turkish Independence movement and last period of World War I.

I. The Period of Increment of Political Activities and Fictionalization of Strategic Plans in the Eve of World War I

Many sources write without exception that "One of the plans of the Entente States towards the end of the World War I was the separation of Istanbul into occupation zones. The plan mostly supported by the French would require each Entente State to have a "High Commissioner" within these occupation zones. Since the Russians reported this, they had thought to come up with a plan. Sazanov partially predicted the French resurrection and slightly changed his division plan for Istanbul to meet the criteria of the Paleologue. According to the plan, the British would invade the Asian side of the city (Üsküdar), and the French would invade the old European neighborhood Pera (Beyoğlu, starting from Karaköy and reaching Galata and Taksim to Ortaköy on the Bosphorus). Russia, on the other hand, would be content with the ancient Byzantine city, outside the Straits, which included all important Orthodox religious sites such as the Church of Chora, the Orthodox Patriarchate, Hagia Sophia, which stretched from the Topkapi Palace to Theodosius walls. In addition, Paleologue ensuring the acknowledgement of French claims on significant part of Syria, Hatay and the Ottoman Cilicia was accepted verbally on the first Sazanov note dated 4 March was on the date of April 10, 1915 with additional statement of Tsar dated March 16, 1915. He defended British interests better than the British could do during this period.² The main reason for Russia to go so far and to believe that Russia would have what it wanted was that the Entente States were defeated in the battle of Dardanelles for Istanbul. It claimed less rights than the ones made at beginning of the war and agreed to take part of Istanbul, not all of it despite this. "The reason for this was that things have not been going well in the recent war with Germany. The failure of the Russians on the Western front led to the dilution of claims on Turkish territory. Recently, the Entente states were in good shape. The Entente states started with high hopes with Sarıkamış and Dardanelles campaigns in 1915 on the Ottoman front, the Turks had reversed the situation in most places by the end of the year. Germany and Bulgaria's united forces (fighting in October with

2 B.Liddel Hart. *Birinci Dünya Savaşı*. A.2014. p.145.

them), the opening of an uninterrupted railway and communication line between Berlin and Istanbul for the first time was the physical inevitable end of Entente forces in Gallipoli just as the troops of Tovnshend were surrounded in Kut.”³

Despite this, the following year coincided with the period in which Russia continued to win on the Caucasus front, though not on the Western front. And this success in Anatolia allowed the Russians to make new claims on the Ottoman Empire. “Despite the difficulties of Britain in the east, the developments in Russia’s war with the Ottoman Empire began to look brighter than before thanks to the Erzurum offensive. This strategic must be highlighted, because the “Sykes-Picot Treaty” was prepared in an environment in which Russia had victories in Eastern Anatolia in the spring of 1916. Otherwise, the development of diplomacy to divide the Ottoman Empire would not be meaningful. The period of negotiations between the major Entente states (January-April 1916) coincided with the two greatest abasement Britain faced in World War I. These were Gallipoli and Kut retreats against the Ottoman army; the second was the biggest mass surrender of the British troops between Yorktown 1783 and Singapore 1942”. With what logical justification Sykes⁴ and Picot⁵ decided that the winter of 1916 was a good time to divide the Ottoman Empire?⁶

In attempting to explain this agreement, the author claims that the British have sacrificed themselves and in fact had more insidious and secret plans. The author adds that Russia, which was not defeated in the war against the Turks, this time, was too awake to be deceived. Sazanov, who was very wise in this case, was waiting for the opportunity for his own move. The author tries to explain the well-known but little-understood case: “This event in the winter of 1915-16, referred to as the Cemal Pasha peace offer, was parallel with the Syces-Picot negotiations and in a way overlapped with them. According to this highly polished legend, Cemal Pasha, as the de facto dictator of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in the World War I as the commander of the fourth Ottoman army in Damascus suggested “to take precautions for safety of Armenians” with the condition

3 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı'nda Rusya'nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.233

4 Representative of a state, which has lost in all fronts in the Ottoman military area.

5 A representative of a state, which provided limited support to Galliboli operation, ending with dishonor.

6 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı'nda Rusya'nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.233-234

that the Entente states walked to Istanbul, helped him overthrow ITC government and continue the new sultanate with his bloodline.⁷

The matter which at least adds superficial credibility to this claim was that "Cemal Pasha's message to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs supposedly delivered by an Ottoman Armenian named Dr. Hakov Zavriyev who escaped from Mus and took refuge in Bucharest. Dr. Zavriev, who had close ties with the Dashnaks, claimed that he was speaking on behalf of the Armenian circles in Istanbul. Zavriyev, who wrote a letter to Petrograd through the Russian ambassador in Bucharest, proposed to arm Cemal Pasha with enough weapons to seize Istanbul. In exchange for the Entente help in the direction of obtaining a docile Empire, Cemal Pasha would recognize the Armenian autonomy and leave Istanbul and Straits to Russia. However, according to the generally told version of the story, Cemal Pasha-Zavriyev peace initiative fell into the water because of French stubbornness: Paris did not want to give up the claims on Cilicia and Syria."⁸

The author then begins to unravel the story and reveals the reality of diplomatic events with the skills of Sean Mcmeekin. "Even though interesting, the story had a bit of a twist from the beginning. So far, no one has been able to reveal the slightest evidence that Zavriyev speaks with the authority he received from Cemal Pasha; Turkish historians find it unbelievable that such a possibility is not worth considering seriously. First of all, it is far from convincing that someone willing to become a Turkish sultan would give the Ottoman capital to the Russians with satisfaction. Although he is known to some extent as a French friend (and speaking French in intermediate level), Cemal Pasha had made a definite turn in the opposite direction by actually finding the documents seized at the French consulate in Damascus (published after the Ottoman Empire entered the war in November 1914) and revealed the connection with Paris's rebellious Arab nationalism. He did not have such a great conversation with the British. In December 1914, he was even rebuked by Talat, the Minister of Internal Affairs for using British civilians in Damascus as human shields in a naval attack on the Lebanese coastline. As Colonel Kress, a German liaison officer who had worked closely with Cemal Pasha from the very beginning of World War I to the end, states

7 Покровский М. Н. Империалистическая война. — М.: Соцэкгиз, 1934.s.126

8 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı'nda Rusya'nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.235

Cemal Pasha was neither pro-German nor pro- Entente; rather, he was a Turk full of fervent patriotism. As for Cemal Pasha who supposedly wanted to give Istanbul and the Straits to Russians, there is no evidence that Cemal Pasha considers them with a bit of sympathy.”⁹

For the author to explain this issue in detail, the author asks “if Cemal Pasha would try such an action “why would he do it through any Armenian Circle? Or why Cemal Pasha would not submit this directly to the Russians via the central command in Tbilisi?” and tries to unravel this. Why would Romania choose not to send this message by way of the Caucasus or the Syrian way, but another way? However, it would be much more comfortable for him to use these roads. In addition, when we examine the letters given in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the documents related to the matter do not bear Cemal Pasha’s (original or copied) signature but Dr. Zavriev’s signature.”¹⁰

In our opinion, there is no need for any other explanation, but the author continues to prove the truth and tries to present more information about Dr. Zavriyev. “A closer look at the history of this person who graduated from the Russian Academy of Military Medicine in St. Petersburg reveals that he was not a spokesman for any environment in the Ottoman country, but a patron of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Dr. Zavriyev was a classic schemer of the war period and he began to turn to the Russians for Armenian autonomy when he was in Petrograd in March 1915. Knowing his “talents” Sazanov sent him to the London and Paris talks in 1915. At one point he started to actively work for the Armenian National Delegation, but things did not go well with France and he did not appear for a while.”¹¹

Then in December, Dr. Zavriyev again supposedly came under the spotlight with a letter from Cemal Pasha. “The new proposal had a strange inconsistency that would actually reveal the case. As Dr. Zavriyev provided Cemal Pasha’s proposal would fit into Russian ambitions for land instead of Cilicia, Lebanon, Syria, Mesopotamia or Arabia. One explanation was that Cemal Pasha tried to rule Syria and aimed to make Damascus the capital. But if this was true, why would “Cemal Pasha” want rifles, guns and ammunition to get up from Damascus and go to

9 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı’nda Rusya’nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.236

10 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı’nda Rusya’nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.236

11 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı’nda Rusya’nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.237

Istanbul, the capital he would supposedly leave to the Russians after its occupation?"¹²

With this, we can easily understand that the "Cemal Pasha" plan was actually a Russian plan. That is to say, sometimes making simple defamation and contemplating deceiving big states with small plans was a behavior specific to "supreme" states like Russia. The interesting matter here was that they believed that this plan would really work. But they were not against a middle state country without diplomacy or intelligence. It was England and France they were against, and in our opinion England and France are too good to be commented on the diplomacy of these two states. It is understood that there is no need for Russia to be considered significant, and sometimes it may not be the same as having a large land mass to a large state and a wise and noble policy.

But, of course, France, which insisted on Cilicia, was not deceived with this and simply ignored this request. This is how the author tries to explain the intent of the Russians in doing this: "Apparently, Sazanov's testing of the water with "Cemal Pasha" was a deception to reveal French and British intentions to share Ottoman lands, or more likely to put between Paris and London against each other on these plans. Sazanov was aware that the negotiations between Sykes and Picot in Paris in early December came to a dead end and during Christmas, he made his offer when Sykes returned to London to receive further instructions."¹³

With this plan, the treaty was only two months late after the negotiations between the two sides. But they couldn't prevent the treaty from being concluded. "This plan only demonstrated the French greed for Cilicia. the British had fallen from the eyes regardless of the French who did not give up Cilicia. But we think that there are no other nations who hate each other in Europe as much. These states were temporarily in an alliance, neither of their interests were compatible, nor were their policies supporting each other. Eventually, these two personal representatives decided to meet in Russia as a trio. Sykes was greeted warmer than Picot. The "up-to-date" record of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for

12 Международные отношения нешняя олитика ССср сборник докуентов
м.1957. р.506

13 Международные отношения в эпоху империализма : документы из архивов
царского и Временного правительств 1878-1917 гг. : Серия 3 : 1914-1917. - М. ; Л. : Гос.
соц.- экон. изд-во, 1931-1938.s.623

the first trilateral meeting on March 9, 1916 states that Sir Mark Sykes made the best impression possible on the foreign minister with his clarity, profound knowledge of the character and clearly positive attitude towards Russia. But the same cannot be said of M. Picot, who, from a narrow perspective, exhibits the traces of a certain documentation against Sazanov." Moreover, this determination reflected Sazanov's reactions after the inquiry after wellbeing of people. After Sazanov began to discuss the main issue on the agenda, he became even less likable to Picot. Picot, who was disturbed by this disrespect, did not consider this right, thus, he got detached from Sykes."¹⁴

Not being able to complete its previous sly and treacherous plan, Russia, succeeded this time. Sazanov ordered a new map to be prepared fulfilling the cliché demands of Russia including "Turkish Armenia" appearing in "blue" French region in the template of February 10 extending from Bitlis passages on Taurus Mountains to Urmiye lake in the east with a professionalism which may not be dealt by the English representative. The new map prepared by Sykes as told was presented to Sazanov on March 11, 1916 in presence of Sir George Buchanan with "blue" area erased and new eastern border of French region drawn by the Tigris. The region of Sivas including a triangle constituted with Sivas-Harput-Kayseri was painted blue as a hush money for Paris. This was a bizarre and mocking irrelevance because the French region would extend to new Russian cities in Eastern Anatolia."¹⁵ Sazanov psychologically influenced Picot and directed him to think as a Russian.

This was exactly the period when the Russians took Erzurum and headed north. "The Russians claimed Erzurum and were moving towards Trabzon and Rize. But then the Russians cut the way of 3rd corps of the Ottoman Empire at the coast and headed to south taking Erzincan, Muş and Bitlis. Sazanov did not have to ask for permission anymore as he was able to gain this by his own power. In other words, most of the alleged lands in Ottoman lands were in their own hands. But then his next target was the land he claimed in Mesopotamia and Iran. But Sykes, unfortunately, took this place into the French population area, contrary to

14 Международные отношения нешняя олитика ССср сборник докуентов м.1957.s.521

15 Международные отношения в эпоху империализма : документы из архивов царского и Временного правительств 1878-1917 гг. : Серия 3 : 1914-1917. - М. ; Л. : Гос. соц.- экон. изд-во, 1931-1938.s.632

Sazanov's plan. So, this is what Sazanov wanted to change. This blue zone was the territory the Russians wanted.

Apart from these incidents, the Russians were trying to get the British to do what they wanted, and thanks to Sykes' incompetence, it was possible."¹⁶

"As if an amateurish approach to the Armenian issue was not enough, Sykes's next step was to bring the classic attitude of the British to shift attention during the war period to the discussion of sharing Ottoman lands: Palestine and Jews. He concluded that the support of Zionism by the British government would bring the Jews of the world to the ranks of the Entente and ensure a financial contribution for the world war."¹⁷

"But the Jewish representative hated the Russians and the Tsarist government. Knowing this, Sazanov was trying to show the good will of the Russians towards the Jews. Accordingly, the Russians promised to help the Jews to protect all their rights and laws and promised their privileges. The Russians agreed to any plan for Palestine. But with a quibble, Sazanov stated that he would accept the plan to give Palestine and Syria to England, France, if Constantinople and the Straits were given to Russia. When the issue of Palestine and Syria was brought into question, he was trying to give the necessary message by raising the Istanbul issue at all times. But Russia was trying to advance on the Ottoman territory and continue its occupation on the Caucasus front in the meantime. As the Caucasus army advanced along the Black Sea coast, without the knowledge of Picot or Sykes, the Russians began to plan to include the northeast of Anatolia into the Empire and tried to predict what kind of objections could come from Britain or France."¹⁸ Then "on February 30, 1916, Sazanov gathered all the Ministers and a few generals, and together with the Ottoman and Iranian experts, planned to prepare Russia's strategic plan for the invasion of Anatolia and Mesopotamia after the war. We understand that Russia was planning to have its own without dividing the Anatolia. Sazanov and the Tsar government had no plans to acknowledge any blue lines. After listening to the soldiers and diplomats at this meeting, Sazanov stated that Russia would annex the provinces of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis to the west of Trabzon on the Black Sea coast. In addition, while claiming

16 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı'nda Rusya'nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.240

17 Sean McMeekin. *I. Dünya Şavaşı'nda Rusya'nın Rolü*. YKY.2013. p.241

18 Готлиб В. В. Тайная дипломатия во время первой мировой войны. — М.: Соцэкгиз, 1960.s.136

the province of Kurdistan extending from Tigris to Taurus mountains south of Van and Bitlis to Muş, Siirt, they left the land from Aladağ and Akdağ to Harput over Kayseri and Sivas provinces extending to Taurus mountains to France.”¹⁹

It is understood that the plans of Sazanov did not change as he insisted on his own line after hearing the offers of other states. “Although Grigorevich’s latest proposal to the French reflected a (slight) regression from the more extreme positions at the planning conference, Sazanov actually remained firmly attached to his own line. In a note signed by the Tsar on March 14, 1916, this line was clarified as follows: All the land between the Black Sea and Russia with a line extending from Urmiya province to Van, Bitlis, Muş and Harput between Tavra and Antitavra mountains near of Sivas province should be taken under the control of Russia. Sykes’ guidance in March and the number of good police / bad police acts on Sinop province followed quite a bit of diplomatic fog, much like the one made by “Cemal Pasha peace offer” in December and January. But as a result, the Russian stance did not move a mile.”²⁰

This was the indication that the French struggle had not been in vain and had been able to earn a little. Even though Kayseri and Sivas provinces were in the plan, they almost managed to took them away.

“As it is known, the three Entente states thus shared the Ottoman Empire from the deserts of Arabia to the Thracian plain, which dominated the roads connecting Europe to “Tsargrad”. The British made some promises to the Sheriff of Mecca, Husayn to start an “Arabian Rebellion” and promises given to Zionists regarding Palestine using some controversial mediators, the publics living in shared regions had no say in the treaty. not necessary. Nevertheless, despite all the bad intentions of the Hashemites between Cairo, London and Mecca, and even greater malice under the 1917 Balfour declaration, it seems that the British appeared to care for opinions and wishes of people living in Arabia and Palestine, perhaps even in Mesopotamia, which the British intended to rule after the war.”²¹

19 Е. А. Адамова. Раздел Азиатской Турции : по секретным документам б. Министерства иностранных дел М. : Литиздат НКВД, 1924. - 383, [1] с., 1 л. к. - (Европ. державы и Турция во время Мировой войны).s.152

20 Готлиб В. В. Тайная дипломатия во время первой мировой войны. — М.: Соцэкгиз, 1960.s.138

21 Е. А. Адамова. Раздел Азиатской Турции : по секретным документам б.

Towards the end of World War I, the situation of the Ottomans was getting worse. The Entente were trying to advance this situation in order to defeat the members of the Entente since the Entente troops knew very well that it was necessary to defeat the members of the Alliance in order to dominate the Ottoman lands. As early as December 1, 1917, French Prime Minister Klemaco had made such a statement: "The defeat of Ottoman is not far similar to Austria-Hungary. The Preuss militarism will finally be over with the defeat of Turkey."²²

According to this request "In 1918, the Entente members attempted a secret treaty with the Ottomans but failed. A new war strategy was determined as a result the failure of peace demand. According to this plan France and Italy were prepared to attack the Ottoman Empire with the strengthened collective units by establishing military positions in the Balkans."

As the majority of the plans and political developments were on the Near East since the beginning of the war, the Near East became a point of great interest in the political table. However, after the October Revolution in Russia, Russia's interest in the Near East began to increase."²³ But it was a known fact that the Near East and the Straits were in the hands of the Ottoman state for the time being.

While the main purpose of the Entente forces in World War I defeating Turkey was to finish the World War and to prevent the spread of Soviet Socialism in Turkey.

The British was prepared to use its all political and military powers to establish its hegemony in Turkey. The main purpose of the British was to keep Iran, Afghanistan and India under its rule.

II. The End of the War, the Eve of the Plans of the Entente States

Approximately one month before the end of the war "Britain prepared the text of the treaty with the Ottoman Empire. Britain's main purpose was to ensure that the land located in the Caucasus and the Near East was given to England. In the 14th article of this text dated October 7-8,

Министерства иностранных дел М. : Литиздат НКВД, 1924. - 383, [1] с., 1 л. к. - (Европ. державы и Турция во время Мировой войны).s.153

22 Haus E. Arhiv Polkovnika Hausa. T.3. M.1939.s.191

23 Нотович Ф. И. Дипломатическая борьба в годы первой мировой войны. — М.-Л.: Издательство АН СССР, 1947.s.151

1918, the lands of the Turkish garrisons in the Hejaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, Mesopotamia and Cilicia would be given to the British representative with an Arab commander. The aim of this article was to voluntary leave of important lands, lands where Kurds lived and Asian lands to the English. This was the spirit of the Armistice of Mudros.”²⁴

Knowing this situation, “France was conducting the same kind of occupation policy, so England was not only watching the situation but trying to do something. Britain began to compete with its ally, France, while fighting in the Near East and occupying more land. However, at the beginning of the war they decided that they would always remain loyal to each other and when they came to an end, they declared that they would act according to the decision they made at the beginning of the war and sealed it with the Anglo-French Declaration signed on November 7, 1918.”²⁵

“On October 19 the Prime Minister Talat Pasha applied to the Entente Powers demanding the opening of the new government peace negotiations under the presidency of the war minister Enver Pasha and the naval minister Cemal Pasha.²⁶ Thus, on October 27, peace negotiations with the Entente States began. The Turkish delegation arrived at the port of Mudros on the island of Limnos. The talks were made by British Admiral Arthur Cough Carl Horpe, commander of the Mediterranean fleet. The Turkish delegation was headed by naval minister Rauf Bey. On October 30, 1918, Turkey’s capitulation treaty was signed on “Agamemnon”, a British battleship in the harbor. The treaty was only a seemingly peace agreement.²⁷ “The first article of the treaty envisaged the opening of the Straits to the Entente States. The ships of the Entente States could freely travel to and from both sides, entering and exiting the Black Sea. However, the articles 6, 9 and 12 foreseen that Turkey’s all military-economic and strategical centres to be given under the occupancy of Entente states. The article 5 dictated the demobilization of the Turkish army other than a certain number of troops under certain conditions to ensure internal secu-

24 Лазарев М.С. “Курдский вопрос на рубеже тысячелетий” М., ИИИиБВ, 2004, р.52

25 Лазарев М.С. “Курдский вопрос на рубеже тысячелетий” М., ИИИиБВ, 2004, р.52

26 Qasımlı, Musa Cəfər. Archived Documents. Azerbaijan ...-2015. p.236

27 *Azərbaycan Halk Cümhuriyyəti. İngiliz arşiv belgələrində.* İstanbul, Doğu-Batı Publications, 2011, p.256

rity. Entente states rejected the recognition of any government formed in Caucasus participated by Turkey.”²⁸

“After the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, the Germans began to leave Turkey quickly. For example, German ground troops based in the Dardanelles were boarded on a ship and taken to Odessa.”²⁹ The politicians of the Entente States understood that the plans they made at the beginning of the war did not fit the end of the war since the balance of power and the internal states of states changed constantly during the course of the war. Bagirova and verdiyeva, discussing this, explained the situation in their book: “The Entente States did not know what to do with Turkey. Each state put forward a version that suited its national interests. For example, in the beginning of 1919, Greek applicant Venizelos proposed to have Istanbul and Western Anatolia. Venizelos claimed that Istanbul may not belong to Turkish government since it was not a complete “Muslim city” as there were exactly 449 thousand Turks in total population of 1 million 173 thousand inhabitants. As a result of these speeches, the Greeks did not settle for words and occupied Izmir on May 15, 1919.”³⁰

During this period, “by the end of the World War I, what Britain started to challenge the treaty of Sycos and Picot. Britain began this activity at a time when the Quadruple Alliance began to decline. The ran anti-French movements in Turkey against the French in politics and this probably started in November 1917.”³¹ F.L Berti, the British ambassador in France, wrote in his diary on October 2, 1917: Obrey Grebert, known for his hatred of Turks in Parliament, told the Turks that only Asia Minor should be left to Turks. It is necessary to apply the special regime in Armenian provinces and to apply this regime against the Turks and the British. Then he said that the Kurdish territories should be connected to the French administration. Berti claimed that after this text he doubted that France and Italy would stay loyal to the pre-war decisions. Berti, who thought they

28 Fətəliyev Məmməd Böyükxan oğlu. Türkiyə, Yunanıstan və Böyük dövlətlər Birinci dünya müharibəsi ərəfəsində və illərində. /M.Fətəliyev; Elmi red.: Y.Mahmudov.- Baku: Baku University, 2005. p.136

29 Константинополь и Проливы.М. 1925. p.452

30 М.Б.Багиров, Х.Ю.Вердиева.В поисках истины...Лицо армянства. Архив Политических Документов Управления Делами Президента Азербайджанской Республики. Документы свидетельствуют...Баку,2011, p.259

31 Fətəliyev Məmməd Böyükxan is the son. Turkey, Greece and Great Forged World War Iriors . /m.fətəliyev; Elmi red .: Y.Mahmudov.- Bak: University of Baku, 2005..p.138

were going too far, especially in Asia Minor, invited the British to be more active."³²

Afterwards, "After long discussions between the Entente states on 21 January 1920 at the last session of the Paris Peace Conference, the opinion to sign a peace treaty called Sevres with Turkey was accepted. Under this treaty, the Straits and the Black Sea Straits would be given control of the Straits Company, but in fact the administration would be under the strict supervision of England, France and Italy. Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, the Aegean islands, Izmir region and similar places were lost to Turkey. In the east, Van and Bitlis provinces and some of Erzurum and Trabzon provinces would be included in the borders of the Republic of Armenia."³³

"The Ottoman Sultan accepted the Treaty of Sèvres, but Mustafa Kemal's Ankara government pushed the document away. The right of those who signed the treaty can only confirmed with battle in such cases. 120 thousand Greek soldiers entered the territory of Anatolia in the west, and the Turkish-Armenian war started in June 1920 in the east. After the Armenians had won a few minor victories, the Turks started the final offensive, Sarıkamış on 29 September and then annexed Ardahan.

The War of Independence started, and people show their will.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the World War I, some problems have arisen among the nations and the panic situation has become widespread. "As a result, the World War I brought about political problems that would not be sustained in the Near East and the solution was long lasting. Some problems have become so big and profound that they remain unresolved today."³⁴

After the end of the war, the Entente states immediately attempted to make a treaty with the Ottoman Empire since they understood very well that they could only realize their pre-war plans in this way.

During this period, the government in Turkey changed and the cabi-

32 Fətəliyev Məmməd Böyükxan oğlu. Türkiyə, Yunanıstan və Böyük dövlətlər Birinci dünya müharibəsi ərəfəsində və illərində. /M.Fətəliyev; Elmi red.: Y.Mahmudov.- Bakı: Bakı Universiteti, 2005..p.139

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net was changed after the war promptly. Thus, Turkey was stuck among both internal and external challenges.

“The World War I was a historical event that played a major role in the reorganization of the map of Europe and the Near East. As a result of this war, the four great empires collapsed and many small states emerged instead. As a result of this war, the great Ottoman Empire was disintegrated, a large part of the Ottoman population was ruined and almost escaped annihilation. The reason for the Ottomans to wage war was the desire to get rid of the influence of the Western powers that tried to conquer the state from within. The World War I became the research field of professional historians and sometimes the field of art and culture in the world historiography.”³⁵

In other words, “When we consider the causes of World War I, which is the first total war, we observe the existence of a composition of causes. Liberalism and nationalism, the continuous and natural consequences of the developments brought about by the French Revolution and the wars that lasted for a quarter of a century, have an important place in this composition. Especially the empires, which contain many different nations, experienced the threat of nationalism the most. In other words, there is aggressive and ethnic nationalism in the war. One another of the most important causes of war is economic reasons.”³⁶

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The Factors of Optimization of the Value Created by the Couple Turkey / Africa

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Abstract

The trade volume between Turkey and Africa reached \$ 179 billion over the period 2009-2018. Since 2005 and the establishment of a new Turkish policy towards Africa, the economic exchanges with the countries of the continent have experienced an acceleration. The Turkish President's statement that the Turks should not go to Africa as lesson givers, but as travel friend for the Africans, sums up most of Turkey's economic diplomacy in Africa. In this article, we have highlighted the opportunities presented by the African continent for the Africans and foreign investors, the factors that limit the success of this economic cooperation, with Turkey and finally, the models currently applied by Turkey in Africa. The results of our analysis lead us to invite Turkish companies to think of an investment over time by building on the opportunities present on the continent and not to consider Africa as a simple consumer market.

Introduction

For their development and their entry into the group of great nations, African countries need serious partners with whom they share the same vision in terms of development. According to Ahmet Riza Demirer, Director General of the Africa Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador, Africa will become a central point of a global agenda in the 21st century [1]. The reason for the growing interest in Africa observed in recent years is then easy to understand. Turkey has relations with Africa that have lasted for centuries, but since the 2000s, relations between these two entities have seen a new turning point of concrete actions on both sides favoured by similarities in culture on the one hand and religion on the other. If it is true that the African culture made of hospitality and consideration of the foreigner is close to the Turkish culture, it is not always easy to understand the Africans so the habits and the cultures inherited from the colonization have in somehow contributed to a strong cultural denaturation. The French colonies, for example, were designed to serve the French trade, the raw material was used to supply industries that subsequently had an almost guaranteed market for finished products. This mode of operation lasted long before Africa was able to multiply partners to create competition. The settlements dating back to colonization had been well-crafted and kept the old continent highly dependent [2]. As a new partner, but already with 41 embassies out of the 54 African countries, Turkey still has a way to go to define a model of sustainable cooperation that benefits all parties. However, some fundamental questions have to be addressed: What are the opportunities in Africa? Is Turkey able to meet the expectations of African partners? what are the strategies that can allow Turkey to be different?

1. Material and method

In order to carry out our research, we relied on the interviews, the on-

line articles that we grouped by group of relevance in relation to our subject. The sites of Turkey's diplomatic representations in Africa have also greatly contributed to giving us the raw material essential to our analyzes. Our experience accompanying African and Turkish companies allowed us to identify the stories and data used as social proof of some analyzes.

II. Opportunities in Africa

To talk about opportunities in Africa, we must make a distinction between regions and resources: North Africa has oil resources, South Africa developed mining industries and sub-Saharan Africa still lag behind and therefore hardly find investors. Natural resources such as oil, precious metals, diamonds, gold or uranium, etc. are abundant and still unexploited. For example, in Cameroon, the government announced on June 2019 the discovery of more than 300 mining sites in five regions of the country [3]. This is not surprising since a large part of the world's deposits of mines is in Africa. The lands are fertile and offer various products. In spite of this, Africa still imports a large part of the food it consumes. Some countries like Cameroon, Senegal and Ivory Coast benefit from their opening towards the sea which allows them to serve as a crossing point for the goods coming from the more enclave countries without access to the sea. They represent a door of entrance in their respective regions. South Africa is one of the largest exporters on the African continent and the largest producer of gold, diamonds, platinum and chrome in the world. The resources of African countries are as much a source of development and prosperity. North Africa namely Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Western Sahara and Tunisia contains large reserves of crude oil, Libya is among the largest reserves of world. Africa's imports are worth several billion dollars a year, and the main imports are machinery, equipment, chemicals, scientific instruments and apparatus, pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs. According to AMIRA Daoui (2019) of the website www.waystocap.com, the most profitable agricultural products imported by Africa, especially in the sub-Saharan region, concern consumer products, among which there are prepared foods, dairy products, poultry, wine, beer and other beverages and vegetables. Growth in bulk imports has been slower, but demand for rice and wheat is also very strong. Although growth rates are rising, wealth gaps and income inequality remain very high [4]. On the list of exported products we have cocoa, wood, nuts, coffee, tea,

and vegetables. Agriculture is a sector with high potential in Africa, with more than 65% of the world's previously unused agricultural land. Foreign and local investors can find good opportunities. Needs are growing for modern infrastructures such as stadiums, roads, railways, airports, ports, IT services, water and electricity supply, and even gas, though this latter component is not always taken into account. This was the case of the Japoma stadium in Douala (50 000 places) in Cameroon built by the Turkish company Yenigün inşaat [5].

The middle class is growing and is becoming more and more demanding in terms of brand and product quality. Which represents a boon for international companies. Africa is one of the world's leaders in mobile adoption, mobile payment networks launched in East Africa have opened up commerce and the global economy connected to the poor, urban dwellers and rural unbanked people. It is not for the moment the inhabitant of an African village will buy a product in Turkey or elsewhere via internet using his mobile money account and will be delivered just a few days later. The continent is a less risky investment destination than is generally said in the media. Opportunities exist not only for large companies and financial institutions but also for small and medium-sized businesses. Whether in energy, technology, supply chain or any other field, Africa has the opportunity and the skills to look at what works elsewhere and then design its own solutions [4]. In Africa, unlike in the West, plants such as corn, tomatoes, etc. grow 24 hours a day, it is possible to harvest them several times a year. Unsold fruits are rotting in markets as people consume imported fruit juices made of chemicals that can cause disease. Access to credit is very limited in Africa. While Europeans boost development by credit, African banks are not solvent and can not issue letters of credit accepted by the banks from Turkey. This considerably limits the exchange capacity between the two entities. This is not the case for French companies because some French banks have branches in Africa.

III. Factors limiting relations between Turkey and Africa

Many of the factors that hinder trade between Turkey and Africa are linked to colonization. However, some of these obstacles stem from the political choices and orientations of the powerful partner. We can mention the lack of infrastructure, the unfavourable trade agreements, the strong subsidies granted to European farmers by the EU. The language barrier,

the language conveys culture as recognized by several researchers, it follows from a difficulty to understand each other. An example could be the following. In a meeting between a Turk and an African for whom I was translating, the African spent about half the time talking about topics that had nothing to do with the agenda. The meeting lasted 2 hours, one hour longer than if both parties had remained focused. It was necessary to explain to the Turkish side the African way of thinking about a meeting, a meal with a partner and so on. We continue to follow the customer who gives the order and purchase more than \$ 50,000, 12 months later. The Turk confessed to me that without my support, he would have given up before the conclusion. Similar examples are numerous and frequently lead to failure. This is rarely the case in exchanges with the colonial powers who have been with the Africans for a long time. European brands have been implanted in the subconscious of Africans for several years, disrupting these consumption patterns. Is very difficult to success for Turkish companies especially when it considers Africa as a consumers market: "I produce in Turkey I sell in Africa and it's finished". This approach may have worked in the past but it is the time to understand that this time is over. A serious partner looks at the environment and sees what it has to offer in relation to the environment. It does not just say I consume this so I produce and I send you my surplus production. The lady shoe sector is a good example of this example. In Turkey, most ladies wear the number 40 at the most, while in Africa many women wear more than 40. Practical no shoe manufacturing plant even the one that says produce for the African market does not think to produce the sizes having a number above 40. In the online education market it's the same; Universities ask to register a Turkish ID number to register for an online course while access to these courses can be offered to African students who want to have Turkish qualifications while staying in Africa. Once the goods arrive in Africa, they must come out of the Seaport. Several seaports from Africa are managed by the French company Bolloré Logistique which for one reason or another can drag containers from countries other than France. This was the case in 2014 in Cameroon where during the Promote fair, Turkish companies were forced to start the fair without their products yet arrived in Cameroon well in advance. Many African countries are underdeveloped and depend on foreign aid. This assistance can also be provided by Turkish government that can support companies investing in these countries.

Trade patterns change from one country to another and it can be difficult to understand the needs of each partner without looking at all trends. It is at this level that African students who have received some of their education in Turkey could help to adjust the game. In all cases the obstacles are minimal in view of the enormous opportunities.

IV. The Turkish Model in Africa

Turkey is in economic rivalry with the big powers in Africa, but its approach, which it still defines as a win-win partnership model, is encouraging all other parties to increase investment. This will create stability in African countries. The Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum chaired by the Turkish Presidency and the African Union is the ideal communication venue for Turkey's policy of collaboration with Africa. Turkey's policy of opening up to Africa, which has grown in the 1990s, is in perpetual motion. A "Strategy for Improving Economic Relations with African Countries" was set up in 2003. In November 2014, it was updated to the capital of Equatorial Guinea or the new needs of the continent, hence the Development of relations with Africa is gaining momentum on a daily basis, trade volume has tripled to \$ 17.5 billion, speaking to Turkish businessmen, President Recep Tayip Erdoğan well understood the African stresses that the latter does not need the people who will come to tell him where he should go or not. The African knows very well where he is going, he nevertheless needs fellow travellers who can understand him and This is in stark contrast to the colonial policy that tends to define everything and to take the African to follow without thinking on his own. Turkey has adopted the model of public-private partnerships that allow endow States with highly costly infrastructure with repayment over time. The Japoma multi-sports complex with a total cost of USD 143 million run by Yenigün inşaat and the refurbished Niamey Airport by the Turkish group Summa for USD 171 million confirm this new orientation of the country. Summa will, therefore, exploit the area for 30 years before handing it over to the State of Niger, this confirms that Turkey is not passing through Africa and that it is there for the long term. For Turkey, as emphasized by Ahmet Riza Demirer, the most important thing is to work in respect of the interests of Africa and its rules.

V. Analysis and Recommendations

To fully benefit from exchanges with Africans, Turks should know the realities of Africa before embarking. They can also go forward with caution in order to take notice gradually. Turkey's domestic and foreign policy should strive to help them in this direction. It already does so by subsidizing participation in fairs and especially with the number of scholarships it offers to African students who are gradually becoming ambassadors for Turkey in Africa. Each action should be contextualized according to local realities, even the products offered to Africans should not be automatically those sold in Turkey but those that take into account, climate data, purchasing power and some other characteristics and of course without deterioration of quality. It is not excluded to reinvent local conditions but after having rubbed shoulders. Turks must stop seeing just African countries as a consumer market because it is also a production area. Indeed, manufacturing in Turkey and selling in Africa has its limits that can be reached much faster than you think. For example, in Cameroon, in the cement market, only imports could fill local demand. Several producers from Turkey then went to the fairs and went to the country to find potential distributors. The Turkish group Eren Holding then tried a not very common approach to Turkish companies. In 2015, he built a local cement production plant inaugurated in 2015. This fourth cement plant in the country, which launched its activities in June 2015, largely contributed to reassure the Cameroonian authorities about the capacity of local producers to meet local demand. This led to the ban on cement imports. The investments made by the competitors thus fell into the water and Eren Holding became a key player in the local production of cement, which was reinforced with its alliance with the Guiferous group of Cameroon with this new partner took products on the spot. that he has long imported. Their investment of 24 million USD largely benefits from the Cameroonian laws on the incentive of private investment. In order to take advantage of African opportunities, Turkey must, therefore, give itself the means to create factories that create factories. In other words, the materials to be produced must be carefully selected according to local needs. Producing locally can even reverse the price trend and thereby raise profits while raising the standard of living of Africans. Raw materials are taken at ridiculous prices in Africa and processed products come back with a price 10 times higher. This is, for example, the case for cocoa

where buyers set the price of raw beans and when chocolate is produced it is still these buyers of yesterday who became a chocolate seller who will fix the price. The relocation of some companies whose products have become highly competitive in Turkey can not only give a new life to the Turkish company but also produce growth in Africa. As an example of a sector we can mention that of the manufacture of gas cylinders and plastic production plants. This problem can be precisely solved by Africans with the help of non-colonizing powers like Turkey. Turkey in Africa, therefore, has a mission not primarily economic but also humanitarian because the cooperation strategy adopted by Turkey can help to free Africa from models inherited from colonization. Of course, all Africans and especially politicians, African intellectuals must put in place strategies that in the near future will produce the expected results.

Conclusion

The volume of trade between Turkey and the African continent reached \$ 179 billion over the period 2009-2018 [6]. Since 2005 and the establishment of a new Turkish policy towards Africa, the economic exchanges with the countries of the continent have experienced a sharp acceleration. The creation of wealth for both Africans and Turks are a primary focus of the Turkish authorities. Africa needs fellow travellers, not people who will tell them what direction to take or not. The Turkish president said at the Turkey Africa Economic Summit in November 2016 in Istanbul. The partnership and actions of Turkish businessmen must be accompanied by the government. These actions should also aim to create exchanges between African students graduating from Turkish universities, by creating job forums for them and why not support Turkish companies that would develop joint projects with former graduates of Turkey?

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Re-Evaluating South Sudan Conflict (2013 -2018): The Causes, Path To Peace And Humanitarian Crisis

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Abstract

The South Sudanese conflict has been on-going since 2013 just two years after succeeding from Sudan following more than two decades of intense civil war between the former North and South regions of Sudan. The purpose of this paper therefore, is to evaluate the conflict from the historical background, discuss the status, analyse the narratives of the conflict and provide policy recommendations to actors involved in negotiating for an accommodative peace process. Investigation of the previous peace processes that even saw the signing of several treaties that later collapsed has necessitated a new approach in understanding the causes and solutions of the conflict. This paper argues by emphasizing the role of ethnicity that has been construed by various factions to attain various political and economic objective resulting in a vicious cycle of

extreme conflict that continues to touch on every cadre of socio-political and economic life of the South Sudanese and the region at large. Thus, this paper provides recommendations for a comprehensive peace outlook that will seek to redress issues pertaining to South Sudan's political system which is the foundation for the restructuring of the administrative, economic and social aspects of South Sudan with the aim of limiting the further manipulation of ethnicity as a tool of advancing political, economic and social objectives.

Key Words: South Sudan, Ethnicity, Civil War, Transitional Authority, Conflict Resolution

Introduction

The year 2011 marked the culmination of decades characterized by intense conflict between South Sudan (Non-Arabs) and North Sudan (Arabs) ending with South Sudan attaining independence and subsequently acquiring the tag of the youngest state in the world. The conflict between the Arab north the Non-Arab south was so intense that the international and regional community was drawn in to come and mediate for a peace deal following huge losses of human life. The efforts of the peace process culminated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on the 9th January 2005 after several protocols and agreements signed by various leaders representing the north and south in Kenya in negotiations that lasts for over two years between 2002 and 2004 (Jok, 2015: 1-5). However, the negotiations were so much focused on addressing between the North-South conflict and finding a solution to stop the war that little attention was given to also recognise the sharp differences that existed between the Non-Arab South. The referendum that was held enjoyed popular support with 99% of the total votes cast in support of a South Sudan secession from the larger Sudan. However, although South Sudan got its independence in 2011, the new state begun life as an already pre-failed state. The North which retained the name Sudan experienced a major reduction in its territorial borders as well as an estimated three-quarters loss of oil reserves to the South (Ottaway et. al, 2012: 3).

Cognizance is given to the fact that South Sudan was indeed, extensively negatively impacted by the secession conflict, which either in one way prevented or destroyed the existing basic infrastructure, human capital, and formal civilian institutions. However, the breaking point of the new state emerged with increasing faultiness characterized by high levels of government corruption at the expense of public delivery of government mandated socio-economic and political services that in a gigantic fashion

hampered the post-civil war conflict recovery and development with the Arab-north. Notably, in 2013, South Sudan was world's largest recipient of foreign aid because of the severe humanitarian crisis.

But intense political tensions in December 2013 between leading South Sudanese political leaders led to the outbreak of violence. Important to note is that this outbreak of conflict was not the result of ethnic identity, however, it quickly transformed to overpower the loosely linked inter-ethnic relations which was exploited by the different political leaders to score or settle political grievances spurring a full outbreak of ethnic cleansing in the capitol Juba and the immediate environs. Behind all this was back and forth accusations between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, with the former accusing the latter of being behind a coup attempt, allegations that until this moment of writing this paper, Machar continues to vehemently deny.

During the early days of the conflict, hundreds of civilians lost their lives following attacks targeted on Machar's ethnic group, the Nuer in Juba before the Nuer also plotted one of the deadliest revenge attacks on Kiir's ethnic group, the Dinka as the violence continued to spread like bush fire to other parts of the country as Machar declared an active rebellion against the government with support of several senior Nuer military commanders. The conflict continued undiminished for more than 20 months as regional neighbours struggled to make progress in negotiations under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.). with constant but unbinding recommitments by both sides of the warring groups, the conflict spread on to become one of the most serious conflicts witnessed in the first quarter of the 21st century.

I. Methodology

The information acquired and subsequently subjected to qualitative analysis of data in this paper has been directly generated from secondary sources documenting progress reports of several non-governmental and international organizations on the different stages of the conflict.

Documentations by media institutions and civil society organizations have featured extensively especially in regard to understanding the severity of humanitarian crisis and cases of insecurity in South Sudan.

II. The Purpose Of This Paper

This paper aims at sequentially constructing facts emphatically from the available secondary sources of data for a comprehensive analysis, with the hope of providing a clear understanding of the conflict in South Sudan through evaluation of the conflict from historical perspectives, discuss the status, analyse the narratives of the conflict and provide policy recommendations to actors of peace and conflict resolutions involved in negotiating for an accommodative and lasting peace process in South Sudan and as a future point of reference in evaluating other conflicts.

Map of South Sudan



Source: Maps of World, 2018

III. Pre-September 2018 Conflicts and Violated Peace Agreements

Immediately after secession of South Sudan, two of the greatest challenges of the new government was on its ability to exercise sole proprietorship of monopoly on the use of violence as well as the challenge over its claim on legitimacy. Weber's characterization of the state as an entity emphasized on the ability of the state to have monopoly over force, an argument that was later reinforced by other realist scholars such as Waltz (1998: 28-34). However, in as much as this monopoly over the use of force is relevant to the state in exercising its control over other actors, other realist scholars such as Thomson et. al, (1989) and Krasner (1999) have emphasized the need for this authority to not be subjected to misuse

and abuse. This is because once the authority of the state over the control of force is eroded, the resultant case is a cycle of violence than can subject more specifically vulnerable states to the danger of total collapse (Adams, 2000: 2-5). The struggle for independence for South Sudan led to the formation of several militia groups with support from their respective ethnicities with both the government and the opposition enjoying a large following of very loyal and equipped military wings controlling various parts within the South Sudanese territorial borders.

The conflict that broke out in December 2013 was not so much due to ethnicity but rather the sharp political differences among the political leaders who in turn used the pre-existing ethnic fault lines to spark armed clashes and propel ethnic killings both in the capital city Juba and other regions far beyond. The immediate impact was a humanitarian crisis with several agencies withdrawing their members from South Sudan because of security risks (Blanchard, 2013). What followed was the killing of thousands of South Sudanese and an influx of refugee displacement estimated at 120,000 with more than 63,000 refugees seeking refuge at UN bases in South Sudan according to the UNOCHA (December 26, 2013) within the first month of the conflict. The international community was rapidly mobilised to intervene and address the crisis that saw UN pass resolution 2132 that authorised for more troops mobilization from other UN missions such as the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Stabilization Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO), AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to move into South Sudan and serve under the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as well as demanding for the immediate cessation of conflict by all the parties involved (UN Security Council, December 24, 2013). This was a clear illustration of the conflict severity that had aid agencies report an estimated figure of more than 50,000 deaths within three months of fighting in South Sudan.

The conflict did not reduce extensively as heavy fighting accompanied by massive casualties continued to be reported in various parts of the country as well as in the capital Juba until 2015 when a temporary call to stop violence was achieved through the signing of the 2015 peace treaty in front of the presidents of Kenya (Uhuru Kenyatta) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni) and the Ethiopian prime minister (Hailemariam Desalegn) following pressure put on both Riek Machar and president Salva Kiir

after a report by UN panel of experts indicated that both government and opposition forces targeted civilians (Aljazeera, August 27 2015). This deal however, was already condemned to fail as there were reservations especially on the government side that saw Kiir refuse to sign the deal earlier before finally inking the deal later. The deal stipulated among other issues that fighting was to stop immediately an soldiers confined to barracks within 30days and foreign forces to exit within 45 days, all military forces to leave the capital Juba, rebel to get the position of “first vice-president”, a transitional government of national unity to take charge of office in 90 days and govern for 30 months, elections to be held 60 days before the end of term of the transitional government and the establishment of the Truth, Reconciliation and Healing Commission to investigate human rights violations (IGAD, 17 August 2015).

This treaty however did not last as both sides threw accusations to each other on grounds of treaty violations as vicious violence kept erupting from time to time as the different factions kept on confronting each other leaving the country unstable as the violence even spread further to the southern parts of the country that were until then relatively stable. Unfortunately, the spreading of conflict to these southern regions will prove to be very costly as the region was known as the country’s food basket region. Destabilization led to poor crop and animal production that affected food supply. Injustice became the order of day as the state lost its control and sole monopoly over the use of force, provide basic amenities to the citizens, provide security and administer justice leading to the erosion of the little political legitimacy enjoyed by the state which stood helpless in the face of a possible genocide in the country (AU Report, 2014: 106).


Within four years, the conflict spread to other states including the Greater Upper Nile, the Equatorials and Western Bahr al Ghazal causing thousands of more deaths and over 2.3 million people displaced according to UNHCR (January 2018). According to a report by London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (September 2018), the conflict in South Sudan has likely led to nearly 400,000 excess deaths in the country’s population since it began in 2013. The period was characterized with intense conflict that saw the government accused of curtailment of media freedoms, harassment of state critics and illegal detentions as well as an increase in the number of troops from 63,000 to 230,000. Humanitarian crisis deteriorated further with the outbreak of famine that hit Unity state

which is a major food basket for the South Sudan. Reports according to Mercy Corps indicate that by 2018, 1.9 million people are internally displaced persons while more than 2.1 million fled to other neighbouring countries in the region as externally displaced persons. The peace keeping missions have also come at a very expensive cost as approximately \$20 billion since 2014 (Rolandsen, 2015: 355).

The chaos that resulted from the continuous cycle of conflict allowed different factions to target civilian populations that were perceived to be supporting the other factions leading to cases of kidnapping, cold-blood murder, arson attacks and gender-based violence such as rape. The lack of food supply also ensured that humanitarian agencies were not spared in these attacks. The conflict in South Sudan has made it impossible for children to be in school with UNICEF documenting that approximately 50% of school going children are out of school. Coming from the backdrop of more than two decades of civil war with the North South Sudan has continued to be very vulnerable in all spheres of social life. Addressing the basic needs of the over 7.6 million people affected by the conflict continues to face budgetary shortcomings as exhibited in 2017 when only 73% of the \$1.64 billion needed to respond to the crisis was funded. In 2018 the targeted budget by the United Nations is \$1.8 billion to help the internally displaced and \$1.7 billion to assist those who have fled out of the country (Reuters, December 2017). The problem of financing is also worsened by the misuse of funds by the political class (Waal, 2014: 362-364). However, to meet the budgetary shortcomings the private sector may be approached to help raise sufficient funding.

Graph showing conflict incidences between 2011-2018

2011-2018 arasındaki çatışma olaylarını gösteren grafik



Kaynak: Silahlı Çatışma Yeri ve Olay Verileri Projesi (ACLEDP)

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLEDP)

Indeed, it is evident from the conflict incidences experienced in South Sudan that innocent civilians in South Sudan have had to pay hugely for the outbreak of the conflict in terms of casualties. According to a report by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS, May 2014) on the human rights violations during the conflict; ... “there are reasonable grounds to believe that violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have been committed by both parties [...]. These violations include extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, rape and other acts of sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention, targeted attacks against civilians not taking part in hostilities, violence aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population, and attacks on hospitals as well as personnel and objects involved in a peacekeeping mission.” UNMISS further indicates that, “in light of the widespread and systematic nature of many of the attacks, and information suggesting coordination and planning, there are also reasonable grounds to believe that the crimes against humanity of murder, rape and other acts of sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and imprisonment have occurred.” (UNMISS, May 2014).

Internal and External Refugees from South Sudan

Families flee to escape conflict


Conflict in the world's newest nation has spread across the country, creating a severe humanitarian crisis. **South Sudan has the third largest refugee crisis**, after Syria and Afghanistan.

3.7 million have fled their homes.



6 out of 10 South Sudanese refugees are children.

As of March 2018
Source: <http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php>



Source: Mercy Corps

International Monetary Fund (IMF) has continuously emphasized the danger of prolonged conflict in South Sudan on the economy if the

imbalances and exhausted economic buffers are not addressed (Sudan Tribune, 3 June 2016). The sharp decline in the prices of global oil has also played a key role in the deeming economic situations of South Sudan which accounts for 98% of the total government revenue in the form of oil exports. The value of the Sudanese pound deteriorated with over 90% of its value lost (Sudan Tribune, April 2017). In 2016, inflation sky-rocketed surpassing a 550% increase with the government registering over \$1.1 billion in budget deficit in the 2016 -2017 financial year (IMF Country Report, 2017). The prices of basic commodities such as food increased sharply outside the reach of many South Sudanese citizens as illustrated in the price of sorghum that had increased by 400% (FEWSN, April 2016).

V. Narratives About Causes Of The Conflict

The magnitude of the South Sudanese conflict has attracted the attention of several scholars especially security experts who have examined the experiences of the conflict such as understanding the causes and even more importantly the reasons why the peace arrangements have been failing from time to time in South Sudan (Johnson, 2005: 608). As will be deduced in the arguments herein, the shortcomings of these narratives to illuminate the critical underlying causes of the conflict, is what has necessitated the rethinking of this conflict.

V. 1. The Natural Resources Narrative (Oil)

Several scholars (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2005: 6-7; Sachs & Warner, 2001: 827-

838) have favoured this narrative by postulating that the different factions (government and rebel groups) want to have absolute control of the oil fields and other natural resources. De Soysa (2003:409) although adopted a different set of case studies concluded that there is a very strong causal relationship between natural resources and civil wars. In explaining economic underdevelopment in most of the developing countries especially in Africa, natural resource curse has been widely cited by political economists who have linked natural resources with political instability.

For South Sudan, oil is the biggest GDP earner. According to the World Bank (12 October 2018), South Sudan is the most oil-dependent country in the world, with oil accounting for almost the totality of exports, and around

60% of its gross domestic product (GDP). However, oil producing states such as Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei have witnessed the most intense battles during this conflict. A report by Sentry alleged that revenues from the sale of oil have been extensively used to finance the civil war while enriching a very small click of South Sudanese elites (Bariyo, August 5, 2014). However, the government through its spokesperson vehemently refuted such claims by stating that oil revenues have been used to pay salaries of civil servants and claiming that, "The oil money did not even buy a knife. It is being used for paying the salaries of the civil servant." (Reuters, February 20, 2014). Relative to understanding the underlying cause of the South Sudanese civil war, other scholars (Sefa-Nyarko, 2016: 194 and Johnson 2014: 167) argue that the civil war in South Sudan cannot be examined through the natural resource curse as the primary cause.

The first argument is anchored on the question of why other income earners such agriculture would not generate conflict, creates an argumentative dilemma in regard to the natural resource curse theories. There also lacks a clear explanation on the process that links conflict to resources. Literature on the civil wars-natural resources connections need to address alternative explanations in the sense that the correlation between civil wars and natural resources can be the exact opposite in that, the dependency on natural resources is the consequent of civil wars. Natural resources for one, are location-specific such that during conflicts they remain immobile whereas other mobile sectors like industries can move away. The more than three decades of conflict in South Sudan has seen its economy and the war solely depend on the oil sector.

Secondly, natural resource narratives need to demonstrate explicitly, which conflicts are affected by which resources and how such resources affect the conflict durations as argued by Hoeffler et. al, (2001). This view has however been criticised by a claim which Doyle et. al, (2000: 798) and Stedman et. al (2002). Thirdly, the narrative that natural resources provide rebels with an opportunity to extort money from miners (Ross, 2002: 9 -10) fails to account why efficient and effective mining security measures have not been implemented and neither does it justify why is it then, that, if rebels are able to generate revenue by controlling natural resources would opt to engage in violence.

V.2. Access to Arms Narrative

The narrative on access to arms is very important in understanding the conflict in South Sudan. The independence of South Sudan from Sudan was on the backdrop of intense conflict for over two decades that culminated with an overwhelming secession referendum vote by the South Sudanese. However, the country became so much engulfed in celebration of the new acquired status that immediate disarmament of the public was not conducted. This failure on the part of the government ensured that during the conflict the public was equally armed and thereby challenging the state's monopoly over the use of force (O'Brien, 2009: 11). The recognition of the fact that arms are owned by the public has led to intense calls by regional states and non-state actors such humanitarian agencies to the United Nations and the Security Council to impose arms embargo on South Sudan to limit and, or, stop access to arms resulting to the imposition of an arms embargo on South Sudan in February 2018 by US. This embargo stipulated that US companies and citizens could no longer offer defense services to South Sudan (Reuters, July 2018). The challenge to this narrative is that it does offer reasons why individuals within the Sudanese society would be involved in killing of other ethnic communities. This therefore necessitates the need to reanalyse historical events, role of leading individuals in the society and the question of ethnic identity.

V.3. Narrative on the Role of Sudan in The Conflict

Sudan has been accused of having a hand in the regarding the woes that curbed SPLM. Reference is drawn when Sudan helped SSDF between 1983-2005 to carry out attacks in South Sudan (Young & Lebrun, 2006: 17) and protect the government oil fields for Khartoum led by Riek Machar and other rebels in exchange for arms and technical support that were instrument in perpetrating serious atrocities such as the Bor Massacre in 1991 (Canadian Department of Justice, 2014). There are contentious border disputes in the oil-rich area of Abyei region between Sudan and South Sudan (Born & Raviv, 2017:178). It is this conflict of interest of Sudan that argued to be the motivating factor for Sudan to fuelling conflict in the neighbouring south. This narrative is however criticised because a stable South Sudan is logically beneficial to Sudan because they stands to benefit to from a renewed positive image within the international

community if it succeeds in negotiating a successful peace deal for the south, it will be possible to implement the three-year oil agreement with South Sudan without disruptions and it will lessen the responsibility of Sudan in supporting the rebels group in Darfur highlands because of the new found peace between the two countries (Adam, 5 July 2018).

V.4. Ethnicity in South Sudan Conflict

Ethnicity and ethnic identity are increasingly becoming a key factor in conflict in not only within the context of Africa but all across Europe and the Middle East in conflicts such as the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish republic of Cyprus, Myanmar and the Crimean question just to mention but a few. South Sudan has therefore not been spared as competition for political influence and the difference in ideologies has seen political leaders mobilise their ethnic groups as the vehicles by which they use to pursue their political ambitions (Cheeseman, 2015: 8-13). In South Sudan the role of ethnicity has been manifested at different levels as will be demonstrated below.

V.4. 1. Divisions Within SPLM

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement was formed in 1983 with membership from the south of Sudan and other minority groups in the north (Barltrop, 2010: 3-5) with the objectives for fighting for a more secularised state under the leadership of the late John Garang' (Warner 2016: 6 -13). Despite this diversity in terms of membership of the SPLM, the Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups constituted the majority the members thereby giving the two ethnic communities leverage to occupy prime positions in the hierarchy of the organisation and this reflection is evident in contemporary times (Kiranda et al, 2016: 33).

The challenges that curbed SPLM such as financial and ideological difference among the leadership (Janssen, 2017: 13) were ethnicized by the dominant groups as they grappled to find solutions that would favour their ethnic groups. This led to the emergence of cracks as SPLM was now facing two critical issues that included the unequal ethnic representation creating tensions and the path in which power would follow (Mamdani, 18 February 2014).

One group led by Akuot Atem Mayem were demanding for an independent South Sudanese state while the other group led by John

Garang' were fronting for a New Sudan that was to be democratic and secular with both sides receiving support from diverse ethnicities. However, in-between there claims that the quest for an independent South Sudan was fronted by the Nuer while calls for a new Sudan was fronted by the Dinka (Kiranda et al, 2016).

The splinter group that was led by Riek Machar who joined ranks with Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1991 after an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the leadership of John Garang' (Sorbo, 2014:1) in SPLM continues to be viewed through ethnic lenses pitting the Nuers against the Dinkas.

The third split in SPLM occurred in 15th December 2013 when forces loyal to Slava Kiir and Riek Machar clashed following weeks of intense succession politics within SPLM (Johnson, 2014: 168) as the party was getting ready to conduct the National Convention which was supposed to discuss issues not limited to, the party's presidential flag bearer for the 2015 presidential elections, the term limits of the chairperson of the SPLM, the constitution and code of conduct (Janssen, 2017: 12). During these intense moments, an order to disarm members of certain communities within the presidential guard led to a mutiny that triggered revenge attacks on the Dinkas in Akobo and Bor by the Nuer (Johnson, 2014: 170). Although the alleged coup plotters were arrested, Riek Machar managed to flee from the country but troops loyal to him continued with the conflict.

Ethnicity continues to remain a significant factor South Sudan's conflict and politics. The domination of the major ethnic groups has become a key tool for ascending to power through systematic ethnic mobilizations based on historical rivalries. Strong ethnic loyalty and a winner-takes-it-all political system has allowed victors to dominate government and amass a substantive portion of the national economic output.

V.4. 2. The Bor Massacre

The Bor massacre was perpetrated in 1991 in the capital of Jonglei state (Wild et al, 2018: 2-11) that is home to a dominant Nuer ethnic group with a few Dinkas in the midst. Prior to the massacre inter-community raids for livestock between these two groups were common. (Glowacki & Wrangham, 2015: 349 -350). To have protection against the raids, both the Dinkas and the Nuers formed armed organised groups in the form of the Titweng and the Nuer White Army respectively (Young, 2016).

Riek Machar took the opportunity during the leadership struggles in SPLM to incorporate the Nuer White Army Members into SPLM-Nasir and which with the support of Khartoum government orchestrated one of the deadliest massacres in the history of South Sudan. Machar who had ideological differences with John Garang' mobilized over 20,000 members of the SPLM-Nasir to attack the Dinkas killing over 2000 of them (Wild et al, 2018). Even after offering a public apology in 2011 as a vice-president, Machar's quest to ascend to the top office of the presidency continues to face challenges as this massacre has been used as a tool against his ambitions (Chol, 2011: 3).

To argue that the conflict in South Sudan is simply an issue of ethnic differences as already branded by sections of the international media, will be superficial and simplistic. The narrative of ethnic rivalry has however been countered by the argument that South Sudan government had diverse ethnic representation and that even after the 2013 coup attempt, those who were alleged to have taken part from Salva Kiir's tribe were not spared (Pinaud, 2014: 192). However, despite the fact that the vice president belong to the Nuer as the president is from the Dinka, the availability of people of diverse ethnic origins in the government cannot be construed to mean a representation of ethnic interests. But, alternative to this, African societies also bestow ethnic responsibilities to particular individuals whose voices are not only the voice of the ethnic groups but also symbols of ethnic unity. As such, any kind of humiliation that targets any ethnic kingpin is construed as humiliation to the entire ethnic group which they represent, and, which, on behalf of their leaders' endeavour, they may seek revenge.

VI. Previous Peace Efforts

The first efforts to mediate in the conflict peace was in 2014 lead by IGAD with support from United States, Norway and United Kingdom (Taulbee, 2014) with the target of having a comprehensive peace deal by 5 March 2015 but the target was not achieved. The United Nations Security Council also imposed sanctions on six individuals in South Sudan but excluding Salva and Machar. However, there was more pressure from the international community demanding for an immediate end to the conflict with the UN security Council also threatening to impose more sanctions on Salva Kiir and Riek Machar should they fail to sign a peace deal by

August 17, 2015 (Foreign Policy, February 2015).

The first treaty lasted for two months after which Machar accused Salva Kiir of making unilateral decisions in running the government. This came on the backdrop of establishment of 18 more additional states by president Salva Kiir. Salva Kiir however agreed to share the cabinet positions in December 2015. But the implementation of the peace accord was very slowly as the deadline of establishing a Transitional Government of National Unity had elapsed by January 2016. However, despite being in exile, Riek Machar was appointed as the 2nd Vice-President and demilitarisation of Juba was ongoing as per the agreement in the early weeks of February. But, there was renewed fighting in other parts of the country following weeks of accusation that troops belonging to the South Sudanese government had attacked a UN-protected civilian camp thus putting the peace deal at great risk. (South Sudan News Agency, 26 February 2016). Machar was able to return back from exile to Juba to take up his position as 1st Vice-President in April 2016 (Baker, 2016: 20-27) before another wave of fighting between government loyalist forces and forces loyal to Riek Machar and forcing him to flee once again thereby marking the collapse of the Transitional Government of National Unity.

Scholars (De Vries et al, 2017: 333-340) attribute the collapse of the 2015 Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) to the lack of political goodwill by both the government and the opposition groups. Relative to this, the conflict between the government and the opposition was given so much attention at the expense of the common grievance by the South Sudanese citizens which may have also motivated them to take to arms. There is also the perception that rebel groups are illegitimate. But also, importantly to not is that some of the claims by the opposition as representatives of genuine grievances may be farfetched. It is because of such concerns that we argue in this paper that unless there is a more comprehensive approach to peace in South Sudan, sharing government positions may just be a temporary solution to the conflict.

VII. Final Roadmap to The 2018 Peace Deal

The collapse of the 2015 peace agreement that was brokered by IGAD saw the conflict continue all the way to the early months of 2018 as mobilization was being conducted to bring back the leaders to negotiate a peace deal that ultimately witnessed the resumption of talks in

May 2018 in Addis Ababa. These renewed talks faced several challenges key among them, the hard-line positions adopted by the factions who rejected IGAD proposals on how to share government positions, the system of governance and most importantly the organization and command of security.

Another agreement was adopted and signed in Khartoum after renewed intense pressure from regional and international community between Salva Kiir and Riek Machar (The Star, June 2018). This new agreement called for the immediate cease-fire throughout the country and the formula for sharing government positions. Unfortunately, just hours after signing this new deal, the cease-fire was violated with both sides of the divide accusing each other of the violations. The disquiet on the government side especially regarding the new structure of government that was to consist of three vice-presidents and the rejection of the postponement of elections by three more years again by the opposition threatened this new peace agreement. The go-ahead for the government to resume oil exploration was also challenged by the opposition. Other provisions this agreement included a 120-day pre-transition period and a 36-month transition followed by a general election, withdrawal of troops from urban areas, villages, schools, camps, and churches. Importantly, other rebel groups were also involved in the negotiations and were allocated a share of the executive and parliamentary slots shared by the two main protagonists as well as gaining a slot among the proposed positions of the vice presidency during an agreement signed in Kampala, Uganda on the 8th of July 2018.

The latest peace deal dubbed the 'Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS),' was inked on the 12th September 2018 in Addis Ababa marking the 12th time that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have signed a peace agreement since the onset of the conflict. The uniqueness of this new peace deal is seen in the entrance of Sudan and Uganda who were previously perceived as being actors in the south Sudanese conflict. The consequence of this development is that the latter are now being viewed as part of the solutions to the conflict. The agreement has already faced violations as witnessed on 24th September 2018 when opposition and government forces clashed again in Koch county. The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) reported that four


of the monitoring group members were assaulted in the Central Equatorial region by government forces in a report addressed to the IGAD Council of Ministers (Sudan Tribune, 18 December 2018). Also, it is imperative to draw to attention the fact that the deal has failed to comprehensively tackle the question of ethnicity as government positions have been distributed out the Nuer and Dinkas at the expense of the minority groups. The new peace deal does not envision South Sudan as a country, but rather, as a coming together of tribes. The consequence of this will be the disenfranchisement of a large section of South Sudan's population as every tribal homeland will be considered the monopoly preserve of its "indigenous" majority; thereby depriving minorities within each district of two critical rights such as the right to customary use of land and participation in local government. It will now be much easier for ambitious leaders of different tribes to mobilize popular discontent and fan flames of a future conflict (New York Times, 24 September 2018).

VIII. Humanitarian Crisis

An analysis of the South Sudan conflict cannot be conducted outside the considerations of the dire humanitarian crisis witnessed even after the signing of the current peace deal in 2018. Most recently, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) has brought to the attention of the South Sudanese government, the issue of sexual attacks perpetrated on over 150 women and girls between the periods of 19-29 November 2018 in what they described as planned attacks (Sudan Tribune, 19 December 2018). The conflict in South Sudan has led to nearly 400,000 excess deaths in the country's population since it began in 2013 with around half of the lives lost estimated to be through violence (Checchi et al, 2018). The conflict has also displaced more than 4 million people with the prolonged fighting plunging the country into extreme food shortages especially after famine struck several regions in 2017. There are constant fears of imminent attack or struggle with food insecurity. As a matter of fact, there has been protests over bread shortages and increase in prices with the government rescinding on providing bread subsidies. In Atbara town of River Nile State in north-eastern Sudan, demonstrators took to the streets to protest against deteriorating living conditions and price hikes as the price of a loaf of bread has increased to 3 Sudanese pounds (Sudan Tribune, December 19, 2018).

In late May 2018, British charity Oxfam called for urgent action to save millions of people from starvation. Currently, over 7.1 million people are faced with starvation. UNHCR appealed for US\$782.7 million for the South Sudan situation in 2018, of which 43 per cent had been funded as of October 2018. Alternatively, with the dire need for humanitarian aid which South Sudan continues to be heavily dependent upon and that can be credited for already saving millions of lives, the UN estimates budgetary funding requirement of \$1.7 billion. However, this has only be funded partially (UNOCHA, 2017).

XI. South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan Funding



UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service, Republic of South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan

A report on Humanitarian Action for Children by UNICEF (2019), documents that there are dire food shortages, economic upheaval and outbreak of diseases. More comprehensively, 4.5 million people have been displaced with an estimated 1.5 million people living in regions with very limited access to humanitarian assistance because of insecurity and operational shortcomings. In the first few months, an estimated 5.2 million people are exposed to starvation out of which 220,700 are children under 5 years. Since 2014, UN (2018), verified that there have been 2700 incidences

of extreme violations affecting over 81,000 children with gender violence affecting over 2300 girls and women, as young as 8 years old.

Of important concern to the issue concerning humanitarian crisis, several humanitarian organizations are on the spot for the loss or misuse of millions of dollars in aid to either looting, frequent raids and theft as well as the additional costs incurred in relocation or evacuation of staff or employees because of either of the above cited reasons (Overseas Security Council Advisory, 2017). Non-Governmental Organizations that are hosted in the outskirts of urban vicinities are particularly prone to challenges of insecurity and are subjected to forced evacuations. However, despite portions of costs being the direct consequence of a very weak economy characterized by sky-rocketing inflation rates with very minimal opportunity for the productive generation of basic or surplus income, reports also point out to an environment of hostility towards international organizations operating within the South Sudan especially with the continued absence of strong state sanctions to maintain law and order firmly (Oxfam, 2016). Scenarios involving looting and raids that for instance, was witnessed when protesters attacked NGO facilities in Maban County led to loss in millions of dollars of humanitarian aid (Sudan Tribune, July 2018) thus increasing the costs of the missions as well as reducing drastically the number of aid beneficiaries.

X. Findings

This paper has noted several issues that either delayed peace or facilitated continued conflict.

The treatment of South Sudan as a collection of ethnic groupings with the concern of facilitating the two dominant groups in having their way has had major impact on the direction of the conflict. The perception that cease-fires can only be achieved when the two ethnic groups have had their way will continue to affect the socio-political and economic dynamics of South Sudan the question of ethnicity cannot be solved comprehensively in this manner.

There are weak support systems to ensure the successful implementation of the provisions of the peace agreements. The institutions established to facilitate this process are faced with financial challenges that hinder them from efficiently and effectively carrying out their mandates. Some of the institutions involved in the implementation of the peace

deal include IGAD, Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), Regional Protection Force (RPF) and the United Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

There have been constant violations of the ceasefire agreements in the conflict. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) is one of the fundamental tenets holding the peace agreements together but, in every agreement signed to this moment, both sides have either been involved in one way or another, in breaching the provisions of the peace deal. Other violations of cease fire agreements include; the government's refusal to commit to a clause submitted during the second round of peace talks in September 2018 suggesting how those who violate peace will be punished as well as the government's impediments to smooth operations of humanitarian agencies by prolonging relief workers work permit processes (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2018).

Recommendations and Conclusion

South Sudan needs to embed a new understanding of statehood by revisiting the philosophical underpinnings of the state as construed on the Westphalian assumptions of 1648 (Leonard, et al: 2). The peace deals proposed have been heavily influenced by Hobbesian arguments that emphasize on the relevance of central authority to create order that ensures a long and good life (Hobbes, 2016: Ch. 4). It is based on this assumption that actors who participate in negotiating peace deals emphasized on the reconstitution of a central authority which collapsed because of the absence of a sense of social contract between citizens and the state (Beichman, 2008).


The cycle of conflict in South Sudan is a manifestation that actors involved in the peace processes have not accounted for the unique features of contemporary African states. Thomas Hobbes argument that governments are better positioned to offer citizens the highest level of security cannot be furthest from the truth. As such, this paper recommends a reformed two-level form of *constitutionalised social contract* between the central government of South Sudan and the people, between devolved regional governments and the people, and, between the central and regional governments. A new constitution will outline the obligations and duties of the state to the people, and the responsibility of the people

to the state at both level of governments.

The structure of modern African societies is epitomised by ethnicity, economic classes and religious divisions (Mamdani 2018). These forms of allegiances can be properly captured in a social contract between the two levels of government and the people. The central government's authority can be limited to include issues of foreign policy, national security, defense, health and education to enhance efficiency while the devolved units tasked with functions such as tourism, early childhood education, environmental management, culture and agriculture, and any other appropriate functions that require public participation. This will enhance accountability, develop a new culture of tolerance, unity in the society and minimise stakes associated with competition for central authority.

Under the executive government, a new constitution should establish a Hybrid Court, that will consist of local and international judges to deal with cases of the conflict as well as providing oversight to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.


Executive arm of government



The executive committee will constitute departments of Treasury, Internal Security and Social Services that will restructure security organs, offer financial management and reform health, education and basic infrastructure sectors of the state. The Advisory Council will be the legislative organ and tasked with drafting a new constitution within a specified period, pass basic laws and approve government expenditure as well as oversight. To address the challenges of the winner takes it all politics, the local government needs to be strengthened and restructured

to bring development to the grassroots levels.

Structure of Complexity in Resolving conflict in South Sudan



Source: Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO), 2018

International community and the transitional government should work together for instance in provision of finances and organization to exploit the commonalities through activities such as drama, sports and other forms of cultural events which are not limited by geographical boundaries while at the same time capable of highlighting critical issues and aspects that plague society such as corruption or ethnicity without having to mention names or groups. Such activities are important in forming unity especially among the younger generations.

Most of the dialogue in the South Sudan conflict occurred at the top. With the new peace deal signed in September 2018, dialogue should be taken down to the grassroots levels among the communities especially on issues pertaining to peace and development. More importantly, the government should involve researchers, practitioners, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations in identifying root causes of conflict and possible ways to resolve the conflict among the communities. Additionally, peace programmes need to be incorporated in school curriculums. The

21st century being a technological era, media platforms of communications such as radio stations, newspapers and social media (Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp) can be used to channel reconciliatory messages.

A comprehensive disarmament process has to be conducted so that the widespread supply of weapons at the hands of civilians is minimized. Heavy penalties and punishments need to be stipulated under the law for anyone found culpable of violations after secessions have been called to a halt so that any desires for retaliations by any groups are discouraged.

The rapidly spreading culture of violence against women must be addressed immediately by the transitional government of South Sudan. More importantly, this undignified behaviour must be strongly and publicly condemned by leaders on both sides of government and in all levels of leadership both socially and politically. All forms of violence against women such as sexual harassment and, or, rape, must not be tolerated. The international and regional community need to work in partnership with the government of South Sudan to conduct intense awareness programmes on a national scale objectively to discourage in the strongest terms possible against all forms of discrimination and violence against women in all spheres; undertake legislative reforms to allow for compliance by South Sudan compliance with regional and international human rights requirements and baselines and ensure that proper and unbiased investigations are conducted into all forms of sexual crimes and perpetrators brought to justice under the jurisdiction of a qualified justice system comprised of qualified and well trained judges, public prosecutors, police and forensic experts.

The significance of professionalising the army cannot be more emphasized. The security agencies and the department of defence needs to be strengthened through suitable training on human rights and any military person or groups found culpable of gross misconduct of human rights violations such as sexual crimes, arrested and prosecuted. To attain this level of responsibility, the judiciary should be adequately staffed with adequate access to financial and material resources for the recruitment of sufficient judicial and judicial support staffs. Additionally, women's representation in the judiciary should be promoted and recruitment must be based on meritocracy with expertise on gender-based and sexual crimes as an added advantage during recruitment drives.

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Comparative Study of Indonesia and Turkey's Secularism Implementation

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Introduction

Turkey and Indonesia share the similarity of being a Muslim majority state. While being the biggest Muslim majority state in Southeast Asia, Indonesia decided to be a secular state. Meanwhile its neighbors Malaysia and Brunei which are also Muslim Majority states, decided to be a religious state. Similar condition applied to Turkey. Even though Turkey was the center of the Ottoman after the Republican revolution Turkey became a secular state. However, Indonesia and Turkey are different in the terms of implementation of the secularism.

Turkey during its first years of establishment implemented a radical reform towards religion. Meanwhile, Indonesia did not have such reform in spite of being secular. The historical development of Turkey and Indonesia led to the differentiation of the secularism in both states. Therefore, in this article, the historical development of Turkey and Indonesia will be

elaborated. The aim of this article is to explain the causes of the secularism difference between Turkey and Indonesia.

1. Definition of Secularism and Laicism

Both Laicism and Secularism are similar in terms of separation of the state and religion. The word Laicism is derived from Latin, Laicus, which means not to belong to any religion or church.¹ The word Laik in Turkish is also derived from the French word of Laicite or Laic.² The word secular or secularism means to not belong to God and the translation of the word secularism in Turkish is *dünyevi*.³ Secularism is more familiar in the protestant world such as German and England whereas Laicism is familiar in the Catholic world such as French⁴. These two words are used interchangeably even though they contain different meaning and thus application.

Laicism is an assertive and Jacobin form of the separation of state and religion. Following the French revolution in 1789 until 1905, the revisionist targeted the religious institution in French by terminating religious clerks, abolishing religious holiday, and some other reforms.⁵ French as a state-imposed an intense control over religion and this phase is called the exclusive laicism or assertive secularism.⁶ On the other hand, secularism is the opposite of the laicism or the assertive secularism and thus secularism is also called as the passive secularism. The secular state allows the religious symbol in the public spaces and tends to compromise with the religion.⁷ the example of the present day secular state is the USA.

The formation of the assertive and passive secular is a result of the

1 Gül Tuğba Dağcı ve Adnan Dal, "Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Din-Devlet Laiklik Tartışmaları", *Barış Araştırmaları ve Çatışma Çözümleri Dergisi* 2, no.1 (2014): 39.

2 Ibid.

3 Durmuş Hacıoğlu, "Batı Tarzı Dünyevileşme: Laiklik ve Sekülerlik", *Türkiye Günlüğü* 28, (1994): 94.

4 Ibid.

5 Ahmet Kuru, *Pasif ve Dışlayıcı Laiklik* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011). Quoted in Erdal Gişi, "Laiklik Kavramının Kronolojik Evrimi" *The Journal of Europe-Middle East Social Science Studies* 1, no.1, (2015): 6.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., pp.7.

ideological struggle of a state.⁸ Furthermore, Ahmet Kuru also argues that the presence of the ancien regime also affects the formation of the type of secularism. Ancien regime is often assumed to be a threat by a state's reformist and usually, the ancien regime is defined as the previous government that is in the form of diffusion of monarchy and religious dominance.⁹ For example, the Ottoman is the ancien regime of Turkey and the French Monarchy is the ancien regime of France. The ancien regime leads to the polarization and thus results in anti-religious or assertive attitude towards religion. On the contrary, the state which does not have the ancien regime tends to be compromising with the existence of the religion.¹⁰ In order to define the ancien regime, there must be a monarchy, the dominant religion, an interrelation between religion and the monarchy, and successful Republican reform.¹¹

The United States would be a good example of a state that does not have the ancien regime as Ahmet Kuru argues. There is no monarchy before the United States was established nor an alliance of monarchy and dominant religion. Therefore, the practice of secularism in the United States is classified as passive secularism. Consequently, religious symbols are allowed in public places and even religious sense is also allowed in state level such as the phrase "In God We Trust" in the United States' currency or taking oath in a religious ceremony. France would be the example of the assertive secularism where religious symbols are more restricted in public spaces.¹²

In order to classify a state a secular, the state must satisfy condition as follow. The state must provide religious freedom to its citizen.¹³ This means the citizens are free to choose any religion that they intend to believe or even not to believe any. Besides that the state must also guarantee the freedom of worship. Apart from that, the state also must separate itself

8 Ahmet Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies Towards Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 10

9 Ibid., pp.23.

10 Ibid., pp.25.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., pp.9.

13 Fatih Özkul, "Anayasalarımızda Laiklik İlkesi", *Ankara Barosu Dergisi*, no.4, (2014): 278.

from religious influence.¹⁴ As a consequence the state does not belong to any religion and the state must be on a fair distance to every religion within its territory. However, the secular state can have a law derived from religious teaching and this condition does not mean the state become religious-based state.¹⁵ For example, the state can decide to have a holiday on a religious celebration such as Christmas or Eid-Fitr in Islam. Even though both Laicism and Secularism believe the state must be separated from religion, the implementation is very depending on the state's understanding of the secularism or laicism understanding.

A secular state is a state where its citizens' understanding of the world is based on the science or positivism instead of religious-based explanation.¹⁶ Among the citizens or societies, the influence of religion is suppressed to the lowest level.¹⁷ Politically too the sovereignty of the government or the state belong to the people instead of from God.¹⁸ The religious influence is limited in a secular state.

II. Secularism Practices in Turkey

Turkey Since October 29, 1923 after the abolition of the Ottoman reign is referred to as a republic. Since then, the new republic was governed by a single party that implemented various reform including in the religious life in Turkey. the regime is called as the Kemalist. The secularism as one of the reform brought to Turkey underwent various development from one regime to another. For the purpose of this research, the development of secularism in Turkey would cover only at the beginning of the republic until 1950.

Turkey as a secular state is prescribed in its constitution article 2 which states that Turkey is a secular state. Previously in the 1924 constitution, Islam as the state's religion existed. However, in 1928 this article was changed and then in 1937 specifically the word laik was added into Turkey's constitution.¹⁹ In Turkish, the word secular that is used in the

14 Ibid., pp.279

15 Ibid., pp.284

16 Mehmet Kahraman, "Avrupa Birliği Ülkelerinde ve Türkiye'de Laiklik", Mustafa Kemal University Journal of Social Sciences Institute 5, no.9, (2008): 59.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Fatih Ozkul, "Anayasamızda...", pp.287.

constitution is Laik instead of *dunyevi*. Consequently, following article 2 in the constitution, Turkey's laws are not derived from religious teaching. Instead, Turkey adopted some laws from western states. For example, Turkey's *Madeni Kanunu* that regulates the inheritance, marriage, divorce, etc is derived from Swiss and thus is different from the Islamic law. In the Swiss inheritance law, both man and woman deserve a similar amount of inheritance where in Islamic law, man receives twice more than the woman does. Another example is Turkey's *ceza kanunu* which took the example from Italy.

During the Ottoman age, the education system was very complex where school based on religious study or foreigner existed. Through the *Tevhid-i Tadrifat kanunu*, all the schools within Turkey's territory were under the supervision of the Ministry of Education.²⁰ According to the law too, in order to raise religious officers, the Imam Hatip School and Theology faculty would be established and thus the religious officers for *Masjids* would be assigned by the state.²¹ However, the school and faculty were closed because there was no student enrolled.²² Furthermore, religious studies were also abolished from the school curriculum after 1933.²³ Turkey's Religious Affairs Office (*Diyanet*) was also established according to the law. All religious services would be conducted by the *Diyanet*. The *Diyanet* was established to replace the role of the *Seyhulislam* during the pre-republic time. However, the role of the *Diyanet* was rather to support the Republican agenda. Those were to bring the religion under the state control, to prevent the religion to influence politics, and to strengthen the secularism project of the Republicans.²⁴

A series of secularization was introduced to the newly founded Turkey. For example, *Sapka kanunu* was introduced in 1925 regulating the people to wear western style hat to replace the fees that often associat-

20 Ayse Yanardag, "Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu Uygulamasinda Diyanet Isleri Baskanligin Rolu", *Ankara Universitesi Turk Inkilap Tarihi Enstitusu Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 13, No. 49, (2012):242.

21 Ibid.

22 Ihsan Toker and Celal Ozcan, "Laiklik ve Sekulerlesme Baglaminda Imam Hatip Liselerinin Dunu, Bugunu, Yarini", *Eskiyeeni*, No.35, (2017): 40.

23 Ibid.

24 Sonmez Kutlu, "Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi ve Islamci Gruplarla (Mezhep ve Tarikatlar) Iliskileri", *Dini Arastirmalar* 12, No.33, (2009), 108.

ed with the Ottoman.²⁵ At the beginning of the republic, the usage of the headscarf for women was not prohibited yet the women were encouraged to avoid using it.²⁶ The religious-based education was also closed and all schools were under the direct supervision of the ministry of education.²⁷

The new alphabet was also introduced to replace the Ottoman Arabic alphabet. The caliphate as a religious institution was also abolished in 1924. These were aiming to enhance Turkey to be at the same level as the western countries were or in other words to bring Turkey more civilized by implementing western-style reform. In order to implement its radical western reform, the single-party regime imposed the Law of Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu) which gave the government authority to suppress the uprising.²⁸ The law was enforced from 1925 to 1929 and had been used to eliminate the protest of the Sapka kanunu.²⁹

The religious reform was not only introduced to the people but also to the religion itself, in this Islam. the Friday prayer of Muslim consists of sermon and Shalat, the prayer itself. The sermon is important to deliver speeches or information for the people. The sermon which was originally delivered in Arabic during the Ottoman time, under the Kemalist regime, the sermon was delivered in Turkish.³⁰ The Diyanet also issued a book consist of Turkish sermons in 1927 in which in 1936-1937 the sermon book was developed into two volumes.³¹ The holy book of Muslim, the Kuran, which was originally written in Arabic, was also translated into Turkish.³² The recitation of the Kuran in Turkish version was introduced in Aya Sofya Mosque in 1932.³³ The Turkish ezan, prayer call, which was usually delivered in Arabic, was also translated into Turkish and the Turkish ver-

25 Nevzet Celik, "From Secularizm to Laicite and Analyzing Turkish Authoritarian Laiklik", *Insight Turkey* 20, no.1, (2018): 198.

26 Hilal Elver, *The Headscarft Controversy: Secularizm and Freedom of Religion*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.16.

27 Nevzet Celik, *Op.cit.*

28 Umut Azak, *Islam and Secularizm In Turkey: Kemalism, Religion, and the Nation State*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 23.

29 *Ibid.*

30 *Ibid.* pp.49-50.

31 M Kamil Yasaroglu, "Diyanet Isleri Baskanliginin Hutbe Hizmetlerine Genel Bir Bakis", *Yakin Dogu Universitesi Ilahiyat Fakultesi Dergisi* 2, No.1, (2016), 96.

32 Umut Azak, *Op.cit.*, pp.51-52.

33 Umut Azak, *Op.cit.*, pp.56.

sion of Ezan was introduced during the Ramadhan month in 1932.³⁴

III. Secularism Practices in Indonesia

The basic ideology of Indonesia is called Pancasila³⁵ which means the five principles. The principles are believing in God, humanity, unity, democracy, and social justice for all. The first principle was original "Godness based on the Islamic Sharia for its believers". However, the non-muslims citizen of Indonesia at the time disagreed to this phrase and thus the phrase was changed to its present form. The ideology formation was discussed during the independence preparation forum in June 1945 and all proposal were similar in terms of the goodness. The delegation of the forum agreed that Indonesia's people could not be separated from the godness or believing in a certain religion. Yet, all delegation also agreed that Indonesia as a state must not belong to any religion or in other words Indonesia must be secular. However, the understanding of Indonesia secularism is limited to not belonging to any religion as a state and the people are not to be driven away from their religion.

Indonesia has the biggest population in South East Asia countries where more than 88% of its citizen are Muslim. In spite of being the majority, the constitution of Indonesia does not specifically describe Indonesia as a secular country. Article 1 says that Indonesia's sovereignty belong to the people and Indonesia is a state based on positive law. Nevertheless, in the 11th chapter article 29, Indonesia constitution also says that the state is based on the Godness. This article is sometimes confusing because in the Indonesian language, literally means based on the only one god.³⁶ Yet the phrase is interpreted as being a believer of religion and it does not mean being Islam in spite of its literal meaning as the only one god. In other words, Indonesia constitution rejects the notion of religion as the base of the state. However, some of its laws are inspired by religious law. There is also an exception to the Province of Aceh in the most western part of Indonesia where the Sharia laws are allowed to be applied. Aceh is an autonomous province in Indonesia that is granted the right to have a broader religious law than another province.

Unlike Turkey which adopted the Swiss civil law for its regulation on

34 Umut Azak, Op.cit, pp.57.

35 Read as Pancasila.

36 In Indonesian Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa means the only one god.

marriage, Indonesia adopted the religious law for its marriage regulation. Majority of the law is derived from Islamic law. Yet the law itself is not aimed to segregate the people but to accommodate all believers.

The presence of religious influence is also tolerated at the state level. The state officials take their oath under the holy book, the Kuran, bible or etc, and swear on the name of god. Specifically too the state officials swear on the name of the god they believe such as Allah. On every law that is passed by a parliament or state officials, on the header of the document, there is always phrase "For the Blessing of the Almighty God".³⁷ However, it is also important to know that in Indonesia law the word god does not particularly mean Allah but Tuhan which means god. Similar to Turkish, the word Allah is specific to Islam but the word Tanrı means god in general.

Following the establishment of Indonesia, in 1946 ministry of religious affairs was established and the aim was to accommodate all religion instead of being specific to Islam. Unlike Turkish diyanet which is formed as a directorate, in Indonesia, the diyanet is formed as a ministry. The aim is not to have the religions under state control but to provide services to religious believers such as Hajj for Muslim and religious education in schools. However, the ministry does not appoint the imam for masjids because the masjids are under the management of the people. The religious schools which were established during the pre-independence time of Indonesia also were not closed by the government but under the supervision of the Ministry of religious affairs. Within the ministry of religious affairs, there is also directorate of Hindu, Budha, Christian protestant, catholic, and Confucius. These are the religion that is acknowledged by the state. Furthermore, the religious holiday in Indonesia does not only cover the holiday of Muslim, but also the holiday of other acknowledged religion's.

IV. The Difference Of Secularism Implementation Between Indonesia And Turkey

Ahmet Kuru argues that the difference of the secularism is caused by the process of the formation of the state. There must be a monarchy which has correlation to the dominant religion and the monarchy would be replaced by a successful republican reform or revolution. This condi-

³⁷ Translated from the phrase "Atas Berkat Rahmat Tuhan yang Maha Esa" in Indonesian.

tion applies to the explanation of the difference between the secularism implementation in Turkey and Indonesia.

In terms of secularism implementation, Indonesia is very different from Turkey. While Turkey at the beginning of its establishment pursued an assertive attitude towards religion, Indonesia was rather being accommodative towards religion. Indonesia limited its secularism understanding of the state does not belong to any religion while its citizen was allowed to practice and the religion itself was protected. The implementation of secularism in Indonesia and Turkey is an example of passive and assertive secularism. This could be understood from the historical development of the two states.

Turkey is the continuation of the Ottoman empire in the form of republic. During the Ottoman empire too, Turkey's intellectuals were already occupied with the cultural development in Europe, which one of them was the nationalism and secularism. A series of reform were also brought to the Ottoman Empire during the 1800s. During the time of Tanzimat in 1839, there had been some intellectuals writing about the secularism.³⁸ Through the Tanzimat too the religious freedom was granted and according to the Tanzimat reform, none of any believers would be punished because of their religious practices.³⁹ Following Tanzimat, the *Islahat* Germany, which had a similar aim as Tanzimat did, was introduced in 1859. The first constitution was also adopted during the reign of the Sultan Abdulhamid 2nd. Ottoman empire had undergone some reform experience regarding the religious issue within the empire and the aim of the reform was to maintain the order and unity of the empire.

IV. 1. Ideology Formation Between Indonesia and Turkey

Turkey as the continuation of the Ottoman and Indonesia as a free state after the Dutch colonization led to the differentiation of the ideology formation including the understanding of the secularism in the two states. Turkey experienced the ideology formation from above, the elite, then the ideology was imposed on the people. Meanwhile, Indonesia's ideology formation was brought from the bottom, the people, and then the ideology was institutionalized among the elites. The series of reform brought

38 Ihsan Tayhani, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Temeli: Laiklik", Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi, no.43, (2009), 521.

39 Nevzet Celik, Op.cit, pp.195.

by the republican regime during the beginning of the establishment of Turkey was imposed by the elites according to their understanding of modernity. This condition was contrasted to the nation-building process in Indonesia which did not experience such progressive reform during its establishment.

The colonization also has influence in the nation-building of Indonesia. This led to the unification of all people in Indonesia. Therefore, during the establishment of Indonesia, the founding fathers also pursued alternatives that could accommodate all people from all background. As consequence, the founding fathers, on June 1st, 1945 decided to have the Pancasila, as the ideology of the state which was believed to be accommodative for all. from the formation of Pancasila, it was very obvious that the establishment of Indonesia was brought from the people instead of from the elites.

Ottoman was a heterogeneous state while Turkey since the beginning was projected to be a homogeneous state. The projection was led by the elite at the time, the Kemalist, from above to the bottom of the society. The difference within the community was reduced as little as possible. For example, the people during the Ottoman used various languages. However, in republican Turkey, the Turkish as the national language campaigned throughout the state. Meanwhile, all the differences within the Indonesian society were preserved during its establishment.

The establishment of Indonesia and Turkey was also influenced by different global tragedy. Turkey was established after the first world war and Indonesia gained its independence after the second world war. The states that gained independence after the second world war was the colony of the western power. Meanwhile, Turkey was an example of a state established after the world war one which was not under the colony.

IV. 2. The Western Influence On Young Intellectual

In order to improve its condition, the Ottoman sent its students to Europe to study and mainly the student was sent to study engineering and medic.⁴⁰ The high rank Ottoman officials also sent their children to Europe for study. Later on, those children would be positioned in an important

40 Ali Yalcin, "Kultur Elcisi Olarak Misafir Ogrenciler", Egitime Bakis, ed.Sukru Kolu-kisa ve Zulfu Demirtas, 11, no.34, 2015, 3.

department in Ottoman bureaucracy.⁴¹ The Ottoman also built modern schools within its territory such as medical school and engineering school. However, the students sent abroad were not only studying there but also were given the chance to look closer to the development in Europe such as in French. The western ideas that were common in the 19th century in Europe were brought to Ottoman by the students. One of the ideas was the secularism and republicanism as it was seen in the French revolution. It is understandable that if the implementation of the secularism in Turkey during the Republican era was similar to the French secularism. These intellectuals were important in transforming the Ottoman into a republic.

Prior to 1945, there was no state called Indonesia because present Indonesia territories were under the occupation of the Dutch. All aspects within the Dutch colony was under the Dutch control and left only a little chance for the inlander to have political experience. This condition led to the inexperience community in state affairs. There are of course some notables that were allowed to hold position as the mayor of a city but this condition was very rare during the Dutch colonization era. It is in a contrast to the Ottoman. The Turks have gained many experiences regarding state affairs. While the Turks in the late Ottoman time had started to know the development of political affairs in Europe, the Indonesian had just started to learn the state affairs. Education was not widely opened to all Indonesian during the Dutch occupation. Though there were some schools for elite inlanders such as the children of a city administrator. However, for non-elite family was difficult to get access to education.

Conclusion

Secularism was a familiar term after the French revolution. However, the implementation is categorized into two groups, the assertive and passive secularism. The French secularism is usually associated with a Jacobin manner towards religion and thus the French secularism or laicisite is taken into an example of the assertive secularism. Meanwhile, the United States implements the secularism in passive form where religion is granted. The difference is influenced by whether or not monarchy with a dominant religion exists prior to a successful republican revolution.

Turkey was very assertive towards religion at the beginning while

41 Guray Kirpik, "Yurtdisina Oğrenci Gondermenin Tarihi Meseleleri", *Eğitime Bakis*, ed.Sukru Kolukisa ve Zulfu Demirtas, 11, no.34, 2015, 12.

Indonesia tent to be accommodative towards every religion in spite of being a Muslim majority. This can be understood from the historical development of the two states. Turkey was very influenced by the French revolution because of its geographical situation and its intellectuals had the chance to follow the development. Meanwhile, Indonesia was still under the colony of the Dutch when the French revolution was at its highest point. Furthermore, Indonesia did not have a monarchy which had a dominant religion as Turkey did. Therefore, Turkey and Indonesia are different in the implementation of the secularism.

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Depreciation of the Georgian Lari and Interventions of the National Bank of Georgia: An Empirical Analysis

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Abstract

Should national bank conduct interventions during the devaluation of the national currency? Theoretical and empirical studies provide no conclusive answer. This paper aims at shedding light on the case of Lari – the national currency of Georgia, which has been experiencing a drastic depreciation against the US Dollar since November, 2014. Effectiveness of the interventions of National Bank of Georgia through the foreign exchange auctions has been evaluated on daily basis. Empirical results prove the existence of bi-directional causality running from exchange rate and interventions and vice versa. Although ARDL approach exhibits long-run and short-run cointegration, speed of adjustment of the error correction term is too small in magnitude to guarantee the long run stability of Georgian Lari.

Key words: exchange rate, intervention, devaluation, Lari

Introduction

The policy of the central bank is one of the most observed and analyzed issue during the national currency crisis. However, theoretical and empirical analysis provide inconclusive conclusion about its effectiveness.

Georgia is a developing country with a fragile economy, which is highly vulnerable to both, internal and external factors. Lari has been exclusive legal tender in Georgia since 1995, which experienced a drastic fall against the USD in the end of 2014. Although each step taken by the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) since November 2014 has become a topic of discussion among economists and politicians, their arguments are mostly based on the theoretical and intuitive assumptions and lack the empirical proofs.

This paper aims at shedding light on the effectiveness of the NBG interventions through foreign exchange market in terms of appreciating and stabilizing Lari. For this purpose, ARDL cointegration approach has been applied to the daily data of exchange rate and NBG interventions obtained from the official statistics of the NBG.

The paper is organized as follows: The second section makes a review of the theoretical and empirical contribution of the previous researches in this field. The third section provides a brief historical storyline of the Georgian economy after regaining independence. The fourth section introduces data and methodology employed in the empirical analysis. The fifth section presents results of the empirical analysis, whereas the last section summarizes the main findings.

I. Literature Review

The effectiveness of central bank intervention while determining the exchange rate has been a subject of discussion for the macroeconomists. The literature and the empirical evidence aiming at shedding light on this

issue are inconclusive and provide controversial discussions. While one part of the economists claims that the national bank should actively use its tools in order to guarantee the stability of currency, others argue that not only the interventions are costly but also they increase the fluctuation of the exchange rate.

For example, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2014) suggests avoiding interventions in the foreign exchange market. The evidence of Israel, Mexico, Poland, and Thailand is a good example of a negative impact of the interventions, while volatility in those countries where the exchange rate is ruled with the market forces, has shown a reducing tendency in recent years. This suggests that interventions may end up with the unintended effects and can lead to volatility of the exchange rate. Dominguez (1998) states that central bank interventions have resulted in triggering exchange rate volatility in US, Japan and Germany. Loiseau-Aslanidi (2011), who investigated the case of Georgia between 1996-2007 years, shows that the National Bank of Georgia 'leans against the wind' when it tries to smooth the exchange rate using interventions. While the exchange rate is effected immediately the next day of the intervention, in the long-run increase in the volatility can be observed. Utami and Hsu (2019) have examined the effectiveness of the interventions during crisis periods in 27 countries and based on the empirical analysis they have concluded that FX interventions do not effectively stabilize neither exchange nor stock market return. In case of Brazil, a quantile regression approach revealed that the impact of interventions vary according to the distribution on exchange rate volatility (Viola et al., 2018). Besides this, we can get the desired outcome only if the intervention is consistent with the monetary policy (Kim, 2003, Amato et al., 2005, Kamil, 2008). Furthermore, according to Obstfeld (1982) and Backus and Kehoe (1989), the interventions must be supported with the changes in the monetary and fiscal policies simultaneously. In their discussions, operations on the foreign exchange market are treated as an additional tool, not as the main one. Therefore, in case the government and the central bank cannot provide the relevant changes in both channels, the interventions are going to be a waste of the resources.

On the other hand, some central banks recognized that their interventions can be an important tool in order to provide liquidity to the economy while the fluctuation of the exchange rate in the regime of financial dollarization puts some economic agents' balance sheet (their assets and

liabilities) under the risk (BIS, 2005). Furthermore, Disyatat and Galati (2007) argue that there is a high probability for the thin foreign exchange market which is represented with a small number of agents to be characterized with high volatility if the interventions are not conducted. However, Cavusoglu (2011) finds that the significant effect of the interventions on the exchange rate does not usually last long. Correlation between the exchange rates and the interventions can be observed only during a couple of days.

If we consider the research papers looking into the cases of specific country and its national bank interventions, we can check the relevance of the theoretical discussions in the literature. The evidence of Czech Republic study suggests that the interventions conducted in 2001 and 2002 by the Czech National Bank against the appreciation of Koruna resulted in a short-run effect on the exchange rate to a certain level. However, no medium or long-run impact has been observed. Besides this, the volatility of the exchange rate has increased (Gersl and Holub, 2006). Domac and Mendoza (2004) investigated the case of Mexico (1996-2001) and Turkey (2001-2002) and stated that in both countries the volatility of exchange rates have decreased as a result of the national bank interventions. Based upon this, they claim that if the interventions are conducted sensibly they can be successful under an inflation targeting framework. They can neutralize the temporary exchange rate shock on inflation and financial stability. The case study of Poland by Adam et al., (2011) shows that foreign exchange interventions carried out by the national bank of Poland were effective in terms of appreciating zloty against euro on the same date of intervention and declining its volatility. Bucacos et al. (2019) have conducted weekly analysis of interventions and their effects based on which they assume that interventions have significant but short-term effect on nominal exchange rate in Uruguay. Fratscher et al. (2019) provide a systematic analysis of FX intervention effectiveness based on the case study of 33 countries, including Georgia. As an overall assessment, they have found out that 80% of the interventions have been successful considering a certain criteria tools. However, we cannot say the same for each and every case. There is an extensive literature but no final consensus about the impact of central bank interventions and exchange rate determination.

II. Georgian Economy at a Glance – Historical Storyline

Georgia is a developing country in the South Caucasus with the area of 69,700 (sq. km) and population of 3,723.5(thousand person). Although the Georgian kingdom, famous for having one of the richest history and culture worldwide, claims to have ancient roots, its recent history count-down has not started long ago.

Having been incorporated in the Soviet Union by force since 1921, Georgia declared independence in 1991. During the Soviet time, Georgia represented a successful and prosperous piece of the empyreal economic chain. However, after dissolution of the Soviet Union, due to the fact that Georgia had no economic independence or effective economic plan, it had to pay a huge price for surviving as a sovereign entity. As for the other Soviet states as well, the transition from the centrally ruled to a free market economy turned out to be a painful process. Absence of the effective institutions have led Georgia to drown in chaos. Military conflict in Samachablo region was followed with the civil war between the government and opposition; there was a shortage for public goods and services, including food and electricity. Criminal became a part of the everyday life. The government was totally unable to fulfill its responsibilities. Temporarily adopted so-called currency Coupon managed to break all the records of the inflation. Total amount of investments in 1994 accounted for the 2.8% of the one in 1990. Only 5% of the total manufacturing was functioning which means that the majority of the industries were paralyzed.




Figure 1: GDP of Georgia (billion USD)

Source: World Bank

In 1994 GDP per capita dropped to its lowest point – 501 USD, which means that after declaring independence, Georgia had been losing around 1/3 of its GDP each year. Slight but positive GDP growth can be observed

since 1995. In 1996 the economic growth reached 12.5%.

Georgia started to strengthen its positions on the geopolitical map after the political changes in 2003. Improved infrastructure, increased trust towards the institutions, safe environment and flexible fiscal politics stimulated private sector and attracted foreign direct investments. The war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 was a huge shock for the economy but Georgia managed to regain positive growth in 2010. Between 2012 and 2013 GDP per capita grew from 867 USD to 3636 USD.

The depreciation of the national currency - Georgian Lari towards US Dollar has become the subject of hot debates among the politicians and economists since November, 2014. Figure 2 shows that the value of national currency, which had been maintaining stability with slight fluctuations since 2008, experienced a drastic fall in the end of 2014.




Figure 2: The value of 1 USD with respect to Lari

Source: National Bank of Georgia

A number of factors have been named in order to explain the tendency of the exchange rate. External factors are intensively discussed as the internal ones.

External factors affecting the exchange rate of Lari:

- The statement of the US Federal Reserve regarding the end of the policy of quantitative easing and the expectations of strict monetary policy;
- Drop in oil prices on the world market;
- Tense geopolitical situation in the region and the conflict in Ukraine;
- Adoption of euro-4 standard in Azerbaijan (since September 2014) and the ensuing restrictions on re-exportation of vehicles from Georgia to Azerbaijan;
- Decrease in Georgian exports, increase in imports (December

2014) and the subsequent deterioration of trade deficit;


- Decrease in flows of foreign investment;
- Decrease in remittances;
- Taking out foreign investors' dividends;
- Paying the external debt;
- Decrease of rate of income growth from tourism

Internal factors include, on the one hand, the government's fiscal policy, and especially the expenditure part of the state budget, and on the other hand, increasing dependence on internal loans in terms of budget revenues. (IDFI, the University of Bremen or the Federal Foreign Office of Germany).

Although the primary goal of the National Bank of Georgia is not taking the exchange rate under control, it still conducted interventions on the foreign exchange market via foreign exchange auction.

Figure 4: Dynamics of Trade on the NBG's Foreign Exchange Auctions (USD) (2011-2017)

Source: National Bank of Georgia



As it is visible from the Figure 4, the rate of selling US Dollar on the foreign exchange auction is higher than buying it, especially from 2014 till 2016. As the theoretical and empirical evidence of the country case studies shows, it is arguable whether the National Bank's intervention during currency crisis is desirable or not. However, the case of the National Bank of Georgia and Georgian Lari lacks the empirical evaluation. Although it has become the issue of debates among the government, opposition, economists and experts, there is no conclusive answer.

III. Data and Methodology

III. 1. Data

The datasets incorporated in this research paper consists of daily observations of exchange rate of US Dollar with respect to Georgian Lari (ER), which is measured in terms of the amount of Lari that is needed to purchase 1 US Dollar. Daily data of the National Bank of Georgia interventions (INT) via foreign exchange market has been included as an independent variable. Net interventions are measured in thousands of US Dollar as a change between bought and sold US Dollars. Inspected time period covers 3073 observations spanning from 03.10.2009 to 08.07.2013. As the impact of intervention on exchange rate is expected to be revealed the following day, one day lagged values of interventions are employed in the analysis. Both of the datasets are obtained from the official statistic database of the National Bank of Georgia.

IV. Methodology

IV. 1. Stationarity Check Of Time Series

In order to select the appropriate methodological framework for the given time series this paper follows the guidelines of Shrestha and Bhatta (2018). Stationary analysis is the primary tool to choose the right model for time series analysis. Therefore, prior to the examination of the relations between the variables, order of integration of the series are determined. In order to check whether the variable is stationary or possesses unit root, I have applied Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) tests for unit root, which are commonly used in the empirical analysis. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron test null hypothesis that the variable has a unit root, whereas the null hypothesis for Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin is that the data is stationary. If LM statistic derived from the KPSS is greater than the critical value, the series are said to be non-stationary. As for ADF and PP, null hypothesis of unit root is rejected in case the test statistic is more negative than critical value. However, these tests have a quite important shortcome. They do not include the structural break, which needs to be considered before investigating a long-run relationship between two series. If there is a structural break in the time series, unit root tests may be misleading in terms of claiming

them to be nonstationary even in case there is no unit root. In this particular case, Georgian Lari experienced a sharp devaluation at the specific time and therefore, the stationarity needs to be checked under assumption of the presence of structural break as well. Within this scope, Zivot-Andrews unit root test (ZA) (Zivot and Andrews, 1992) is applied to the given variables. ZA tests the null hypothesis that a series has a unit root with a structural break in the intercept (Model A), in the trend (Model B), or both in intercept and trend (Model C). In case the test statistic is greater than critical value, null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected.

IV. 2. ARDL Approach

After determining the integration of time series, it is plausible to conduct cointegration analysis. This paper employs the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach, which is applicable for the time series with mixed integration (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). It has number of advantages compared with other cointegration tests such as Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) as it uses just one equation for estimating long-term parameters and avoids serial correlation and endogeneity issues (Narayan, 2004).

ARDL cointegration test, which is based on ordinary least square (OLS) model, exhibits sensitivity towards the number of lags included in the analysis. Therefore, optimal number of lags can be obtained by running fitted standard Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models, which is a widely used tool for macroeconomic forecasting. VAR provides a number of criteria for lag order selection: Akaike information criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ), Schwarz information criterion (SC), Final prediction error (FPE) and sequential modified LR test statistic (LR). The shortest lag is accepted to be optimal.

ARDL approach can be used to obtain information about long-run as well as for short-run cointegration. If the long-run cointegration is detected between the variables, short-run cointegration analysis may be conducted by making a small linear transformation.

If we take ER as a dependent variable and INT as an independent variable, the model with intercept will be shaped as follows:

$$\Delta ER = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_i \Delta ER_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i \Delta INT_{t-i} + \varphi_1 ER_{t-1} + \varphi_2 INT_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

Where δ_i and γ_i represent short-run coefficients, φ_1 and φ_2 stand for long-run coefficients and ε_t expresses disturbance term (white noise). In order to check the long-run cointegration Bound Test is applied to long-run coefficients. F statistics is compared with lower (I(0)) and upper (I(1)) critical values developed by Narayan (2005). If F statistic is smaller than I(0) critical value, there is no long-run cointegration between variables, in case it is between I(0) and I(1), the interpretation cannot be specified. In case F statistics is greater than I(1) critical value, null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected.

After determining the existence of long-run cointegration, ARDL model can be used to estimate short and long-run parameters. Short-run cointegration can be checked by employing the error correction model (ECM). In general, ARDL model is a form of unrestricted ECM as all long-run relationship variables are specified and not restricted. If we replace the long-run term with its residuals, the model reverts to ECM and can be defined as follows:

$$\Delta ER = \theta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_i \Delta ER_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i \Delta INT_{t-i} + \theta_1 ECT_{t-1} + u_t$$

Where ECT_{t-1} represents one period lagged error correction term and shows the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium, i.e. the portion of short-run deviation that can be corrected in the long run. Error correction term is expected to be negative and statistically significant. Negative sign guarantees that if the system is moving out of equilibrium in one direction, ECM will pull it back to equilibrium.

IV.3.Causality Test

Shrestha and Bhatta (2018) suggest that in case two variables are cointegrated, there might be causal relation between them too. Granger (1969) developed a time-series based technique to track the causality and its direction between continuous, stationary variables. Granger causality tests two null hypothesis:

X does not Granger cause Y

Y does not Granger cause X

Therefore, x is the cause of y in case x is successful in predicting the future values of y by considering the past values of y and vice versa. Sim-

ple Granger-causality test consists of two variables and their lags. The test can detect uni-directional, bi-directional or no causation between the respective variables. The basic model of Granger causality for this particular case can be written as follows:

$$\Delta ER_t = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \Delta ER_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^n \beta_j \Delta INT_{t-j} + u_{1t}$$

With the null hypothesis that $\beta_j = 0$ and therefore, ΔINT does not Granger cause ΔER and

$$\Delta INT_t = \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i \Delta INT_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^n \delta_j \Delta ER_{t-j} + u_{2t}$$

With the null hypothesis that $\delta_j = 0$ and therefore, ΔER does not Granger cause ΔINT . Decision on rejecting null hypothesis is based on the F test.

Results

In order to determine the order of cointegration of the series, ADF, PP and KPSS unit root tests have been conducted. Table 1 provides the outputs of the unit root tests.

Table 1: Output of ADF, PP and KPSS unit root tests

Variable	ADF				PP				KPSS	
	C		C+T		C		C+T		C	C+T
	t-stat	prob	t-stat	prob	t-stat	prob	t-stat	prob	LM-stat	
ER	-0.35	0.91	-1.67	0.76	-0.24	0.92	-1.58	0.79	4.95	1.36
INT	-13.48	0.00	-13.48	0.00	-59.49	0.00	-59.51	0.00	0.21	0.21
D(ER)	-41.83	0.00	-41.84	0.00	-41.7	0.00	-41.68	0.00	0.21	0.09

Critical values for ADF and PP tests with constant are -3.43, -2.86 and -2.56 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Critical values for ADF and PP tests with constant and trend are -3.96, -3.41, -3.13 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Critical values for KPSS test with constant are 0.73, 0.46 and 0.34 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. Critical values for KPSS test with constant and trend are 0.21, 0.14 and 0.12 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.

ADF PP and KPSS unit root tests provide the conclusive results regarding to the stationarity of the variables. ER is non-stationary at level but becomes stationary at first difference, whereas INT is stationary even at level.

Table 2: Output of Zivot-Andrews unit root test

Variable	Model A	Model B	Model C
ER	-4.89	-2.61	-4.11
INT	-20.73	-19.90	-20.75
D(ER)	-24.52	-24.48	-24.63
Critical value at 1%	-5.34	-4.93	-5.57
Critical value at 5%	-4.80	-4.42	-5.08
Critical value at 10%	-4.58	-4.11	-4.82

Zivot-Andrews unit root test with one structural break results are summarized in the Table 2. Same as the previous unit root tests, INT is stationary at level, whereas ER becomes stationary at first difference. What is more, structural break date suggested by ZA test precisely corresponds to the period (November, 2014), when the national currency started to devalue with respect to the US dollar. As a summery for unit root tests, the variables incorporated in the model are of mixed integration: ER is I(1), whereas INT is I(0) and therefore, ARDL approach is the best option for the cointegration analysis.

Table 3 provides the main findings of ARDL approach. Bound test suggest that F statistic is higher than I(1) and therefore, there is a cointegration between ER and INT at 1%. Based upon this, we can check the long-run and short-run coefficients. Interventions turn out to be significant and their positive sign meets the expectations. As net intervention is calculated as a difference between buying (+) and selling (-) US Dollars, additional net buying should have a positive effect on the exchange rate. Regarding to the short run model, error correction term shows up to be negative and significant, which means that it can pull the short run fluctuations towards the long run equilibrium.

Table 3: Output of long run and short run model


F Bounds Test			Null hypothesis: No levels relationship	
Test Statistic	Value	Significance	I(0)	I(1)
F-statistic	8.97	10%	4.04	4.78
		5%	4.94	5.73
		1%	6.84	7.84
Variable	Coefficient	St. Error	t- statistic	p-value
ER(-1)	-0.000252	0.000415	-0.608054	0.5432
INT(-1)	2.69E-07	6.35E-08	4.234655	0.0000
ECT(-1)*	-0.000252	5.96	-4.247	0.0000

After estimating ARDL model, it is necessary to check its properties. Table 4 provides the output of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity tests. Breusch-Godfrey test for serial correlation suggests that there is no serial correlation at 5%. Although Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey failed to reject the null hypothesis of the presence of heteroscedasticity, the model is still acceptable due to the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) covariance estimator (Andrews, 1991). Furthermore, COSUM test suggests that the model has no issue with stability.

Table 4: Model diagnostic

Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test		Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey	
Prob F(9,3036)	0.0375	Prob F(19,3045)	0.0000

Figure 5: Stability Test



Since there is a long-run and short-run cointegration between ex-

change rate and interventions, it is interesting to look into the causality pattern. Granger-causality test suggests that there is a bi-directional causality running from INT to ER and vice versa.

Table 5: Output of Granger-Causality test

Null Hypothesis	F-statistic	Prob
D(INT) does not Granger Cause D(ER)	6.987	5.E-10
D(ER) does not Granger Cause D(INT)	2.514	0.0072

Conclusion

Empirical analysis suggest that there is a long-run and short-run cointegration between the exchange rate of Georgian Lari with respect to the US Dollar and net interventions of the National Bank of Georgia. Although an error-correction term has the potential to adjust the fluctuations that occur in exchange rate at daily frequency, its speed of adjustment is too low to exhibit a successful performance in alleviating short-run deviations and guaranteeing stability in the long run. Moreover, bi-directional causality pattern can be observed between the inspected variables. As expected, interventions can be employed as an injection that has a sudden and temporary effect without any long run implication. It is obvious, that monetary tools usually fail in dealing with the fundamental reasons of the devaluation. Based on the historical evidence, economic indicators precisely follow the patterns of the ongoing political processes. Therefore, rather than monetary injections, strong institutions that can smoothen both – external and internal shocks and coordinated monetary and fiscal politics can guarantee the stability of Georgian Lari.

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Convention on the Legal Status of The Caspian Sea under the Light of In- ternational Law

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INTRODUCTION

The Caspian Sea is the biggest enclosed saltwater mass of the world covered by Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Russia and Kazakhstan. The Caspian Sea region has significant importance for global energy markets in addition to being a gateway between Europe and Asia. With rich petrol and natural gas sources, the Caspian Sea¹ became a point of interest of extraterritorial international actors. Therefore, the interest of regional powers as well as Western states in the petrol and natural gas basins of the Caspian Sea has turned the region into an area where opposing interests of these powers clash in geopolitical sense.

The dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 and declaration of indepen-

1 “Sea” here is not a legal use, instead only reflects the historical use.

dence of new states afterwards have brought the problem of legal status of the Caspian Sea. Previously, the Caspian Sea was shared by Russia and Iran and the problems regarding usage of the sea were brought to solution by mutual agreement of two states. The number of riparian states increasing from two to five with dissolution of USSR and the agreements made between Iran and Russia not containing any rules regarding limitations regarding underwater development, extraction of hydrocarbon sources, protection of environment and usage of biological sources and not fulfilling the needs of the day have caused riparian states to seek new solutions. Additionally, each riparian state asserting its own thesis regarding legal status and sharing of the Caspian Sea and inconsistency of asserted opinions have made the determination of its status.

It can be said that the problem of legal status of the Caspian Sea has reached to a complete solution with Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea signed by riparian states in Aktau city of Kazakhstan in August 12, 2018 as a result of years-long discussions.

In this scope, the purpose of this article is to examine the new international legal status of the Caspian Sea with consideration of historical process. Firstly, the historical development of legal status of the Caspian Sea via agreements and the opinions of riparian states after exhibition of theoretical scope in international law regarding the Caspian Sea being a lake or a sea and lastly, the Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea of 2018 are examined within this article.

1. HISTORICAL PROCESS REGARDING LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA VIA AGREEMENTS

The Caspian Sea was not a subject to interstate political relations of the period under the control of Turkistan or Iran centred dynasties². According to Sazhin, the political and legal status problem of the Caspian Sea emerged after Petro I's campaign against Persians (1722-1723) and Russian and Persian wars dated 1804-1814 and 1826-1828. After these events, Treaty of Resht, Treaty of Gulistan and Treaty of Turkmenchay were signed between Russian and Persian Empires respectively in 1729, 1813 and 1828 after these events³. The right of navigation in the Caspian Sea was given to

2 GÖKÇE, M. (2011). Soğuk savaş öncesinden günümüze iran'ın hazar denizi siyaseti. Tarihînin peşinde International History and Social Studies Journal (6) p.156

3 SAZHİN, V. (23.07.2018). Sud'bonosnaya vekha v istorii Kaspiya. (K predstoyashc-

vessels of Russian Empire indefinitely in these agreements.

The Treaty of Resht is the first agreement dealing with the Caspian Sea problem made between Persian and Russian Empires on the date of February 13, 1729. This agreement regulates the determination of borders and transfer of some land to Russia. It has accepted the commerce and navigation freedom on the Caspian Sea⁴.

Two more agreements regulating the navigation rights in the Caspian Sea between Russians and Persians were made. The Treaty of Gulistan signed in 1813 banned Iran from having naval forces in the Caspian Sea and 8th article of the Treaty of Turkmenchay only allowed two parties to freely have their commercial vessels in the Caspian Sea and indicating that no state may have military vessels in the Caspian Sea except the Russian Empire⁵. In fact, the vessel restrictions against the Persian Empire given in the 5th article of the Treaty of Gulistan was repeated with this agreement.

However, it is worth noting that these treaties did not characterize the Caspian as a sea or a lake, the borders of the states were defined only by the treaties and the Russian Empire was granted the right to have a navy in the Caspian Sea⁶. These regulations remained valid until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

After the Revolution of 1917, the new Bolshevik administration gave up its desire to become the only military force in the Caspian Sea. They declared that all previous agreements with Iran were invalid⁷.

On February 26, 1921, Article 11 of the Moscow Friendship Treaty granted Iran's rights restricted by the Treaty of Turkmenchay. In addition, Russia-Iran will enjoy equal rights to free movement under their own

hemu podpisaniyu Konventsii o pravovom statuse Kaspiyskogo morya). <https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/20232> Erişim Tarihi:13.05.2019 .s.1

4 ROMANO, C. P. (2010). Hazar: Hukuki Bir Bulanıklık, Uyuşmazlıkların Kaynağı. *Erzincan Binali Yıldırım University Faculty of Law Journal* Translator Yasin POYRAZ, XIV (3-4), p.272.

5 KULAGİNA, L. (2010). ROSSIYA I IRAN (XIX - nachalo XX veka). Moskova: Klyuch-S, p.68 ;ASLANLI, K. (2018 Ekim). Hazar Denizi'nin Jeopolitik Ve Jeoekonomik Konumu: Enerji, Taşımacılık, Hukuk Ve Çevre Boyutları (Anaylsis). (*İRAN*) *Iran Research Centre*, p. 9.

6 CİDDİ, O. (2017). Hazar'ın Hukuki Statüsünün Belirlenmesi Sorunu *Near East University Postgraduate Thesis*, p. 5.

7 BEKYASHEV, K., BEKYASHEV, D. (2018). Sovremennyy mezhdunarodno-pravovoy rezhim Kaspiyskogo morya .Modern international legal regime of the Caspian Sea . *Yevraziyskiy yuridicheskiy zhurnal .(Eurasian Law Journal)*(№ 9 (124), p. 131.

flags⁸.

The Treaty of 27 August 1927 envisages the right of free movement to Iranian and Russian ships, as well as the creation of a private area of 10 nautical miles⁹ for fishing¹⁰. In the text based on the treaty, the Caspian Sea was recorded as the "Soviet-Iranian Sea"¹¹. In 1929, 1931 and 1935, agreements were made between the two countries on trade and navigation.

The Commercial Treaty of 27 August 1935 provided for the right of free navigation for Soviet and Iranian ships and the establishment of a 10-mile exclusive fishing zone, but no official limit was set. Again, the Treaty of Tehran on 25 March 1940 largely confirmed the provisions of the Treaty of 1935. In the exchange of notes for the Treaty, it was made clear that the Caspian Sea was the Soviet-Iranian Sea¹².

The dissolution of the USSR brought the issue of the status of the Caspian to the agenda again. The number of Caspian riparian countries increased from two to five: Azerbaijan, Islamic Republic of Iran, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The length of the coastline of the States were Azerbaijan by 955 km, Iran by 724 km, Kazakhstan by 2320km, Turkmenistan by 1200km, Russian Federation (Astrakhan Oblast, Dagestan Region and Kalmukya) by 695 km. In this way, Russia and Iran have fewer regions against Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The fact that the coasts cannot be divided equally is one of the reasons for the debate about the status of the Caspian to the present day. After lengthy negotiations, Azerbaijan from the riparian states signed the International Agreement on September 20, 1994 entitled "Joint Use and Division of Oil Fields in Azeri, Çırac and Güneşli in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea"¹³ as a result of Iranian and Russian reactions to these tenders, the

8 VASİLYEVA.O.A. (2014. № 16 (187). C. 113-118.). Sovetsko-İranskiy dogovor 1921 goda. *Nauchnyye Vedomosti Belgorodskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta.Seriya: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo*, № 16 (187), pp. 113-118.

9 1 nautical mile is 1,852 km; International Measurement Systems

10 MOHAMMADREZA, M. (2018). Pravovoy Status Kaspiyskogo Morya. *Matters of Russian and International Law*(8), p. 157.

11 USLU, K. (2006). Hazar Bölgesi Enerji Kaynaklarının Ekonomik ve Uluslararası Boyutu. *Marmara University I.I.B.F Journal*, XXI (1), p. 102.

12 ABDULLAYEV, C. (1999). Uluslararası Hukuk Çerçevesinde Hazarın Statüsü Ve Doğal Kaynaklarının İşletilmesi Sorunu. *Ankara University Faculty of Law Journal*, 48(1), p. 270.

13 OĞAN, S. (2001). Hazar'da Tehlikeli Oyunlar:Statü Sorunu, Paylaşılmalı Kaynaklar ve Silahlanma Yarışı. *Avrasya Dosyası. Türkmenistan Özel*, 7(2), p. 150.

status of the Caspian Sea was further exacerbated¹⁴.

On December 21, 1991 with the Alma-Ata Declaration, the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the successor of the Soviet Union, stated that they were bound by the treaties made during the USSR and would fulfil their international obligations. On the one hand, these declarations of states indicate that the riparian states, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan cannot engage in any activity in the Caspian Sea without making an agreement with Iran and Russia¹⁵. The rules regarding the status stood valid until the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was signed for CIS member states¹⁶ as per international custom rules, the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States to the Treaties of 1978 (art.34, art.35), Treaty of Minsk¹⁷ establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (art. 12) and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991¹⁸.

The regime, which was established by the Treaties of 1921 and 1940, did not meet the needs of the day after 1991. This regime was established only to regulate the mutual sovereignty of the two states (Russia and Iran) and the riparian states did not reach a conclusion in terms of the basic problems such as the exploitation of natural resources, freedom of passage, protection of the environment, maintenance of peace and security of the region¹⁹.

The activities started in 1996, the First Caspian Summit 2002 Ashgabat (Turkmenistan), the Second Caspian Summit 2007 Tehran (Iran), the Third Caspian Summit 2010 Baku (Azerbaijan), the Fourth Caspian Summit 2017 Moscow (Russia)²⁰ with the coastal states, concluded with execu-

14 HARUNOĞULLARI, M. (2018). Hazar'ın Hukuki Statüsü ve Enerji Kaynaklarının Paylaşımı: Kıyıdaş Ülkeler Arasındaki Anlaşmazlık ve Mücadele. *International Journal of Geography and Geography Education (IGGE)*, p. 207.

15 ZAVYALOVA, İbid .p. 42

16 POYRAZ, Y. (2011). Hazar'ın Hukuki Rejimine İlişkin Sorunlar ve Kıyıdaş Devletlerin Çözüm Çabaları. *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika (UHP)*, 7(28), p. 32.

17 Soglasheniye o sozdanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv (gorod .Minsk, 8 Dekabrya 1991 goda) Ispolnitel'nyy komitet SNG Ofitsial'nyy sayt <http://cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=176> Erişim Tarihi:13.05.2019

18 Alma-Atinskaya Deklaratsiya (gorod. Alma-Ata, 21 Dekabrya 1991 goda) Ispolnitel'nyy komitet SNG Ofitsial'nyy sayt <http://cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=178> Access Date:13.05.2019

19 Romano, İbid., p. 278.

20 ÜLKER, H. (2018). 5. Hazar Zirvesi Ve Avrasya Enerji Hattının Geleceği,Türkiye'ye

tion of Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea on August 12 2018, thus, the legal status of the Caspian Sea has been solved.

2. Theoretical Opinions Regarding The Legal Status of The Caspian

2.1. Consideration of Caspian as a Sea

In order to understand whether the status of the Caspian is sea or not, it is necessary to approach the issue based on international documents. Accordingly, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 which is the most comprehensive legal treaty that sets the most advanced legal rules for maritime law, is important for understanding the subject at hand²¹.

According to Article 122 of the UNCLOS, “closed or semi-enclosed sea” means a gulf, a sea basin or a sea which is surrounded by two or more states and connected by a narrow passage to another sea or ocean, or composed entirely or in large part of the land waters and exclusive economic zones of two or more states. According to the definition, it is the “narrow passage” that determines whether a sea is “enclosed” or “semi-enclosed”²². However, there will be no difference in terms of its legal status whether it is an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea²³.

If the legal status of the Caspian is considered as a sea, the provisions of the UNCLOS will be applied and the riparian states will be limited to 12-mile territorial waters, exclusive economic zone not exceeding 200 miles. Outside the territorial waters, one sea status will be applied²⁴.

2.2. Consideration of the Caspian as a Lake

In international law, it is not possible to talk about general rules about lakes. In multilateral international treaties between states, a lake is not defined. In the definitions accepted today, the condition of the water surface

Etkileri. *Eurasian World Journal* (3), p. 26.

21 ABDULLAYEV, İbid, p. 266.

22 See the link below for Turkish text of Agreement of Maritime Law of United Nations: http://www.unicankara.org.tr/doc_pdf/denizhukuku.pdf

23 TERZIOĞLU, S. (2008). Hazar'ın Statüsü Hakkında Kıyıdaş Devletlerin Hukuksal Görüşleri. *OAKA Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu*, 3(5), p. 34.

24 KOCAMAN, M. (2018). Hazar Havzasının Hukuki Statüsü. *EGE STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR DERGİSİ*, 9(1), p. 105.; additionally, POYRAZ, İbid, p. 35.

with the seas and the natural connection with the seas of the world or the salinity rate are taken as a criterion²⁵. The concept of the lake here refers to transboundary lakes.

In our opinion, the most comprehensive and concrete definition of the boundary lake is made by Mamedov. According to this definition, “lake boundary” is a water area surrounded by the shores of two or more states, which has no natural connection with the world oceans and has a unique international legal status and regime determined by the concrete international treaty signed by the riparian states²⁶. In this context, according to some authors, the Caspian Sea is considered as a lake. If the Caspian is considered a lake, there are two views on sharing²⁷. The first one is the condominium of the Caspian, and the second is the division of the Caspian into national sectors²⁸.

2.3. Consideration of the Caspian as a Unique Matter

Considering both ecological and geographical characteristics, the Caspian Sea has its own characteristics. Due to such different characteristics, the status of the Caspian cannot be defined according to the rules and practices of international law. It is argued that the Caspian is a private watershed and the status of maritime law alone and the application of the division of international lakes will not be possible when determining its status²⁹. According to this view, the Caspian’s legal status accepted with the Convention of 1982 reflects this last view.

3. Approaches Of Riparian States To Sharing The Caspian And Its Status Problem

3.1. Russian Federation

The most effective country in determining the legal status of the Cas-

25 KOCAMAN, İbid, p. 106.

26 MAMEDOV, R. (2006). *Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoy Status Kaspiyskogo Morya: Vchera, Segodnya, Zavtra (Voprosy Teorii I Praktiki)*. https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2000/journal_rus/cac08_2000/24.mamedov.shtml Access Date:13.05.2019

27 “Göl,etrafı kara ile çevrili ve denizlerle doğal bir bağlantısı olmayan su alanı olarak tanımlanabilir.Göl sularının tuzlu olup olmaması önemli değildir.Örneğin”Hazar Denizi”, diğer bir denizle doğal bir bağlantı içinde olmadığı için bir göl sayılır”. SUR, M. (2014). *Uuslararası Hukukun Esasları* (8 b.). İstanbul: Beta .p.378.

28 TERZIOĞLU, İbid, p. 35.

29 TERZIOĞLU, İbid, p. 35.

pian Sea is the Russian Federation. It played a major role in determining the legal status of the Caspian due to historical, strategic, political and economic reasons. Russia has made three fundamental policy changes on the Caspian so far.

Firstly, Russia asserted that the Caspian legal status was determined by the Treaty of Moscow of 1921 and Treaty of Tehran of 1921 between the USSR and Iran, that the exclusive sovereignty in these treaties consists of a 10-mile shoreline recognized for fishing alone, that the waters in other regions were open to common use and that the riparian countries could benefit equally from these waters³⁰.

Russia's second position has been "common use outside the 40-45-mile coastline" since 12 November 1996. After February 1998, Russia adopted a third position. On 10 February 1998, Russia and Kazakhstan adopted a text of reconciliation on the status of the Caspian. Accordingly, the parties divided the Caspian Sea floor completely according to the principle of equal distance and left the water mass for common use. However, there is no explanation for the national sectors that the riparian states will have on the Caspian³¹. With the third attitude of Russia, it is seen that Russia approached to definition of "border lake" the definition of "common water mass" for the Caspian³². Furthermore, Russia signed a treaty with Azerbaijan in 2001, similar to the Treaty of Kazakhstan of 1998. In May 2003, together with Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed a three-way treaty based on the "midline" method for the division of the Caspian seabed. According to the Treaty, the breadth of the exclusive economic zones was solved by drawing a central line parallel and equidistant from the shoreline of states. As a result, the reconciliation in the northern part of the Caspian officially turned into a three-party status³³.

3.2. Iran

Iran has approached the question of the status of the Caspian Sea with the view of a condominium. According to this view, each riparian state will have its own national region and the rest of the Caspian will belong

30 ÇOLAKOĞLU, S. (1996). Uluslararası Hukukta Hazar'ın Statüsü Sorunu. *Ankara University Faculty Political Sciences Journal*, 53(1), p. 110.

31 AMİRBEK, A. (Yaz 2015). Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Hazar'ın Statüsü Ve Sınırlandırma Sorunu: Kıyıdaş Devletler'in Yaklaşımları Açısından Analizi. *Black Sea Studies* (46), p. 36.

32 ÇOLAKOĞLU, İbid, p. 110.

33 TERZIOĞLU, İbid, p. 37.

to the common use of riparian states³⁴.

In support of the thesis put forward by Russia in general, Iran opposed the division of the Caspian Sea into national sectors among the five coastal states, and later declared that it accepted the regional sharing of the Caspian Sea. He proposed that the bottom and surface of the sea be divided into equal regions between the five coastal states and that each state would have a 20% share. Tehran could not give up its desire to divide the Caspian into five equal parts among the coastal states.

3.3. Azerbaijan

Since the issue of sharing of the Caspian Sea has emerged, Azerbaijan's opinion on this issue is as follows: The sharing and status of the Caspian Sea will be determined according to international legal principles, international norms and UNCLOS of 1982. According to this, Azerbaijan assumes that "open sea" status can be applied to Caspian Sea. If this proposal is accepted, each riparian state will have 12 miles of territorial waters, 200 miles or more of continental shelf and 200 miles of exclusive economic zone.

Another view of Azerbaijan is that the Caspian is a "border lake", the division of the Caspian waters and seabed into five national sectors on a meridian line basis, where the coastal country in each country has exclusive powers and can do all sorts of activities. With the 1995 Constitution of Azerbaijan (Article 11 / II)³⁵, Azerbaijan has taken its national sector under constitutional guarantee³⁶.

3.4. Kazakhstan

Until February 1998, Kazakhstan adopted similar views on the Caspian status with Azerbaijan. The approach of this country is to view the Caspian as an enclosed sea within the framework of UNCRC³⁷. When the views of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are compared, it is seen that while

34 LEUKHOVA, M., PIANOV, A. (2013). Problema Pravovogo Statusa Kaspiyskogo Morya v Otnosheniyakh Prikaspiyskikh Gosudarstv V 1990 – 2000 gg. *Vestnik KemGU*, 3(2 (54)), p. 236.

35 See Turkish Constitutional Law Website for Turkish Text of Republic of Azerbaijan: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/azerbaycan-aleskerli.htm>

36 OĞAN, İbid, p. 161.; POYRAZ, İbid, p. 39.

37 AVCI, E. (2014). Hazar'ın Statü Sorunu ve Sahildar Devletlerin Konuya Yaklaşımları. *International Strategic Approach Institute.*, p. 16.

Azerbaijan advocates the division of the Caspian into the national sectors completely, Kazakhstan seeks to share the seabed and to use the waters of the Caspian in a common exclusive area³⁸.

Kazakhstan and Russia signed a treaty between Kazakhstan and Russia on July 6, 1998, "Exercise of sovereign rights to exploit the resources of the northern part of the Caspian Sea". According to this treaty, Kazakhstan accepts the complete division of the seabed and accepts the common use of the water body, giving the impression that it regards the Caspian as a "border lake"³⁹. In May 2003, the treaty signed by Russia and Azerbaijan on the division of the seabed formally transformed the reconciliation in the northern part of the Caspian into a three-party status⁴⁰.

3.5. Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan's attitude towards the Caspian was more ambiguous and flexible than the other riparian states. For the Caspian, Turkmenistan initially adopted the thesis of joint use of Russia and Iran. However, he later adopted a different position at the summit of the coastal states in Moscow in December 1998 and declared his acceptance of the division of the Caspian Sea and the determination of the border between Azerbaijan and the border line. In general, Turkmenistan has been closer to the policies of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The point that Turkmenistan separates from these countries and especially Azerbaijan is that it cannot determine the areas where the middle line will pass. It can be stated that Turkmenistan supports the division of the Caspian into national sectors since the Azeri and Chirag oil deposits, which are the problems with Azerbaijan, are beyond the 45-mile coastline⁴¹.

In 2003, Turkmenistan and Iran signed an agreement on the division of the southern sector of the Caspian Sea, and the two countries agreed to share the seabed in accordance with the principles and norms of international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The agreement, however, does not determine what these principles contain, but gives the impression that each of the two countries should have 20% of the Caspian

38 GÖKAY, Bülent, "Caspian Uncertainties: Regional Rivalries and Pipelines", *Perceptions*, March-May 1998, pp. 49-66 akt; ÇOLAKOĞLU, İbid. p. 111.

39 ÇOLAKOĞLU, İbid. p. 111.

40 TERZIOĞLU, İbid., p. 39.

41 AVCI, İbid., p.13.

state and favour the division into five equal parts⁴².

4. CONVENTION OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA

On 12 August 2018, the legal status of the Caspian Sea Convention was signed by the leaders of the five riparian countries: Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in Aktau⁴³. The issue of the legal status of the Caspian, which has been the subject of controversy since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and which has affected the energy geopolitics of the region and the relations between the riparian countries, has been solved with this Convention through years of negotiations⁴⁴. Let us consider in detail the provisions of this Treaty below.

4.1. Contents of the Convention

The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea consists of 24 articles. The importance of the Convention is stated in the beginning. In the first part of the Convention, it is understood that the Caspian Sea has vital, economic, social and cultural importance for coastal states that have signed the treaty, that the states parties to the treaty are aware of their responsibilities to the new generations, development of favourable conditions for the development of economic cooperation for riparian states⁴⁵. The statements in the text of the agreement show that it is much more than a sharing agreement.

The Convention of 2018 provided a solution to the legal status of the Caspian, which is an important topic of discussion. In the Treaty of Moscow of 1921 and the Treaty of Tehran of 1940, the Caspian Sea was defined as an enclosed (inland) sea⁴⁶. In the first article of the Convention, the Cas-

42 TERZIOĞLU, İbid., p. 37.

43 Sammit v Aktau: prinyata "konstitutsiya" Kaspiyskogo morya <https://ee.sputnik-news.ru/politics/20180812/12118116/konstitutsiya-aktau-konstititsia-kaspijskoje-more.html>

44 SARI, İ. (Ağustos 2018). Hazar Denizi'nin Hukuki Statüsü Konvansiyonu ve Çok Boyutlu Etkileri. *İRAN Analiz*. <https://www.irancenter.org/hazar-denizinin-hukuki-statusu-konvansiyonu-ve-cok-boyutlu-etkileri> Access Date:13.05.2019

45 Text of Convention on Legal Status of the Caspian 12 August 2018; Official Website of President of the Russian Federation, <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5328> Access Date:13.05.2019

46 ALASOV, I., FEDOROVA, T. (2019). Konventsiya o Pravovom Statuse Kaspiyskogo Morya:İstoriya Podpisaniya (2002-2018)Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea:-

pian Sea is defined as “a body of water surrounded by land”. Indeed, the Caspian Sea is not considered to be a sea or a lake, and the treaty brings a special status to the Caspian. Therefore, the provisions of the 1982 UNSC and the principles applicable to transboundary lakes do not apply to the Caspian Sea. Because the Caspian is divided into sectors for using only seabed and underground resources. The boundaries of these sectors shall be determined by an agreement between the State Parties which are reciprocal or adjacent to each other (Article 8). In contrast to the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, the Convention includes new concepts such as the fishery zone, common water area, territorial waters, common biological resources⁴⁷. The Caspian’s seabed and underground is not the continental shelf of the underground riparian states⁴⁸.

Each State Party that has signed the Treaty may act on the basis of the following principles:

- ensuring security and stability in the Caspian region;
- ensuring balance in the armament of the State Parties to the Treaty in the Caspian Sea;
- Carrying out military activities within reasonable limits, taking into account the interests of the Parties and without prejudice to each other’s security;
- Adhering to confidence-building measures adopted in the field of military activities in the spirit of predictability and transparency, in accordance with international agreements between all parties and joint efforts to strengthen regional security and stability;
- Absence of armed forces from the Caspian Sea that do not belong to the Caspian coastal states;
- Ensuring the freedom of movement and navigation security outside the territorial waters of each Party, subject to compliance with the rules established by them, with respect to the activities determined by the Parties, provided that the sovereign rights of the Coastal States are respected⁴⁹.

Bekyashev K. A. and Bekyashev D. K. stated that these principles

Signing History (2002-2018). *Vestnik Yaroslavskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta im. P. G. Demidova. Seriya Gumanitarnyye Nauki*, 47(1), 16-21. <http://j.uniyar.ac.ru/index.php/vyrgu/article/download/773/652> Access Date:13.05.2019, page:19

47 BEKYASHEV „BEKYASHEV, Ibid, p. 133.

48 BEKYASHEV „BEKYASHEV, Ibid, p. 30.

49 Text of Convention of Legal Status of the Caspial Sea, 12 August 2018 <http://krem-lin.ru/supplement/5328> Access Date:13.05.2019_

equally guarantee the rights and interests of the Caspian coastal states and that they fully comply with the jus cogens of international law and the general principles of international law⁵⁰. According to Nutsalkhanov, all of the above principles are of systemic importance in the process of using the Caspian Sea and should be considered together with the ideology of the UN Charter. In this context, the essence of the Caspian Sea's legal status consists of generally accepted international law principles in the Charter of the United Nations⁵¹.

According to Article 5 of the Convention of 2018, the Caspian Sea water area is divided into inland waters, land waters, fishery areas and common water area. The sovereignty of the parties is regulated in Article 6. According to Article 6 of the Convention, the sovereignty of the parties includes the inland and territorial waters as well as the airspace and underwater above these areas.

The Parties agreed on the limit of territorial waters. According to Article 7 of the Convention, each Party shall determine the territorial waters to the extent of not exceeding 15 nautical miles from the main lines specified in this Convention⁵². The external boundary of territorial waters is considered to be the boundary of that coastal state (article 7/2).

According to Article 9 of the Convention, the parties shall have 10 nautical mile fishing areas adjacent to the territorial waters⁵³. Within this area, the coastal state has the right to benefit from all kinds of biological resources. Article 12 of the Convention relating to the fishing zone, each Party shall be entitled to undertake all kinds of legitimate commercial activities related to the protection of natural resources, the collection and protection of seabed and underground resources and biological resources in the water, of the seabed, underground resources and In order to exercise sovereignty, the parties may take measures such as inspection, hot pursuit, detention, arrest and trial procedures that may be necessary for their vessels. In terms of legal status, it can be said that the fishing zone

50 BEKYASHEV ., BEKYASHEV, *ibid*, p. 134.

51 NUTSALKHANOV, G. (2019). Konventsiya o pravovom statuse Kaspiyskogo morya ot 12 avgusta 2018 goda v svete mezhdunarodnogo prava [The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea of August 12, 2018 in the light of international law]. *Voprosy rossiiskogo i mezhdunarodnogo prava [Matters of Russian and International Law]*, (9(1A)),p. 136.

52 NUTSALKHANOV, *ibid*, p. 137. ;BEKYASHEV .,BEKYASHEV, *ibid*, p. 136.; SARI, 2018

53 ÜLKER, *ibid*, p. 26.

has the same characteristics as the exclusive economic zone in the seas. Because the measures such as inspection, hot pursuit, detention, arrest and trial procedures are regulated in UNCRC of 1982 as measures that can be taken by the states in the exclusive economic zone for ships carrying the flag of another state. Therefore, these criminal measures should be regulated in detail by bilateral agreements.

The area outside the territorial waters is a common area. Vessel belonging to the riparian states shall have the freedom to navigate beyond the external borders of their territorial waters, respecting the sovereign rights of the States Parties and in accordance with the rules established by the Parties.

4.2. Provisions regarding Vessels

The Treaty includes rules for preventing the presence of non-regional armed forces in the Caspian Sea, and five coastal states are responsible for ensuring marine security and managing resources in the Caspian Sea. Accordingly, States which are not Parties to the treaty will not be able to keep their military ships in the Caspian Sea.

The terms and conditions for the passage of territorial waters by military ships, underwater vessels and other underwater vehicles of the Parties shall be determined in accordance with the agreement between the flag state and the coastal state. In the case of such agreement, the passage shall be made in accordance with the legislation of the coastal state (article 11/2).

It is essential that the commander of the military ship make the necessary notification for entry into the territorial waters before entering the territorial waters of the coastal country in order to aid force majeure cases, natural forgiveness acts, persons on vessels or aircraft. The territorial waters are entered along the route determined by the commander of the military ship in accordance with the agreement between the two sides. If the conditions indicated in the notification disappear, the military ship shall immediately leave its territorial waters (Article 11/4).

In the event of a force majeure or natural disaster, the terms and conditions for the entry of military ships into the inland waters of the states to assist or the persons on aircrafts and vessels shall be in accordance with the agreement between the flag state and the coastal state. If such a treaty does not exist, the entry into inland waters will be made under the legis-

lation of the coastal state.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of the Convention, military ships, underwater vessels or other underwater vehicles passing through the waters of the riparian state shall not have the right to enter the ports of the coastal state or to anchor in the territorial waters of the riparian states except in exceptional circumstances, such as appropriate permits for entry, force majeure acts or disasters.

4.3. Natural Gas Pipeline

With the discovery of oil and gas deposits under the Caspian Sea, kilometres of pipelines pass under the Caspian for various purposes to date. The Convention of 2018 sets out in detail the laying of underwater pipelines and cables at the bottom of the Caspian Sea, and it is clearly accepted to lay pipelines on the seabed in the coastal states' own sovereign areas. The convention also makes it possible to implement projects such as the "Trans Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline".

According to Article 14 of the Convention, the parties may lay underwater cables and pipelines on the Caspian Sea bed, and their projects shall comply with the environmental standards and conditions of the international agreements and the environmental and related protocols of the Caspian Sea, including the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Sea. may lay underwater pipelines on the Caspian Sea's bed, depending on their circumstances, that submarine cables and pipelines routes will be determined by agreement with the Party to which the seabed sector will pass by cable or pipeline⁵⁴.

In this context, the following issues are important: it is regulated that the routes of submarine cables and pipelines will be determined according to the agreement with the Party to which the seabed sector will pass by cable or pipeline (article 14 / 3). In other words, the laying of these pipelines and cables depends on the consent of the riparian state, which will pass through the seabed sector, not all Hazara riparian countries (Article 14 / 3)⁵⁵. Another issue will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the Environmental Impact Assessment Protocol (EIA Protocol

54 YAMAN, A., TARI, H. (2018). Hazar Denizi'nin Yasal Statüsü Hakkında Anlaşma Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme., p. 12.

55 ALASOV ., FEDOROVA, İbid, p. 19.

for the Caspian riparian countries of 20 July 2018)⁵⁶, in accordance with the mutual agreement. This identifies the right of each of the five States to participate in a comprehensive environmental impact assessment, even at the planning stage, of projects related to maritime activities that could affect and damage the natural environment of the Caspian Sea. In other words, in addition to a clear review at national level, such activities will need to be analysed in detail by all potentially affected parties. If there is a plan for transit pipelines to be passed from the bottom of the Caspian, then any of the Caspian countries may participate in the process of evaluating the possible consequences of such structures for the Caspian environment, if necessary, starting from the project stage⁵⁷.

Finally, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention of 2018 and to review the cooperation in the Caspian Sea, a high level working group with ministry of foreign affairs and fully authorized representatives of riparian states meeting at least once a year regularly and in rotation in one of the riparian states (Article 19)⁵⁸.

CONCLUSION

The Convention of 2018 put an end to the debate on the legal status of the Caspian. In the Treaty, the Caspian Sea is defined as a body of water surrounded by land areas. Therefore, the treaty brings a special status to the Caspian. The Caspian was divided into sectors by using only seabed and underground resources. The sovereignty of the sides on the surface of the water was regulated according to different principles. The boundaries of these sectors will be determined by a treaty between the states which are mutually or side by side. In this context, the provisions of UNCLOS of 1982 and the principles applicable to transboundary lakes will not apply for the Caspian Sea.

Undoubtedly, in accordance with the legal structure of the Conven-

56 Протокол По Оtsenke Vozdeystviya Na Okruzhayushchuyu Sredu V Transgranichnom Kontekste K Ramochnoy Konventsii Po Zashchite Morskoy Sredy Kaspiyskogo Morya 20 İyul 2018 <http://www.mid.ru/documents/10180/3319061/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BB+%D0%BF%D0%BE+%D0%9E%D0%92%D0%9E%D0%A1+%2820.07.2018+%D0%B3.%29.pdf/94c09d75-672a-4266-bda5-9e14b-967dfc8> Access Date:13.05.2019

57 NUTSALKHANOV ,İbid, p. 138.

58 Pravovoy status Kaspiyskogo morya . Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Respubliki Kazakhstan Ofitsial'nyy sayt <http://www.mfa.kz/ru/content-view/pravovoj-status-kaspijsko-go-morya> Access Date:13.05.2019

tion on the Status of the Caspian Sea, it is a modern legal text in line with the UN Charter, the Vienna Treaty Law of 1969 and the basic norms of international law.

According to the Convention, the Caspian Sea is divided into inland waters, territorial waters, fishery zones and common areas of parties. The territorial waters are 15 nautical miles in width and the outer border of the territorial waters has been accepted as the border of the country. In addition to territorial waters, a fishing zone with a width of 10 nautical miles has been arranged. The riparian state has the right to benefit from the biological resources of the sea within this area.

The Treaty sets out in detail the provisions for the passage of military ships, underwater vessels and other underwater vehicles of the parties through the territorial waters of another riparian state. Ships carrying the flag of one riparian state do not have the freedom to anchor in the territorial waters of another and enter the ports of the coastal state. The Convention explicitly prohibits the presence of ships not carrying the flag of the riparian states of the Caspian Sea. Prohibition of ships from non-regional states in the Caspian is important in terms of eliminating the security concerns of the parties and preventing the third states from having a say in the utilization of Caspian resources. Ships belonging to the riparian states have the right to move freely in the common area of the Caspian Sea.

The convention permits the realization of major projects such as the Trans-Caspian, which have never been seen in the Caspian. It has been regulated that underground cables and pipelines routes will be determined by agreement with the Party to which the seabed sector will pass by cable or pipeline.

So far, many treaties have been signed between the parties. These agreements must be concluded in accordance with the Convention of 2018. If the norms in the Convention are not regulated in more detail by the relevant treaties, the provisions of the Convention cannot function effectively. Previous agreements between the parties must be brought in line with the Convention of 2018.

As a result, it can be said that it is a modern legal text in line with the UN Charter, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 and the basic norms of international law in accordance with the legal structure of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea.

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Quality of Institutions and Business Environment

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Abstract

In this paper, we use a cross-sectional data of 154 countries for 2017 period to study how the quality of institutions affects the business environment. We find that quality of institutions are important predictors for business environment and countries with qualified institutions have less regulations and better business environment. Also, the relationship between institutional quality and business environment is nonlinear. In addition to that, we find that the effect of institutions on business environment changes in accordance with the level of GDP per capita across countries. The marginal effect of institutions on business environment is higher for low-income economies than high-income economies. Lastly, economic institutions and political institutions have different impact on business environment.

Key Words: Quality of institutions, Business Environment, Quality of Governance, Internet Use.

Introduction

Institutions are the one of the key determinants of economic activities. In the last decades, the literature on institutions has increased since it has gained more significance with the developing world. In their remarkable paper, Acemoglu (2005) has brought the topic to colonial times which is a very significant view in terms of understanding the institutions in a better way. According to the Acemoglu (2005), differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. However, institutions could vary across countries because countries differ from each other in terms of some factors which shapes the institutions. The factors that may affect the institutions in countries are basically geography, climate, culture, history etc.

Business environment has a notable importance that every government has to care about it a lot. Foreign investors who want to invest in any country may wish to compare the countries with respect to their business environments. The country has a better business environment is more attractive, keeping all else constant, for those who want to make an investment. In the Keynesian view, making a decision for investment is very risky because there is a high uncertainty in investment making process. Investor can't predict perfectly the change in prices, inflation... etc. A good business environment means that there is less uncertainty and business friendly regulations which improves the economic activities in the market. Hence, business environment is a significant concept that we need to study more on its explanation.

As it is mentioned above, institutions affect economic activities in many ways. In this paper, we deal with the channel in which institutions affect the economic activities via business environment. The basic question that we handle is that how institutions in a country affect the business environment of that country? Are they related with each other? Do the countries have better institutions tend to have a better business environ-

ment? Do the political and economic institution has the same impact on business environment? These are the basic questions that we would like to touch upon.

I. Literature Review

I. 1. Institutions

Institutions play a crucial role in economic activities. There is a plenty of research that employs institutions in order to explain macroeconomic indicator for many years. We here touch upon the previous well-known studies about institutions.

Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Institutions provide the incentive structure of an economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change towards growth, stagnation, or decline. (North, 1991)

In the traditional well-known growth model differences in income per capita is explained different paths of factor accumulation, saving rates and preferences. In these models, differences in income and growth was not explained by variation in institutions. Differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development. (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005)

The literature on the relationship between institutional quality and economic growth suggests that better institutions tend to be associated with better long-term growth and are an important indicator of overall economic well-being (Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Djankov, McLiesh, and Ramalho 2006) (as cited in Bailey & Thomas, 2015).

The analysis suggests that economic institutions tend to be better in countries that are more open to trade and financial flows and do not have significant natural resource endowments. While natural resources may enable countries to improve government effectiveness, regulatory quality and other measures of institutional capacity that tend to improve as income grows, deeper economic institutions such as rule of law and control of corruption tend to be weaker in resource-rich countries. History and

geography also play an important role in shaping a country's economic institutions. (Lehne, Mo, & Plekhanov, 2014)

We draw on existing notions of governance, and seek to navigate between overly broad and narrow definitions, to define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011)

I.2. Business Environment

Business environment or business climate of a country demonstrates the positive and negative points that will be encountered when entrepreneur wishes to conduct a business activity in that country. It has great importance in the literature and has influence on economic activities through many channels which we refer to in this part.

There are many indicators in order to measure the business environment of a country. These indicators are such as the Doing Business Reports of the World Bank, the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum and the Economic Freedom Index of the Heritage and Foundation. These three indicators are used in the literature so as to measure the quality of business environment. The Doing Business Reports of the World Bank is used in this paper among the three of them.

M. Escaleras and Eric P. Chiang (2017) analyze data on 78 countries for the periods 2004-2012 and regressed business environment on decentralization, GDP and the quality of institutions by having main focus on decentralization. Their results show that fiscal decentralization improves the business environment and the effect is strongest among lower income countries. (Escaleras & Chiang, 2017)

Djankov et al. (2002) presents data on the business regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time and official costs that start-up must bear before it can operate legally. Countries with heavier regulation of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. He finds that the countries with more open access to political power, greater constraints on the executive,

and greater political rights have less burdensome regulation of entry – even controlling for per capita income – than do the countries with less representative, less limited, and less free governments. (Djankov, Porta, De-Slanes, & Shleifer, 2002)

In the literature, doing business data has been used by many researchers as business regulations as well. Klapper and Love (2001) performed a research about the impact of business regulations on new firm registration. They found that the costs, days and procedures required for starting a business are important predictors of new firm registration. However, we find that small reforms, in general less than a 40 percent reduction in costs, days, or procedures, do not have a significant effect on new firm creation. We also find important synergies in multiple reforms of two or more business environment indicators. Finally, we show that countries with relatively weaker business environments require relatively larger reforms in order to impact new firm growth. (Klapper & Love, 2011)

The impact of the internet on the business environment is also important. Elena (2014) conducted a research with descriptive statistics and graphs, she claims that electronic businesses are not only a trend, they represent a revolutionary approach of the “making business” concept. There are changes in how information is used, in contacting the customers, suppliers and employees, in marketing, promotion mode, and so on. (Apavaloaie, 2014)

II. Data and Method

In order to test empirically the relationship between the business environment and quality of institutions, we use the data on 154 countries for the period 2017 and estimate the following models :

$$Business_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Ins_i + \beta_2 Int_i + \mu_i$$

$$Business_i = \alpha + B_1 Ins_i + \beta_2 Int_i + B_3 Ins_i^2 + \mu_i$$

$$Business_i = \alpha + B_1 Ins_i + \beta_2 Int_i + B_3 Ins_i GDP_i + \mu_i$$

Business shows the business environment, Ins measures the quality of institutions, GDP measures the log value of GDP per capita and Int measures the number of individuals using the Internet (% of population).

In the following part of this section, the variables we have exploited in our is explained and empirical result is demonstrated.

II. 1. Measures of Quality of Institutions

In the literature there are many indicators in order to measure the quality of institutions. Among the available indicators, we choose the very famous one which is the worldwide governance indicators (WGI). The WGI project consists of six dimensions of governance and it is published since 1996. The source data underlying the WGI come from a large number of individual sources, and reflect the views on governance of thousands of survey respondents and public, private, and NGO sector experts worldwide. The underlying source data capturing this wide diversity of views and experiences is available together with the six aggregate WGI measures at <www.govindicators.org>. (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011)

The six dimensions of the WGI indicators are the following;

1. Voice and Accountability (VA) – Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.

2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV) – Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.

3. Government Effectiveness (GE) – Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.

4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) – Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

5. Rule of Law (RL) – Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.

6. Control of Corruption (CC) – Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011)

The six indicators are divided into two parts in accordance with the area they are related to. The first part consists of voice and accountability (VA), political stability and absence of violation/terrorism (PS) that demonstrates the quality of political institutions. Hence, the first two variables afore-mentioned measure the quality of political institutions. The second part representing the economic institutions are government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL) and control of corruption (CC). Therefore, the last four indicators are used in order to measure the quality of institution in this paper.

The data is published annually and with the help of this data we can compare the quality of institution of one country in years or we can compare some group of countries at a point of time. We give the very basics of WGI data in order to interpret the what we find in our results. The governance indicators range from -2,5 to 2,5. The greater the indicator is the better the quality of institution is.

II. 2. Measures of Business Environment

Firstly, it is necessary to explain what we mean by business environment. It consists of some factors which an entrepreneur encounter and must fulfill these factors as duty during and after the setup of company. The factors related to employees, customers, some business regulations etc. In the literature, there are many indicators in order to measure the business environment and among the indicators we exploit the World Bank’s Doing Business Dataset. We now explain the basic information about Doing Business Dataset.

In the Doing Business project, one city is selected as representative for a country or regions and the small and medium size companies are observed in order to generate the data. By doing so, they gather the quantitative data in order to measure the country’s business environment in quantitative terms. By using the gathered data, they publish the annually the Doing Business Report which covers the rank of countries with respect to their business environments and new regulations or reforms. They also refer to the improvements in the reports. The first doing business report

is published in 2003 for 133 economies and 5 indicators. In 2019, it is published with 11 indicators for 190 countries.

The Doing Business reports presents the aggregate measures from two different ways. They publish annually the ease of doing business score and the ease of doing business ranking that also based on the ease of doing business score. The ease of doing business rank helps us compare the countries with each other in a given year. However, ease of doing business score provides more detailed information because it helps us compare the country across years and how much the business environment has changed relatively to other economies.

The 11 indicators in order to measure the business environment:

(1) Starting a business, (2) dealing with construction permits, (3) getting electricity, (4) registering property, (5) getting credit, (6) protecting minority investors, (7) paying taxes, (8) trading across borders, (9) enforcing contracts, (10) resolving insolvency, (11) labor market regulations. The data for labor market regulation is new and it has not been taken into account in 2019's ranking on ease of doing business. (Doing Business Report, 2019).

The ease of doing business score (EDBS) consists of the average of above indicators and ranges from 0 to 100. The ease of doing business score represents a better business environment in terms of the mentioned factors above. The table in the appendix depicts what is being measured in ease of doing business score.

II.3. Empirical Results

In this part, we present the regression results and clarify the variables for table 1 and table 2 here. For table 1, the institutional variables represent the quality of economic institutions. EDBS is the ease of doing business score which is the dependent variable we try to explain. InternetUse is the control variable and shows the number of individuals using the Internet (% of population). Government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ) and rule of law (RL) are the variables for institutional quality. GDP is the log value of GDP per capita. In table 2, institution variables are voice and accountability (VA), political stability and absence of violation/terrorism (PS) and they represent the quality of political institutions.

In table 1, column (1) to (9) shows the OLS regression results with the cross-sectional data for 2017 for 154 countries. In the first table, we regress business environment on three different variables for quality of econom-

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ic institutions controlling for the internetuse variable. Our results show that all of the institutional variables are statistically significant. Therefore, it verifies that quality of institutions enhances the business environment. Moreover, all of the square of institutional quality variables is statistically significant and negative. The negative sign of the square variables in the model depicts that the relationship between quality of institutions and business environment is a nonlinear and convex. It means that the marginal effect of institutional quality variable on business environment is higher for the countries which performs very poorly in terms of institutional quality. Thereafter, the interaction terms in the model is negative and statistically significant. The negative sign means that the impact of institutional quality on business environment changes with respect to the GDP per capita level of countries. In other words, the marginal effect is obviously less for developed or high-income level countries than undeveloped or low-income countries.

Table 1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
VARIABLES	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS
GE	9.925*** (0.958)	10.55*** (0.975)	16.80*** (3.562)						
Internet Use	0.0689** (0.0327)	0.0574* (0.0325)	0.0538 (0.0333)	0.0782*** (0.0280)	0.0738*** (0.0270)	0.0571** (0.0274)	0.163*** (0.0297)	0.167*** (0.0294)	0.159*** (0.0297)
GE2		-1.186** (0.478)							
GDP_GE			-0.726** (0.363)						
RQ				10.12*** (0.828)	11.03*** (0.833)	22.87*** (3.435)			
RQ2					-1.690*** (0.461)				
GDP_RQE						-1.338*** (0.351)			
RL							7.279*** (0.865)	7.534*** (0.860)	13.21*** (3.571)

RL2								-1.181**	
								(0.517)	
GDP_RL									-0.646*
									(0.378)
Constant	58.01***	59.70***	59.69***	57.16***	58.88***	59.79***	53.03***	53.91***	54.02***
	(1.823)	(1.919)	(1.991)	(1.548)	(1.560)	(1.635)	(1.687)	(1.708)	(1.774)
Observations	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154	154
R-squared	0.749	0.759	0.755	0.784	0.802	0.803	0.708	0.717	0.713

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS	EDBS
VA	7.907***	8.242***	6.565			
	(0.897)	(0.897)	(5.664)			
VA2		2.168**				
		(0.943)				
GDP_VA			0.151			
			(0.630)			
PS				3.844***	3.387***	2.043
				(0.809)	(0.968)	(3.900)
Internet Use				0.283***	0.287***	0.283***
				(0.0265)	(0.0269)	(0.0266)
PS2					-0.500	
					(0.580)	
GDP_PS						0.222
						(0.470)
Constant	61.23***	59.33***	61.10***	46.63***	46.79***	46.49***
	(0.839)	(1.168)	(0.992)	(1.552)	(1.565)	(1.585)
Observations	154	154	154	154	154	154
R-squared	0.338	0.361	0.338	0.626	0.628	0.627

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 *

In table 2, we regress business environment on institution variables representing the political institutions. All institution variables in table 2 are statistically significant except column (3) and column (6). We also exclude the variable InternetUse in first three regressions because the variable VA and InternetUse causes to multicollinearity problem since they are highly correlated and provide the same information. Although both of the political institutional variables explains the business environment, PS is better at explaining the business environment than VA.

Conclusions

Our findings affirm that there is a positive relationship between quality of institutions and business environment. The countries with qualified institutions have better business environment in terms of operating a new business. Also, the relationship between institutions and business environment is non-linear as we have obviously seen in the table 1 and table 2. Also, InternetUse is also positively related to the business environment. Moreover, the negative sign of the interaction term in the model demonstrates that the effect of institutional quality on business environment changes with respect to the development level of country. In other words, the marginal effect of institutions on business environment is lower for high-income economies and higher for low-income economies. Lastly, when we compare the table 1 and table 2, the variables which represents the economic institutions explains the business environment better than political institutions.

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Name of DB Indicators	What is measured

Appendix

1.) Starting a Business	Procedures (Numbers), Time (days), Cost (% of income per capita), Min. Capital (% of income per capita)
2.) Dealing with Construction Permit	Procedures (numbers), Time(days) Cost (percentage of income per capita)
3.) Registering Property	Procedures (numbers), Time (days) Cost (percentage of property value)
4.) Getting Credit	Strength of legal rights index (0-10), Depth of credit information index (0-6), Public registry coverage (% of adults), Private bureau coverage (% of adults)
5.) Protecting Investors	Extent of disclosure index (0-10), Extent of director liability index (0-10), Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10), Strength of investor protection index (0-10)
6.) Getting Electricity	Time, Procedures, Cost Reliability of Supply and Transparency of Tariffs

7.) Paying Taxes	Number of hours per year to prepare files, Firm tax liability as % of profits Postfiling Index, Firm tax liability as percentage of profits before all taxes borne
8.) Trading Across Borders	Time to Export, Cost to Export, Time to Import, Cost to Import
9.) Enforcing Contracts	Days to resolve a commercial dispute (time) Attorney, court and enforcement costs (cost) Quality of judicial process index
10.) Resolving Insolvency	Recovery Rate Strength of Insolvency Framework Index

Source: www.doingbusiness.com

Madrasahs in Niger

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Introduction

The Republic of Niger has the largest territory in West Africa, is rich in underground resources and governed by the republic. It is adjacent to Niger, Algeria and Libya from the north, Chad from the east, Nigeria and Benin from the south, Burkina Faso and Mali from the west. 22 million¹ is the most sparsely populated country in West Africa. Despite an area of 1.267.000 km², the population is very small. Especially in the northern deserts, no one lives, but in the south of the country the population is crowded. Almost most of the people are Muslims. The official language of the country is French, with about ten national languages being spoken. These include Hausa, Zarma, Fulfulde, Gulmancema, Kanuri, Tuareg and Arabic. In 1898, the French colonists began invading Niger territory. As a

¹ United Nations Economic and Social Works Division, <https://countrymeters.info/fr/Niger>, 29.04.2019.

result of the efforts of Europeans to get rid of this dark colonial yoke, Niger became a separate state as a French colony in 1922 and finally gained its independence in 1960.

Niger has many uranium deposits. The desert regions in the north are full of uranium mines that develop the Niger economy. In addition, it is a rich country in terms of coal, phosphate and oil.

1. The Arrival and Spread of Islam in Niger

According to historical sources, the first arrival of Islam in Africa was realized by some Companions before the emigration to Medina during the first period of Islam.

As mentioned in the Siyer books, this emigration was repeated to Abyssinia twice in the first period of Islamic history. This stage is considered the first stage of the arrival of Islam in Africa. Thus, Islam began to spread from Abyssinia to neighboring regions. Later, the evolvment(intişar) of Islam religion appointed Hz. Amr b. As as the governor of Egypt and this continued as the said governor assigned Ukbe b. Nâfi as commander to North Africa. After the conquest of the region, "Kayrevan" city was established and Islam spread rapidly in this region.

Following this, Ukbe b. Nâfi conquered the "Timbuktu" in area in Libya in Sahra-i Kebir. Later, in 46 (666), the Islamic invitation reached to Niger's "Kavar"² region.³

In *History of Islam in Niger*, Djibo Hamani⁴ confirmed this by stating "Islam reached Niger before the Arabian countries of our day was enlightened by Islam".⁵

It is said that; Havsa region in the north of Africa was named after Havsa b. Ebi Zayd and his community fleeing to this area during the foundation of Abbasid state.

2 Located in the northeast of the Republic of Niger, it still has the same name today.

3 Mahmud Şit Hattâb, *Ḳādetü fethi'l-Mağribi'l-'Arabî*, 7. bs, Daru'l fikr, Beyrut, 1386/1966, s.100. Ahmet Kavas, "Osmanlı-Tibû Münasebetleri: Büyük Sahrâda Reşâde (Çad) ve Kavar (Nijer) Kazalarının Kurulması", *İslam Araştırmaları Derneği*, V. 4, 2000, p. 87.

4 Djibo Hamani is a researcher, historian and professor in Abdou Moumouni University.

5 Djibo Hamani, *L'Islam au Soudan Central (L'Histoire de L'Islam au Niger)*, L'Harmattan, Niger, 2017, p.330.

Basin b. Ebi Zayd and his tribes opposed the establishment of the Abbasid State and were followed by the soldiers to this region.⁶ Although historian Ilori⁷ conveyed and defended such a rumour, we could not find works supporting this in other sources.

But historians stated that Islam had reached this region because of the cultural and commercial relations with Havsa region after the Kanem Kingdom, which was adjacent to the Havsa area mentioned in the time of Umar.⁸

Another opinion conveyed by historians as much stronger and more accurate is the fact that the Niger people had commercial relations with Arabs, Western Sudanese traders and other tribal traders before the appearance of Islam and that these relations continued after the emergence of Islam enabled them to get acquainted with Islam. The presence of gold, silver, salt, etc. in the region for the reasons of the subpoena of merchants and the presence of cultural and commercial centres in the northwest of Niger such as "Kavar, were the other factors that caused the settlers to settle in the region. Because of the credibility and moral treatment of these Muslim merchants, many African people became Muslims by wondering about Islam, but some merchants established religious circles because of the knowledge and the spread of religion in the region.

At the same time, religious groups played a major role in the introduction and spread of Islam to Niger. If we give an example to some of the leaders and elders of the groups who led these groups;

1. Muhammad bin Abdul-Karim al-Megili, who came to Niger from Algeria in the late fifth century, was instrumental in spreading the Kadiri Order to the surrounding areas.⁹

2. Sayyid Mahmud al-Baghdadi was coming from Turkey, in 957 (1550) met with the Sultan of Agadez, Tuaregs (tavarik) and Fülani between tribes in the region has been effective in spreading the cult of Khalwatiyya Sunbuliyya. Later, this order reached Sheikh Osman Dan Fodi-

6 Adam Abdullah Ilori, *el-İslam fi Nijerya ve şeyh Osman dan Fodiyo*, mektabatü vehaba li'l tiba'tı ven-neşr, Lagos, 2012, p. 25.

7 Adam Abdullah Ilori, a Benin-Nigerian Islamic scholar, was born in the last Sheikh Abdulbaki's family. Maliki was a scholar, and he was one of the elders of Sufism who was the author of many works in Arabic.

8 Muhammed Şâkir, *et-Tarihu'l İslam (garbi ifrikiya)*, 3.bs, el-Mektebu'l İslami, Beyrut, 1317/1997, p. 225.

9 Ahmet Kavas, "Nijer" *TDV Encyclopaedia of Islam* Istanbul, 2007, v. 33., p.107.

yo.¹⁰

The pilgrimage in this region played a major role in the spread of Islam. Namely, the Sultans of Islamic States established in the west of Africa paid attention to the fulfilment of the pilgrimage. Among the tribes, Havsa tribe is known to be the most zealous tribe in terms of pilgrimage.

Those who contributed to the introduction and spread of Islam as mentioned above can be summarized in three points.

1. Veterans, who played a role especially in the conquest of the region, have spent all their power and efforts in the publication of Islamic religion. As an example; Ukbe b. Nâfi 'al-Fahri, Moses b. Nasir, Osman dan Fodiyo, etc.

2. Muslim merchants who traded silver and gold with salt and similar products for trade purposes.

3. The Sufi leaders, who united the truth and the Sharia, were satisfied with the heart and spiritual foods that people needed at that time.

One of the most famous Sufi sects in Niger is the Kārīdī order. The founder is Sheikh Abdulkādir Geylanī.

Another is the Ticanī order, which has spread over a wide geography among African tribes.

It should be added that although Islam entered Niger at an early stage, non-religious practices and beliefs in the region were not fully abolished until Sheikh Osman Dan Fodiyo, the King of Sokoto, undertook reforms (1804-1810). This kingdom was later ruled by his son Muhammad Bello.

In recent years, Sufi orders have been subjected to some reactions. One of them is the imposition from the group called "Bid'at'ın Kaldırılması Sünnetin İkamesi" from the Wahhabis and Salafists.

II. Qu'ran Madrasahs:

The history of the Qu'ran Madrasahs in Niger State dates back to the entry of Islam into the country. As a matter of fact, veterans, announcers and merchants who participated in the conquests established religious circles as well as their own occupation. These people chose some commercial and cultural cities as their centres, few examples of those are Say, Agadez, Zinder, Ayr.¹¹

10 Hür Mahmut Yücer, "Sünbūliyye", *TDV Encyclopaedia of Islam*, İstanbul, 2010, v. 38., p. 139. Ahmet Kavas, *İbid*, p. 107.

11 Ali Yakup, "el-Luga el-Arabiya fi'l Nijer beyne'l mazı ve'l hazır ve tetallu'aati'l müstak-

Thus, in many parts of Niger, the Qu'ran Madrasahs developed and started to spread. So much so that there is no city or even a village where there is no Qu'ranMadrasah where children begin Islamic education and can memorizeQu'ran. The people of Niger have shown due diligence in this matter and those who speak the Havsa language have been sensitive in sending their children to the courses.

When the French entered the region for colonial purposes, they especially hindered the educational activities of these courses and also imposed their own language and culture on the Muslim people. In order to prevent the development of Islam, they have introduced many prohibitive laws. For example, travels for science were prohibited, travel to abroad for the purpose of pilgrimage was prevented for up to ten years and those who did so were given heavy penalized.¹²

After the independence of the Niger state against French exploitation in the twentieth century, although the colonial period was officially over, the intellectual confusion still continues on the Niger people like other colonial countries. The Qu'ranMadrasahs, on the other hand, began to gain popularity though not as much as before.

The newly established governments did not attach the necessary importance to these courses, whereupon the Niger people reacted to the establishment of formal and modern Islamic schools. As a result of this, the first official Madrasah was established in Say in the "Tillaberi" areain 1957 giving Arabic courses in addition to French courses.¹³

After 1960, the students who were educated in the course were sent to Arab countries in order to improve their education in Islamic sciences and Arabic language.

The Madrasahs continued to open in the country and in 1974 the Niger Islamic Organization was officially established for the administration of religious affairs. In 1986, the Islamic University of Niger opened, and many students are graduating each year.¹⁴

Thus, Islamic schools in Niger have developed. However, especially Bedouin people are hesitant to send their children to these new institutions, thinking that they have been subjected to colonial effects; instead

bel", *mecelletül kiraâti ifrikiya*, s. 4, 1430/2009, p. 4.

12 Ahmet Kavas, *İbid*, p. 107.

13 Yusuf Munkayla, *Ta'lim el-Lügat- el-Arabiya fi garbi ifrikiya*, p. 3.

14 Ali Yakup, *İbid*, p. 4.

they send their children to local Koran courses. These Madrasas, which have reached to the present day with their own education system, have faced many financial and moral difficulties especially in the recent period. These problems prevent the development of Madrasas.

II. I. Types of Qu'ran Madrasahs in Niger

When we look at madrasas from the eyes of the Niger people, we can say that these madrasas are divided into two different parts:

II. 1. 1. Traditional Qu'ran Schools " Wooden Schools ":

Such schools are known by various names in the Islamic world such as Ketatip in Egypt, Halve in Sudan, Madrasah in Southeast Asia, Mekerantello in Niger and Nigeria.¹⁵

Many people leave their families and countries to learn the Qu'ran and Islamic Sciences. It is a traditional way that the teachers gather the students of the region where they live and go to another village or a city in another country.¹⁶

These schools start after the harvest period, which is called the drought period. The end of the period is adjusted according to the time of rain. An agreement is reached between the teacher and the families without financial provision. Teachers control all kinds of education and security of children, moral support by providing them with moral support. Teachers in these Madrasas have high status and are respected by the public.

It is very difficult to determine the number of students since these Qu'ran Madrasahs are not official. Generally, children between the ages of 6 and 18 even youth older than 18 may participate. But today, young people rarely attend because of financial inadequacy. Students studying in schools are called "immigrants" because they left their hometown for science and emigrated to another place.

Some villages have a Qu'ran course, and when teachers come with their students, they either participate in a course in the village or continue their education in their newly opened classrooms.

In case that the course teachers have migrated with their families to

15 Al-Tâhir Muhammed Davud, "Nijeryadaki Kur'an Okulları, Kökeni, Sistem ve Gelecek Beklentileri", Kur'an-ı Kerim ve İnsan Uygarlığının İnşasında Rolü Uluslararası Sempozyum, Afrika Uluslararası Üniversitesi, Hartum, Sudan, 1433/2012, p. 22.

16 They usually prefer to go to Nijer

train students, then a place is arranged for them, and students spend the night around the school or on the streets. Due to insufficient financial facilities, the conditions of the classrooms and the places where they sleep are not very good. During the lesson, they have to sit on the seats made of straw. Lessons are generally taught anywhere, without distinction in terms of age.

Since teachers and students cannot bring their food with them, they ask for help from the people around the course to meet their food needs. In this way, they procure their food.

II.2.Operation System of Traditional Qu'ran Madrasahs:

II.2.1. Registration

The registration system for these schools is different from the registration system of other schools. The agreement between families and teachers is achieved by families stating that "I want my son to go to school with you this year".

Teachers do not receive salaries from families or anywhere else; they act by knowing that the world is not the place of reward, but the place of service.

II. 2. 2. Course Schedule:

The course days in these madrasahs are every day except Friday and Saturday. On this two-day holidays¹⁷, students do their personal cleaning and some students collect timber to sell. Teachers and older students work to make their living by cutting nails of people, tailoring hats, sewing straw and other crafts. Since classes are held every weekday, they only do this

17 Şevşevî, in the book *Fevaidu'l Cemile Ala Ayâti'l Celile*: Omar b. Khattab (r.a) is determined to do this weekly holiday and this is done while returning from the conquest of Damascus is told. Because Hz. When Omar returned to Medina, people went out to meet him. The first ones to meet him were the children because they were fast. They met him only after a day's walking. It was Thursday. Hz. Omar spent the night with them on Friday night and arrived in Medina before Friday prayers

He said to the children you are tired for coming out of Medina and entering in one day. I have made the day of comfort and rest until Friday and Saturday until the Day of Resurrection for you and the ones after you. Prayers of this circumcision should be poor, and those who make it alive should be rich. '

See, Ebu'l Hüseyin Bn Ali şevşevî, *Fevaidu'l Cemile Alâ Ayâti'l Celile*, Vakıflar ve İslami İşler Bakanlığı, Fas Krallığı, 1409/1989, p. 289.

on holidays.

First session: The session starts before sunrise and morning prayer is made during break. Then if they don't have the food left, they go outside. And, so breakfast ends at 8:00 - 8:30.

Second session: Half an hour after breakfast, everyone collects the lesson equipment; if they are in the village, they go out of the village, either go into a shed or sit under the trees. When the Qu'ran lesson starts here, no one speaks to each other other than the subject. The course continues until approximately 11:00 and then rest. At break, the students go back to the village to find something to eat, and if food is found, they all sit down to eat together.

Third session: This session starts after noon prayer and continues until sunset. Afternoon prayer is made between courses.

Fourth session: This session starts half an hour after the evening prayer and at the end of the course, dinner is eaten. At this stage, there is an application called "musaffat" in which advanced students are gathered in the ring and sit in the form of a ring, so that they can repeat the Qu'ran collectively. Upon agreement, each student reads a few verses on each request, then the other proceeds. Thus, every day almost ten fascicles of Qu'ran memorization can be repeated without being tiresome.

Fifth Session: After dinner this session extends to the first third of the night. In the same way, the practice and memorization of the Qu'ran continues under the presidency of the teachers.

There is no doubt that the efficiency of these madrasahs is much more successful and beneficial than the modern madrasah system.

II. 3. Applied Curriculum:

Many people of our day who do not know these madrasahs can think that they do not have any curriculum. But whoever sees it with a careful eye will see that they have their own curriculum and methodology that distinguishes them from other madrasah systems. First of all, it should be noted that the terms used in the curriculum are specific to the Havsa language. Terms will be expressed, and the curriculum will be explained. After reading the explanations below, it is correct to say whether these schools have a curriculum.

II. 3. 1. First stage: In this first step, the student begins to memorize

the meaning of the Qu'ran from the Fatiha surah to the Fil surah without explaining the meaning and does not engage in any other science. The aim is to try to understand the persistence and reading ability of the student.

II. 3. 2. Second stage: In this step named as "Babbaku de vusille" in which the student passes the letters to still reading and writing methods. But his teachers write the surahson the blackboard. Then they learn the harmonic form of the letters and the sound phonetic of the verses. All of these stages are based on the student's memorization.

II. 3. 3. Third stage: In this step, the student starts writing surahs on the blackboard. His teacher corrects him and teaches him the verses and does not erase the board until the student memorizes it. After that, the teacher allows the student to start on the next surah, so that the memorization continues until the time of Â'la.

After reaching this level, the teacher understands that the student can do three things:

1. Arabic letter layout
2. reading and writing
3. Memorization

Thus, the student continues to read and write on Thursday and Sunday under the supervision of the teacher until he remembers the Qur'an. This is called the first hatim.¹⁸

Then, the memorization of the whole Qu'ran begins to recite from the time of Fatiha. The students also helps those who are lower than him to help his teacher during this period. However, they write verses and prayers that will heal in the treatment of various diseases.

II. 3. 4. Fourth stage: The student writes a hizbi or a half of the same on a large wooden board based on his memorization, regardless of the pages of the Qu'ran, every day or every two days. Afterwards, they check with a friend and bring the boards with the other students like him in front of the mosque door or in the tent where the teacher sits. Following the afternoon prayer, the students take the form of a ring and their teacher sit in the middle and start the lesson. In turn, the students go to the teacher and read with him. If he makes a mistake, the teacher or the people in the ring will intervene. This ring is called "Derasu". This is the most important

18 Due to today's worth, the food (velime) is distributed. Friends and teachers of the students are invited and a ceremony is held.

ant feature of these madrasas.

II. 3. 5. Fifth stage: Now students have made serious progress in writing the Holy Qu'ran. They wrote all the time until the time of Fatiha. The teacher writes Fatiha surah. However, he corrects the Mushaf written by the student. If he succeeds, he is entitled to receive an authorization.

II. 3. 6. Sixth stage: This is the stage where Islamic sciences and linguistics are acquired. The students who memorize the Holy Qu'ran in the corridor of the teacher's house¹⁹ or sit in front of the mosque in a ring form and engage in Islamic sciences every day. Previously, this stage is for memories, but nowadays non-memory can also participate. These students take catechism lessons from another student every day or once a week. However, the number of these is quite small because the level of the traditional system in these madrasas is not suitable to participate in the stage of the inspection.

Dehliz methodology is the methodology in which books are taught gradually from the smallest to the largest. Among the most important books taught at this level are:

In General Islamic Sciences:

It starts with the books of Maliki order which is the dominant in Niger society and continues with Ahzari, Ishmael, al-Iziyah, al-Risale and hadith and interpretation books.

In Linguistics:

Firstly, Mükaddimetü'l Ecrümiye, Mulhatu'l i'rab, Katrün-nedâ and Bellüs-sedâ, Elfiyatü ibn Malik.

In Literature:

Makamati'l-Hariri, Maksûratu ibn Dureyd, Mu'allaqât es-Sab'a, Işrin-iyat, Kaside-i Bürde, Ukudul Cemal...²⁰

At the same time, the curriculum used in these madrasas corresponds to the curriculum of the Holy Qu'ran madrasahs in North Africa (Morocco), which Ibn Khaldun mentioned in his holy speech.

Indeed he has stated that "The Moroccan people were limited to

¹⁹ The purpose of being named as Dehliz stems from the fact that the lessons are held in the hallway of the teacher's house.

²⁰ Ali Yakup, *İbid*, p. 7.

teaching the Holy Qu'ran. They learn writing rules and focus on memorizing. They won't engage in any other science until Hafez becomes..."²¹

III.Problems Faced by Madrasas Today:

The Niger people, who have a long history, have a high reputation in the Qu'ran Madrasas and have achieved many successes over time. During this period, it has been able to preserve the Arabic language and Islamic culture and has achieved hundreds of scholars who are proud of the Niger community.

However, in recent years, some problems have emerged, and the main cause of these problems is poverty. These problems will be briefly discussed below.

III. 1. That the Niger State does not give equivalence to students who graduate from these madrasahs and does not allocate salaries to their teachers. This factor hampers the development of traditional madrasahs. Students cannot have any job opportunities upon graduation.

III. 2. It is that students have to beg for lack of livelihood. Unfortunately, some students are required to beg in front of houses, on roads and in places where religious and social activities are held. However, it should be noted that this problem is not only specific to Niger. This problem arises in all developed and undeveloped countries in the world.

As mentioned before, these madrasahs are not official, and their needs are not met by the charities and the state. Therefore, the opportunities of teachers and students are very limited.

III. 3. The inability of living conditions and the lack of campus and health services, therefore, students often have to engage in marginal activities. For example; servants in the homes of the rich, washing dishes in restaurants, begging... Unfortunately, this has become common in Niger society. This is an image that is not suitable for a Muslim society, especially that of the people of science.

III. 4. Poverty, drought and migration movements in the country are other reasons that indirectly prevent the growth and development of

21 Ibn Haldun, *Mukaddime*, Daru'l fikr, Beyrut, 2001, pp. 538-539.

these madrasas in Niger. Because, these madrasahs and students in other schools are forced to leave and migrate to help their families. At the same time, this migration causes many social problems such as academic failure, ignorance, drug and alcohol addiction and theft.

III. 5. Madrasah students are not given catechism lessons and therefore the information required in daily life is insufficient.

III. 6. It is the lack of knowledge of the teachers in the traditional Qur'an Madrasah about the science of seclusion. As a matter of fact, nowadays, the Holy Qu'ran education is given to the students without any isolation.

III. 7. The disdainful attitude of the people who grew up in French educational institutions about these madrasahs in the society can cause the public to see these madrasas as simple and inadequate and keep their children away.

III. 8. Previously, religious education was neglected in madrasas for women. This situation led to the spread of ignorance among the ladies. But nowadays they have the opportunity to study in cities. However, training for women in the villages has not started yet. Due to the lack of education in the social structure, it is essential to provide the necessary educational opportunities for the future of the society as soon as possible.

It should be noted that these problems vary from region to region and even from school to school in the same region. However, these problems are more or less found in the traditional Qur'an Madrasas in Niger.

IV. Modern Koran Madrasahs

IV. 1. Establishment

Modern Koran Madrasahs in Niger represent contemporary intellectual and cultural understanding reflected in Islamic sciences and Qu'ranic education. The main factor that causes this is the relationship of the Niger people with the Arab countries and their thinking.

The students who studied in the Arab countries in order to receive education were impressed by the systematic Arab madrasas during their stay and as a result they wanted to carry the learnings when they came back to Niger. As a result of intellectual consultations and support among

themselves, the first foundations of Modern Qur'an Madrasas were laid with different programs and curricula from Traditional Qur'an Madrasas.

At the beginning of the different points, the combination of male and female students with mixed education comes together. Many female students graduated from these institutions as religious teacher and Qu'ran memory. Thus, it is aimed to prevent ignorance which is common among women. As a result of this effort, special educational institutions have been opened for women in recent years.

The factors contributing to the development and prevalence of modern Qur'an Madrasahs are the help of charities and the rich. That is why many of these schools are named after an institution or an individual. This is the main reason why it is materially different from traditional madrasahs.

These madrasahs are found in many cities and towns. According to a study, there are 598 madrasahs in the city of Zinder and 90% of them have a modern school of madrasah and 10% have traditional madrasah schools.²²

The teachers who provide education in the modern madrasah system do not receive any fee from the state or any charity. The difference is that these teachers charge parents a certain amount during registration and once a week.

Another significant difference between the two institutions is that Verş Kira is preferred in the traditional way while Hafs Kira is taught in the modern way.

IV. 2. Curriculum and Program:

The classes of these madrasahs are usually held on weekdays on Wednesday nights, full days on weekends and other holidays. Because the students studying in these madrasahs also attend public schools. The times of the madrasahs are adjusted accordingly.

The method of processing courses in madrasahs will be explained in future points.

- First of all, students are divided into classes according to their level and each level has its own program.
- Similarly, the curriculum of each class is different from the others.

22 Maman Mahbubu Malan Sani, "Recompositions et dynamiques de l'enseignement arabo-islamique au Niger: le cas de Zinder" (Nijer de Arapça-İslam eğitiminin yeniden birleşimleri ve dinamikleri: Zinder örneği), *Cahier de la Recharge sur l'Education et les savoirs*, s. 05, 2017, pp. 75-99.

In general, the first course begins with the Qur'an and then continues with any of the Islamic sciences such as Fiqh, Hadith, Siyer or Arabic Language Literature.

- For the Qu'ran memorization, it is determined one or more days a week.

Almost all of these madrasahs are the same when it comes to textbooks. However, it can vary from one madrasah to another according to the teachers' wishes.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Niger society has maintained this madrasa system against all kinds of modernization, globalization and contemporary pedagogical theories. There has been no change in the curriculum system from past to present. However, in recent years, madrasahs have been declining every day due to Niger's economic situation.

As a result of the trainings I have received from the Qu'ran madrasahs in Niger, and because of my social life, morality and wisdom, I would like to express my satisfaction on behalf of myself. I think that the continuation of these madrasah education systems will be very beneficial for future generations and since the madrasahs need financial and moral support for this system to be better, we recommend that they give all kinds of support to the state, charities, charitable and even the supports to the families of the students.

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